# Self regulation `kaal:entity:self-regulation` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 11 claims that carry the concept tag `self-regulation`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 11 claims across 10 works, 2013 to 2022. **2013** - [2273857-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-030) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- In the absence of crises the intensity of regulation diminishes, because regulators cannot commit to long-term regulatory strategies and instead fall back on private strategies such as self-regulation to overcome resource constraints. > In the absence of crises, however, the intensity of regulation diminishes because regulators are unable to commit to long-term regulatory strategies and instead use private strategies like self-regulation to overcome resource constraints. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-065](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-065) [mechanism/argued] -- The threat of heightened scrutiny under a deferred prosecution or corporate integrity agreement optimizes incentives because increased government monitoring attaches only after a first time offense, giving institutions a reason to comply and self-regulate in order to avoid it. > The threat of heightened scrutiny for institutions subject to a DPA/CIA may help optimize incentives because financial institutions would be subjected to increased monitoring by government regulators only after a first time offense had occurred. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 **2016** - [2811718-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-005) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Almost no guidance exists on the standards applicable to private fund investor due diligence, so despite the growing importance of due diligence in capital formation and in litigation the industry is left mostly to its own devices to ensure adequate standards. > Little to no guidance exists on applicable standards for IDD.18 Despite the increasing relevance of IDD in the capital formation and allocation process, and IDD litigation, the industry is mostly left to its own devices to ensure adequate due diligence standards apply. Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718 **2017** - [2998097-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Despite the rising relevance of investment due diligence and increasing due diligence litigation, the private fund industry is largely left to its own devices to ensure adequate due diligence standards. > Despite the increasing relevance of investment due diligence in the capital formation and allocation process and despite increasing litigation in the context of investment due diligence, the industry is mostly left to its own devices to ensure adequate due diligence standards apply. Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097 **2019** - [3405401-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-008) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because the smart contract removes centralized guarantors and self regulates, only limited legal recourse remains available when execution of the contract terms goes wrong. > Most importantly, the smart contract removes centralized guarantors. The smart contract self-regulates. Only limited legal recourse is available if something goes wrong in the execution of the terms of the contract. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401 - [3406323-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Smart contracts remove centralized guarantors and self-regulate, with the consequence that only limited legal recourse is available if execution of the contract terms goes wrong. > Most importantly, the smart contract removes centralized guarantors. The smart contract self-regulates. Only limited legal recourse is available if something goes wrong in the execution of the terms of the contract. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323 **2021** - [3782210-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-024) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- In hierarchical structures where members are siloed and have few formal connections across tiers, letting service providers create the regulations produces moral hazard, because the provider has an incentive to weaken standards and regulations. > In a hierarchical structure, where members are siloed and have few formal connections with those immediately above and below their tier in the hierarchy, this leads to the moral hazard problem that the service pro- vider has an incentive to weaken the standards and regulations. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 - [3782214-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-031) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Code is law smart contracts deliver a genuine leap in efficiency and clarity through digital self execution, but their supposed self regulation will always ultimately fall short, which is why an appeals capacity is necessary in any business deal. > While code-is-law smart con- tracts give a technological leap in efficiency and clarity, with efficient digital self-exe- cution, their supposed self-regulation will always be ultimately lacking. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3949098-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-033) [normative/asserted] -- The decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms provide a higher form of decentralized governance than most legal standards in any given jurisdiction. > (Calcaterra & Kaal et al (2019)) provide a higher form of decentralized governance than most legal standards in a given jurisdiction. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 **2022** - [4015908-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-040) [predictive/argued] -- Through fair launch evolution and continuous practice improvements, the fair launch industry and the underlying digital asset businesses can become the foundation of the emerging decentralized digital asset economy. > Through fair launch evolution and continuous practice improvements, the fair launch industry and underlying digital asset businesses can become the foundation of the emerging decentralized digital asset economy. Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908 - [4033886-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-028) [design/argued] -- One design remedy for thin trading volume is supervision of digital asset exchanges by a federal governing authority or a self regulatory organization to assure compliance with existing laws. > To increase the trading volume, one solution may be to have a federal governing authority or a self-regulatory organization monitor the exchange to assure compliance with existing laws. Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/self-regulation.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.