{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/self-reporting",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:self-reporting",
 "name": "Self reporting",
 "termCode": "self-reporting",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/self-reporting.md",
 "sha256": "cf221396c89051a38eabb5688135afac62310e19d1dbe1612dcf4db3b206c122",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 6
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2013",
    "2024"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-023",
   "text": "The additional CIA requirements, and especially the self-reporting provisions, force companies to spend additional resources and at times to alter their day to day operations after signing.",
   "abstract": "All of these additional requirements, especially the self-reporting provisions, require companies to",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "companies operating under a CIA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-029",
   "text": "CIA provisions create economic incentives that affect directors' diligence, because stipulated daily noncompliance penalties stacked on top of monetary penalties under federal health laws expose companies that executed CIAs to significant financial ramifications.",
   "abstract": "Adding the stipulated penalties in CIAs to the monetary penalties under federal health laws, companies that executed CIAs face significant financial ramifications.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "companies with self-reporting obligations under a CIA",
    "exposure under the False Claims Act, Sunshine, Stark, AKS, and HIPAA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-037",
   "text": "The governance trends reported in this study apply only to corporations that actually executed an agreement, so because a disproportionately large number of corporations self correct or self report instead, the findings may capture only the tip of the iceberg.",
   "abstract": "The corporate governance trends identified in this study only pertain to corporations that have executed N/DPAs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "sample restricted to corporations that executed an N/DPA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-032",
   "text": "Governmental contracts generate multilevel feedback processes across a sequence of stages: corporate self investigation, self reporting, preemptive remedial measures, negotiation, continuing wrongdoing, and execution of the contract.",
   "abstract": "Governmental contracts facilitate multi- level feedback processes by way of corporate self-investigation, self- reporting, preemptive remedial measures, negotiation of governmental con- tracts, continuing wrongdoing, and execution of governmental contracts",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033",
   "text": "Self reporting supplies institution specific information from which the government can identify governance shortcomings in the reporting entity and draw conclusions about regulatory needs across the entity's industry.",
   "abstract": "Based on the additional institution-specific information made available through self- reporting, the government can identify institution-specific governance short- comings and draw conclusions about regulatory needs in the respective indus- tries.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "corporate wrongdoers self investigate and self report"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4796714-019",
   "text": "Mandatory AI use reporting fails as a transparency mechanism because it assumes accurate and complete disclosure, while regulated entities have incentives to underreport or misreport in order to avoid scrutiny and regulatory burdens.",
   "abstract": "However, this approach assumes that entities will accurately and fully disclose their AI applications and potential issues. There may be incentives for underreporting or misreporting to avoid scrutiny or regulatory burdens, which could undermine the effectiveness of the regulations.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to self reporting mandates such as the White House AI reporting proposals",
    "holds where disclosure is unverified"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "59fa63bae179e8f9b6b8efbdf90cee28400276512a1b04f9f579a48641305c93",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "6 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'self-reporting'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}