# Sec rulemaking

`kaal:entity:sec-rulemaking`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `sec-rulemaking`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

9 claims across 7 works, 2012 to 2016.

**2012**

- [2029983-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-035) [design/argued] -- The SEC, rather than the courts or Congress, is the institution positioned to implement a choice of law regime for securities transactions, through rulemaking.
  > This is where the SEC could step in to implement a choice of law regime through rulemaking.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983
- [2150377-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-008) [design/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Because Title IV's registration exemptions are broad enough to threaten the rule they qualify, the Dodd-Frank Act deliberately gives the SEC rulemaking authority to keep the exemptions from swallowing the rules.
  > The Dodd-Frank Act also empowers the SEC to utilize its rulemaking authority to prevent the exemptions from registration to "swallow the rules."100
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377

**2013**

- [2337268-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-038) [mechanism/argued] -- The SEC mandated written compliance policies and procedures for investment advisers as a reaction to mutual fund industry scandals and in an effort to curb IAA violations.
  > Reacting to several scandals in the mutual fund industry and in an effort to curb violations of the IAA, the SEC has mandated the implementation of written policies and procedures for investment advisers,106 among other compliance measures.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268

**2016**

- [2715083-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-034) [predictive/argued] -- Confluence is not one directional: the SEC may counteract some confluence drivers, for instance by curtailing derivative trading and short selling used by retail alternative mutual funds to mimic hedge funds.
  > Despite the regulatory trends and investor preference trends favoring increasing confluence of mutual and hedge funds, the SEC might counteract some of the confluence drivers.
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2715083-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-040) [predictive/argued] -- Proposed SEC Rule 18f-4 is a potential threat to the alternative mutual fund business model, because its risk based portfolio limit could undermine managers' ability to implement their investment strategies using derivatives.
  > Proposed SEC Rule 18f-461 constitutes a potential threat for the business model of the alternative mutual fund industry.
  Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083
- [2732915-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-008) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- After the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC's 2004 hedge fund adviser registration rule in Goldstein v. SEC, the overwhelming majority of private fund advisers who had registered under that rule deregistered.
  > The overwhelming majority of private fund advisers that had registered under the SEC's 2004 registration requirements deregistered after the Goldstein decision.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915
- [2732915-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-040) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The same SEC implementation and clarification of Dodd-Frank registration and reporting requirements that helps the industry comply also creates uncertainty and higher costs for it, so continuing rule development cuts both ways.
  > At the same time, there is sufficient evidence in the findings that the SEC's implementation and clarification of Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements for private funds also creates uncertainty and higher costs for the industry.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915
- [2739479-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-002) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The SEC's 2004 attempt to require hedge fund adviser registration failed: after the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule in Goldstein v. SEC, the overwhelming majority of private fund advisers that had registered under the 2004 requirements deregistered.
  > High- lighting the significant opposition of the private fund industry to the rule, the over- whelming majority of private fund advisers that had registered under the SEC's 2004 registration requirements deregistered after Goldstein.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2811729-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Proposed Rule 18f-4 would be highly limited in mitigating liquidity and other risks in an unconstrained mutual fund portfolio, because material leverage, counterparty, and liquidity risks in such a fund can arise from investments in a range of non-derivative instruments that the rule does not reach.
  > in mitigating significant liquidity or other risks in a UMF portfolio is therefore potentially (highly) limited, as material leverage, counter-party, liquidity, and other risks to a particular UMF could arise from the fund's investments in a range of non-derivative instruments,
  Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/sec-rulemaking.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.