{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/shareholder-accountability",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:shareholder-accountability",
 "name": "Shareholder accountability",
 "termCode": "shareholder-accountability",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/shareholder-accountability.md",
 "sha256": "e1815a9f6be834e9ab41d863aaaf7386fead63c3b43439b4c08c5e69dfa663a5",
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   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
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  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
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   "value": 2
  },
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   "value": 2
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   "value": [
    "2012",
    "2025"
   ]
  },
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  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2061166-021",
   "text": "Contingent capital supports general risk control and reduces moral hazard by holding shareholders responsible and internalizing the costs of bank failure rather than externalizing them onto taxpayers.",
   "abstract": "Contingent capital may also support general risk control in financial institutions454 and may contribute to minimizing moral hazard by holding shareholders responsible and internalizing bank failure costs.",
   "citation": "Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5583610-001",
   "text": "Traditional board defenses such as staggered boards and poison pills protect incumbent boards at the cost of value creation and reduce board accountability to shareholders, even when they succeed in defeating an activist campaign.",
   "abstract": "Staggered boards and poison pills are examples of defenses that frequently shield boards at the price of value generation and lessen accountability to shareholders.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "conventional takeover and activism defenses",
    "U.S. public companies"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'shareholder-accountability'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}