# Securities litigation

`kaal:entity:securities-litigation`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `securities-litigation`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2010 to 2012.

**2010**

- [1558614-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-031) [mechanism/argued] -- The United States compensates for its lenient corporate law treatment of risk taking under the business judgment rule with a comparatively strict disclosure regime and a robust securities class action litigation regime; substantive corporate law pushes the monitoring requirement toward leniency while securities enforcement pushes it back toward stringency.
  > In sum, what the United States lacks in its lenient approach to risk taking in the application of the business judgment rule the Unit- ed States may make up for with its relatively strict disclosure regime and robust securities class action litigation regime.
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**2011**

- [1765901-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-002) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Before Morrison, U.S. courts refused to adopt a bright line rule for the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b), and the resulting case by case conduct and effects analysis was applied inconsistently.
  > U.S. courts had avoided a bright line rule for determining which cases can be litigated in U.S. courts and which cannot. As a result, U.S, courts applied the conduct and effects tests inconsistently'.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901
- [1765901-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-020) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If Section 10(b) were held to reach swap agreements based on stocks traded outside the United States, plaintiffs' attorneys would use that holding as precedent to limit Morrison broadly, and other courts might create a general exception for U.S. derivative contracts referencing non-U.S. securities.
  > If Section 10(b) is held to apply to cases involving swap agreements based on stocks traded outside the U.S., plaintiffs' attorneys would be encouraged to use such a holding in Porsche as precedent to limit the application of Morrison in a wide range of contexts.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901

**2012**

- [2029983-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-003) [definitional/asserted] -- The authors stipulate that jurisdictions which take steps only to expand the jurisdiction of their courts as venues for litigation, rather than to attract transactions, engage in Forum Competition.
  > Jurisdictions that take steps only to expand the jurisdic- tion of their courts as venues for litigation engage in "Forum Competition."
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/securities-litigation.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.