{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/settlements",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:settlements",
 "name": "Settlements",
 "termCode": "settlements",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/settlements.md",
 "sha256": "1de50b93175bb156bef598141c5674f53fc74bb376ec921ca4f0975dbe92607a",
 "additionalProperty": [
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   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2012",
    "2025"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2029983-016",
   "text": "Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts, which in turn depresses settlement amounts and damages awards.",
   "abstract": "Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "European collective procedures that require plaintiffs to opt in"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2029983-020",
   "text": "The WCAM's requirement that a court evaluate procedural and substantive fairness and the efficiency of the settlement lets the Dutch system avoid blackmail settlements, where a defendant pays simply to escape endless proceedings and reputational loss.",
   "abstract": "The WCAM, thus, avoids black- mail settlements in which a defendant offers a payment to get out of a class action to avoid the prospect of endless proceedings",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Dutch collective settlements certified by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2029983-029",
   "text": "The WCAM's structural limits could reduce the number of successful settlements: while the largest cases such as Shell and Fortis give plaintiffs enough leverage to force large settlements, smaller cases may not be successfully settled in Dutch courts.",
   "abstract": "While the largest cases, such as Shell and Fortis, would probably still provide sufficient lev- erage for the plaintiffs to result in large settlements with de- fendants, smaller cases may not be successfully settled in Dutch courts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "smaller claims with limited settlement leverage"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5583610-029",
   "text": "Traditional golden leash arrangements pay activist-nominated directors and generate conflicts of interest, whereas LER offers non-transferable utility-only rewards that induce activists to withdraw nominations without any cash flowing to directors.",
   "abstract": "Unlike traditional golden leash arrangements, which may involve financial payments to activist-nominated directors and raise conflicts of interest,116 LER offers non-transferable, utility-only voucher rewards to encourage activists to withdraw nominations",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "settlement context with an activist investor"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'settlements'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}