# Sec enforcement

`kaal:entity:sec-enforcement`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 12 claims that carry the concept tag `sec-enforcement`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

12 claims across 5 works, 2011 to 2020.

**2011**

- [1765901-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-001) [mechanism/argued] -- Because Morrison ties Section 10(b) to the location of the securities transaction rather than to the place where the deception originated, the logic of the holding implies that the SEC likewise has no enforcement rights over securities transactions occurring outside the United States.
  > The logic of the holding strongly suggests that there would also be no enforcement rights for the SEC with respect to securities transactions taking place outside the United States
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-025) [condition/argued] -- Section 929P(b) may not have been necessary, because Section 10(b) already gives the SEC enforcement authority whenever a single U.S. securities transaction is affected by the alleged fraud.
  > Section 929P(b) furthermore may not have been necessary. Section 10(b) al- ready gives the SEC enforcement authority whenever a single U.S. securities transaction is affected by the alleged fraud.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-026) [condition/argued] -- Foreign-cubed rulings such as Morrison determined the size of the plaintiff class in private suits, but were irrelevant to the SEC's ability to enforce wherever a U.S. securities transaction is connected to the alleged fraud.
  > Morrison and other foreign-cubed cases determined the size of the plaintiff class in private suits, an issue relevant to the compensation of plaintiffs' lawyers, but the rulings in these cases were irrelevant to whether the SEC could pursue enforcement
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-027) [normative/argued] -- Read as more than a jurisdictional grant, the Dodd-Frank provision becomes an open-ended statute rather than the targeted authority the SEC already held under Section 10(b) and Section 30, and it is undesirable for the SEC to use such powers unilaterally without consulting foreign regulators and the U.S. foreign policy establishment.
  > To the extent the provision gives the SEC additional powers, it may not be desirable that the SEC use these powers unilaterally without consulting with both foreign se- curities regulators and the United States foreign policy establishment.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Section 929P(b) risks complications where the SEC proceeds unilaterally in situations in which coordinated enforcement with foreign regulators would be more effective, for example insider trading cases involving exchanges whose home regimes do not recognize comparable insider trading rules.
  > The provision risks complications if the SEC pursues cases unilaterally when coordinated enforcement with foreign regulators would be more effective.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-029) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Expanded SEC enforcement under the Dodd-Frank provision runs a serious risk of being perceived as an encroachment on the corporate governance of foreign companies.
  > There is serious risk that such SEC enforcement actions would be perceived to encroach upon the corporate governance of foreign companies
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-030) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Overuse of the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial enforcement provision by the SEC or the DOJ could deter foreign companies from having U.S. operations.
  > Overuse of this provision by the SEC or DOJ could deter foreign companies from having U.S. operations.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901

**2013**

- [2348463-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2348463-023) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because the SEC is still working out the appropriate use of Form PF and still improving the form and its instructions, its enforcement division is unlikely to open investigations into alleged misreporting or failures to report.
  > While the SEC is still ascertaining the appropriate use of Form PF and improving Form PF and the instructions to it, it is unlikely that the SEC's enforcement division will start investigations into alleged misreporting or failures to report.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463

**2016**

- [2739479-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-015) [predictive/argued] -- Registered investment advisers should expect a more demanding regulatory environment ahead, including new or proposed regulations, more SEC enforcement actions against private fund managers, and longer and more intrusive examinations.
  > Given the trends discussed above and the SEC guidance provided in public statements, it is likely that the private fund industry will encounter new or proposed regulations; increased SEC enforcement actions against private fund managers; lengthier, more intrusive SEC examinations;
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2739479-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-023) [mechanism/argued] -- Rather than outsourcing required compliance work, the industry is on some metrics increasingly performing that work in-house, a shift consistent with the SEC's emphasis on compliance officer liability and post-2012 enforcement actions aimed at compliance departments.
  > The compar- ative data also suggest that—at least under some metrics—rather than outsourcing required compliance work, the industry is increasingly doing such work in-house.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2811718-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-040) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Despite bringing enforcement actions over misrepresentations about due diligence, the SEC has not taken a rigid enforcement position on whether particular due diligence industry practices are effective, and has merely acknowledged that practices became more robust after the financial crisis.
  > Despite a number of enforcement actions that deal with misrepresentation in relation to due diligence,46 the SEC has not taken a rigid enforcement position on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of due diligence industry practices.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718

**2020**

- [3606663-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-005) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The assumption by ICO issuers that token sales let them circumvent securities registration and disclosure requirements proved to be a fallacy for many U.S. issuers, who faced increased SEC enforcement actions in late 2019.
  > Of course, for many U.S. issuers of tokens in ICOs this presumption became in retrospective a fallacy that should haunt them in the aftermath of increased SEC enforcement actions of ICOs in late 2019.
  Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/sec-enforcement.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.