# Self reporting

`kaal:entity:self-reporting`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `self-reporting`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 4 works, 2013 to 2024.

**2013**

- [2317580-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-023) [empirical/evidenced] -- The additional CIA requirements, and especially the self-reporting provisions, force companies to spend additional resources and at times to alter their day to day operations after signing.
  > All of these additional requirements, especially the self-reporting provisions, require companies to
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2317580-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-029) [mechanism/argued] -- CIA provisions create economic incentives that affect directors' diligence, because stipulated daily noncompliance penalties stacked on top of monetary penalties under federal health laws expose companies that executed CIAs to significant financial ramifications.
  > Adding the stipulated penalties in CIAs to the monetary penalties under federal health laws, companies that executed CIAs face significant financial ramifications.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

**2014**

- [2486570-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The governance trends reported in this study apply only to corporations that actually executed an agreement, so because a disproportionately large number of corporations self correct or self report instead, the findings may capture only the tip of the iceberg.
  > The corporate governance trends identified in this study only pertain to corporations that have executed N/DPAs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-032) [mechanism/argued] -- Governmental contracts generate multilevel feedback processes across a sequence of stages: corporate self investigation, self reporting, preemptive remedial measures, negotiation, continuing wrongdoing, and execution of the contract.
  > Governmental contracts facilitate multi- level feedback processes by way of corporate self-investigation, self- reporting, preemptive remedial measures, negotiation of governmental con- tracts, continuing wrongdoing, and execution of governmental contracts
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033) [mechanism/argued] -- Self reporting supplies institution specific information from which the government can identify governance shortcomings in the reporting entity and draw conclusions about regulatory needs across the entity's industry.
  > Based on the additional institution-specific information made available through self- reporting, the government can identify institution-specific governance short- comings and draw conclusions about regulatory needs in the respective indus- tries.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**2024**

- [4796714-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Mandatory AI use reporting fails as a transparency mechanism because it assumes accurate and complete disclosure, while regulated entities have incentives to underreport or misreport in order to avoid scrutiny and regulatory burdens.
  > However, this approach assumes that entities will accurately and fully disclose their AI applications and potential issues. There may be incentives for underreporting or misreporting to avoid scrutiny or regulatory burdens, which could undermine the effectiveness of the regulations.
  Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/self-reporting.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.