{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/self-citation",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:self-citation",
 "name": "Self citation",
 "termCode": "self-citation",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
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   "value": 2
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   "value": [
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6269518-007",
   "text": "Under the standard citation-weighted payment formulation the dominant strategy for a self-interested agent is to cite no one and maximize self-attribution, which is the precise negation of honest knowledge attribution.",
   "abstract": "The rational strategy for any self-interested agent is therefore transparent: set cx = 0 for all j ≠ i (cite no one) to maximize personal payment. Under the standard formulation, the dominant strategy is maximal self-citation, which is the precise negation of honest knowledge attribution.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "standard PageRank-derived payment formulation",
    "self-interested agents",
    "no verification or penalty layer"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6269518-033",
   "text": "The equilibrium depends on a design requirement rather than an assumption: mechanism parameters must be chosen so that the negative effect of increased self-citation on the honesty score outweighs its positive effect on the value score, at which point increasing self-citation strictly decreases utility.",
   "abstract": "the mechanism parameters (θ = 0.6, reputation coefficient = 2) are chosen such that the negative effect of increased self-citation on the honesty score outweighs the positive effect on the value score.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "validators rate citation honesty lower when self-citation is inflated"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'self-citation'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}