# Secondary market

`kaal:entity:secondary-market`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `secondary-market`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2021 to 2025.

**2021**

- [3949098-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Exit by selling reputation tokens is more problematic for reputation than for other cryptocurrency tokens, because reputation is less fungible: a token's value is tied to the specific post in which the reputation was created and is subject to separate review.
  > This is more problematic for reputation than for most other cryptocurrency tokens, since reputation is less fungible because a token's value is tied to the post in which the reputation was created and subject to separate review. But in principle it could be algorithmically valued.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

**2024**

- [4685567-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Impact 1.0 impact markets fail on the demand side: they have more sellers than buyers, and many potential buyers would have funded those projects anyway, which removes the need for a secondary market and significantly reduces resale value.
  > Impact 1.0 markets typically have more sellers than buyers and many potential buyers would have done those 47 projects anyway thus removing the need for a secondary market. This imbalance of high supply and low demand significantly reduces the "resale" value
  Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567

**2025**

- [5454054-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5454054-023) [design/argued] -- LER can be engineered outside the Howey test by keeping reward units consumptive as discounts or credits, non-yielding, unmarketed for appreciation, and by disabling secondary trading.
  > LER could be engineered to fall outside of the Howey test. This is possible by avoiding a reasonable expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others. LER voucher loyalty reward units remain consumptive as discounts/credits, non-yielding, and not marketed for appreciation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5454054
- [5454054-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5454054-028) [condition/argued] -- A favorable legal assessment of LER depends on four design features holding simultaneously: non-transferability, absence of a secondary market, absence of fiat redemption, and consumptive utility.
  > Most important for a favorable legal assessment is LER non-transferability, no secondary market, no fiat redemption, and consumptive utility.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5454054

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/secondary-market.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.