# Settlement

`kaal:entity:settlement`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `settlement`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

10 claims across 8 works, 2014 to 2021.

**2014**

- [2486570-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-035) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If corporate wrongdoing is not in fact caused by deficient corporate governance, then the governance reform imposed through a non or deferred prosecution agreement is merely a method of settlement rather than a lasting reform effort.
  > If corporate wrongdo- ing is not the result of lacking corporate governance, it seems possible that N/DPA related governance reform is just a method of settlement rather than a lasting re- form effort.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**2017**

- [2959730-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-031) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Manual per transaction fee calculation and settlement is prone to human error, and these errors are removed through the use of blockchain technology.
  > While normally the use of this type of fee is prone to human errors that occur during manual calculation or settlement, these errors are removed through the use of blockchain technology
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730
- [2998033-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-033) [mechanism/argued] -- Per transaction fee models were previously impractical because settlement and calculation created a prohibitive amount of manual work; blockchain removes that barrier by automatically allocating the correct fee to the correct executed trade and client account without manual reconciliation.
  > It enables the fully automated allocation of the appropriate fee to the correct executed trade and associated client account without any manual reconciliation or settlement.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033

**2019**

- [3396522-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-039) [mechanism/argued] -- Near instant settlement with stable cryptocurrencies removes counterparty risk, and the resulting reduction in counterparty risk boosts consumer confidence and increases transactional certainty relative to systems like Visa that take five to seven business days to pay merchants.
  > Such speed in settlement takes away the counterparty risk and with less counterparty risk, speed of settlement with cryptocurrencies boosts consumer confidence and increases certainty for transactions.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522
- [3411110-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-001) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Existing ledger structures for securities offerings are defective: because individual firms rely on batch processing, the model generates dependencies, multi-day settlement times, distinctive operational risks, and duplicative costs.
  > ledger structures applicable to securities offerings are subject to significant shortcomings: While for individual firms, batch-processing is the norm, this model creates numerous dependencies, multi-day settlement times, unique operational risks, and duplicative costs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110
- [3411110-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Near instant settlement creates its own regulatory problem: there is no practical ability to correct trade errors when settlement is same day, whereas the T+2 or T+3 structure supplies a correction window even as its delay causes other trading violations.
  > Settlement-related issues (e.g., no practical ability to correct trade errors because of same-day / near-instant settlement versus T+3 / T+2 structure).
  Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110
- [3411110-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-035) [condition/argued] -- Using blockchain as a more efficient public offering medium will almost certainly require modifying the regulations governing the offering process, the processes for offering, settling, and administering securities, and the roles of market participants built up over decades.
  > The utilization of blockchain as a more efficient and reliable public offering medium will almost certainly require modifying many of the (i) regulations applicable to the offering process
  Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110

**2021**

- [3782205-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-032) [mechanism/asserted] -- In peer to peer systems the redundant and eternal storage of the blockchain takes the place of the central bank.
  > In P]P, the redundant and eternal storage of the blockchain takes the place of the central bank.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205
- [3808852-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-024) [mechanism/argued] -- Conflicts of interest and counterparty risks are absent on a decentralized exchange because proprietary trading intermediaries such as market makers and centralized third-party operators cannot inject themselves into a transaction.
  > Proprietary trading intermediaries, such as market makers and centralized third-party operators, cannot inject themselves in a transaction. As a result, conflicts and counterparty risks are absent in a DEX.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852
- [3936876-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3936876-034) [mechanism/asserted] -- Credit risk is low in digital asset transactions because the transactions are made instantaneously, which removes the counterparty performance window that generates credit risk in traditional custody.
  > Fortunately, this risk is low in digital asset transactions because transactions are made instantaneously.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hayley Howe, Custody of Digital Assets (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3936876

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/settlement.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.