{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/screening",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:screening",
 "name": "Screening",
 "termCode": "screening",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/screening.md",
 "sha256": "be19b2ef92c6f9591cb8cff509f8ecd5a0fdc7a257e85a72ff1dbeb80809a8d2",
 "additionalProperty": [
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   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2014",
    "2026"
   ]
  },
  {
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   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-018",
   "text": "Stage one of the FSOC's designation process is a mechanical screen: six quantitative thresholds filter out nonbank financial institutions unlikely to pose significant systemic risk before any institution specific or qualitative analysis begins.",
   "abstract": "In stage one, applying six quantitative thresholds, FSOC uses a mechanical screening process to eliminate those nonbank financial institutions from review that are unlikely to pose significant systemic risk and may not merit SIFI designation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "FSOC three stage SIFI designation process"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-010",
   "text": "The IEO reinserts an intermediary into token offerings: the exchange screens the offering and the issuer no longer interacts with investors directly, reversing the direct issuer to investor structure of the ICO.",
   "abstract": "In an IEO, the cryptocurrency exchange acts as a screening device for token offerings. In an IEO the issuer does no longer interact with investors directly.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "initial exchange offerings",
    "token offerings listed on a cryptocurrency exchange"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-020",
   "text": "In traditional underwriting, investors who cannot distinguish underwriters by reputation create free riding: once free riding occurs, underwriters stop investing in screening and try to free ride on others, producing a lemons problem.",
   "abstract": "As a result, free-riding on other's reputation may occur. Once free riding occurs, traditional underwriters will likely stop investing in their screening and instead attempt to free ride on others. This creates what is known as a lemons problem in the law and economics literature.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "traditional underwriting markets",
    "investors cannot distinguish underwriters based on reputation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6421319-020",
   "text": "Costly signaling through degrees, warranties, bonding, and credit scores becomes redundant when direct verification is instantaneous and free, and the Spencian signaling game has no moves left when every agent capability is directly and costlessly observable.",
   "abstract": "When every agent's capability is directly and costlessly observable, the signaling game has no moves to make.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "conditional on capability being directly and costlessly observable"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0f4f68e56ee48bb8b2d73d3ab7fd96fa572e76c195694ffa740360704c1b172d",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'screening'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}