# Sifis

`kaal:entity:sifis`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `sifis`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

7 claims across 1 works, 2012 to 2012.

**2012**

- [1998455-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-001) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Government bailouts of systemically important financial institutions create strong incentives for those institutions to externalize the cost of their risk taking onto taxpayers.
  > Government bailouts create strong incentives to externalize the cost of SIFIs' risk taking onto taxpayers.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-003) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because governments prioritize the rescue of systemically important financial institutions over other entities, those institutions are incentivized to adopt similar risk profiles and to correlate their risks.
  > Government prioritization of SIFI bailouts could incentivize SIFIs to adopt similar risk profiles and correlate risks.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-005) [design/argued] -- Combined with other corporate governance mechanisms, contingent capital securities function as an internal, institution specific mechanism that could fill the void left by regulators' apparent inability to supervise financial institutions effectively.
  > Com- bined with other corporate governance mechanisms, CCSs, as an internal institution-specific mechanism, could help fill a void left by regulators' seeming inability to supervise financial institutions effectively.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-006) [empirical/evidenced] -- The anecdotal record of ethically questionable conduct by leaders of systemically important financial institutions is not dispositive and does not establish an underlying trend, but it does show that some of the most pervasive cases of unethical conduct involved such institutions.
  > The anecdotal evidence pertaining to ethically questionable conduct of SIFI leaders is certainly not dispositive or indicative of underlying trends. It does seem to show, however, that some of the most pervasive cases of unethical conduct did involve SI- FIs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Regular corporate governance controls may not work in systemically important financial institutions, because those institutions are considered too big to fail and their leaders, anticipating a bailout commitment, are incentivized to shift their risk preferences upwards.
  > the regular corporate governance controls may not work in SIFIs. SIFIs are often considered too big to fail and may be bailed out. If that is the case, SIFI leaders may anticipate a bail-out com- mitment and may be incentivized to shift their risk preferences upwards.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Switching to contingent capital financing could reinforce rather than dampen risk incentives, and these distorted risk incentives are a drawback of contingent capital issuances.
  > In effect, switching to CCS financing could reinforce risk in- centives and these distorted risk incentives could create draw- backs for CCS issuances.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-021) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Where institutions hold each other's contingent capital and share similar risk profiles, they will be hesitant after conversion to vote for necessary organizational changes at a competitor or otherwise exercise their voting rights, because they are similarly exposed and may face reciprocal voting power.
  > With sim- ilar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities, SIFIs could be hesitant to vote for necessary organizational changes or otherwise exercise their voting rights on a competitor after conversion of CCS into equity.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/sifis.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.