# Shareholder primacy

`kaal:entity:shareholder-primacy`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `shareholder-primacy`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2013 to 2017.

**2013**

- [2317580-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-038) [mechanism/argued] -- Governance of health care providers is distinctively complicated because directors must balance patients, physicians, taxpayers, the government, and shareholders, and substantial government involvement and liability through Medicare and Medicaid make the taxpaying public a stakeholder.
  > Substantial government involvement and liability through Medicare and Medicaid further complicates governance of health care providers because the taxpaying public is a stakeholder.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

**2017**

- [2922176-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-007) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Reforms that increase executive accountability to shareholders and increase shareholder control over executives do not solve the problem of corporate short-term focus.
  > Increasing the accountability of corporate executives to shareholders and increasing shareholder control over executives does not address the problem of short-term focus.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176
- [2922176-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-008) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Increasing shareholder control over executives can be actively counterproductive: it further incentivizes the damaging emphasis on quarterly financial reporting that reform was meant to cure.
  > In fact, it may actually have the counterproductive and unintended effect of further incentivizing a damaging emphasis on quarterly financial reporting.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176
- [2922176-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Mobilizing investors as stewards leads managers to ask the wrong questions about sustainable success: rather than pushing firms toward innovation and relevancy, such measures simply reinforce the centralized shareholder primacy view they were meant to soften.
  > In fact, mobilizing investors may actually lead managers to ask the wrong kind of questions about what needs to be done to ensure sustainable success. Rather than incentivizing a focus on innovation and relevancy, such measures merely reinforce the centralized shareholder primacy view.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/shareholder-primacy.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.