# Sifi `kaal:entity:sifi` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `sifi`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 5 works, 2011 to 2017. **2011** - [1908473-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-029) [mechanism/argued] -- Information asymmetries between market participants and a systemically important institution's management before default can be reduced if a financial weakening after conversion of contingent capital triggers a voting rights increase. > The information asymmetries between market participants and a SIFI's management before a SIFI defaults199 could be minimized if a financial weakening of the SIFI after conversion of CCS triggers a voting rights increase. Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 **2012** - [2061166-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-001) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Where bank resolution regimes are not coordinated across jurisdictions, the same systemically important financial institution can be handled in opposite ways: it might petition for reorganization under German law and emerge leaner and more competitive, while its United States operations are liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act. > it is possible that a SIFI with operations in multiple countries could petition for reorganization under German law, for instance, and emerge as a more competitive and leaner business while the same SIFI in the United States may be liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The German voluntary reorganization procedure has a structural gap: groups of financial institutions, financial holding groups and conglomerates cannot petition for protection under it, even though these are precisely the entities that qualify as systemically important and pose the highest risk to market stability on failure. > Unlike the involuntary reorganization procedure initiated by the Supervisory Authority under the German Banking Act,333 groups of financial institutions, financial holding groups, or conglomerates are not eligible to petition for protection under the voluntary reorganization procedure. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-015) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because the amendments to the German Banking Act sharply increase the supervisor's intervention powers, the prospect that any systemically important bank would voluntarily petition under the German stabilization or reorganization procedure is remote at best. > Furthermore, in context of these increased powers the likelihood that any systemically important bank may file a voluntary petition under the German stabilization or reorganization procedure seems remote at best. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2097160-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-001) [design/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Early European initiatives to put contingent convertible bonds into executive pay lack governance-improving designs; contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger should be used in executive compensation instead. > Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in executive compensation. Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 **2016** - [2715083-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-004) [mechanism/argued] -- Lifting the advertising ban for hedge fund advisers under the JOBS Act, combined with FSOC treating mutual and hedge funds alike for SIFI designation, effectively assimilated the advertising requirements applicable to the two asset classes. > Similarly, the removal of advertising restrictions for hedge fund advisers under the JOBS Act and the equal treatment of mutual and hedge funds for FSOC's SIFI designation in effect assimilated the advertising requirements of mutual and hedge funds. Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083 - [2715083-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- FSOC's SIFI designation framework does not distinguish between mutual and hedge funds, even though evidence indicates designation would have disparate effects on the two asset classes. > While evidence exists that SIFI designation could have disparate affects on mutual and hedge funds (Stevens Letter (2015), the applicable regulatory framework does not distinguish between the two asset classes.44 Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083 **2017** - [2957645-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-018) [mechanism/argued] -- The conversion feature of contingent capital securities has the potential to change the control dynamic, the distribution of power, and the dependencies within systemically important financial institutions. > The conversion feature of CCS has the potential to change the control dynamic, power, and dependencies within systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 - [2957645-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-019) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Regulators are often unable to supervise financial institutions effectively because of insufficient public funding, and contingent capital securities could help fill the void that this supervisory incapacity leaves. > Given this potential, CCSs could help fill a void left by regulators' inability to supervise financial institutions effectively, often the result of insufficient public funding. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 - [2957645-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-022) [mechanism/argued] -- The threat of dilution of stock holdings, combined with the threat of loss upon conversion, could help reduce the pressure shareholders place on management of systemically important financial institutions to take increasing risks. > The threat of dilution of stock holdings, in combination with a threat of loss due to conversion could help reduce shareholder pressure on SIFI management to take increasing risks.48 Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/sifi.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.