# Screening

`kaal:entity:screening`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `screening`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 4 works, 2014 to 2026.

**2014**

- [2470008-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-018) [mechanism/asserted] -- Stage one of the FSOC's designation process is a mechanical screen: six quantitative thresholds filter out nonbank financial institutions unlikely to pose significant systemic risk before any institution specific or qualitative analysis begins.
  > In stage one, applying six quantitative thresholds, FSOC uses a mechanical screening process to eliminate those nonbank financial institutions from review that are unlikely to pose significant systemic risk and may not merit SIFI designation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008

**2020**

- [3606663-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-010) [design/asserted] -- The IEO reinserts an intermediary into token offerings: the exchange screens the offering and the issuer no longer interacts with investors directly, reversing the direct issuer to investor structure of the ICO.
  > In an IEO, the cryptocurrency exchange acts as a screening device for token offerings. In an IEO the issuer does no longer interact with investors directly.
  Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663

**2021**

- [3949098-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- In traditional underwriting, investors who cannot distinguish underwriters by reputation create free riding: once free riding occurs, underwriters stop investing in screening and try to free ride on others, producing a lemons problem.
  > As a result, free-riding on other's reputation may occur. Once free riding occurs, traditional underwriters will likely stop investing in their screening and instead attempt to free ride on others. This creates what is known as a lemons problem in the law and economics literature.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

**2026**

- [6421319-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-020) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Costly signaling through degrees, warranties, bonding, and credit scores becomes redundant when direct verification is instantaneous and free, and the Spencian signaling game has no moves left when every agent capability is directly and costlessly observable.
  > When every agent's capability is directly and costlessly observable, the signaling game has no moves to make.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/screening.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.