# Social welfare

`kaal:entity:social-welfare`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `social-welfare`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 2 works, 2012 to 2020.

**2012**

- [1998455-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-028) [definitional/argued] -- Contingent capital securities approximate the characteristics of a quasi-public good: just as ships cannot readily be excluded from a lighthouse, systemically important institutions benefit from the issuance of contingent capital by other such institutions whenever the design minimizes systemic risk and contagion.
  > CCS could have the potential to approximate quasi-public good characteristics. Similar to the difficulty of excluding ships from using the services of a lighthouse,219 SIFIs may benefit from the issuance of CCS by other SIFIs if the CCS design min- imizes systemic risk and contagion.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The social welfare maximization potential of contingent capital securities is lower if their design features are left entirely to private ordering, because private parties do not necessarily structure those features with a view toward the common good, the avoidance of future bailouts, or the limitation of systemic risk and contagion.
  > The social welfare maximization potential of CCS could be lower if the design features are entirely left to private ordering.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**2020**

- [3709041-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-001) [mechanism/argued] -- Centralized coordination of behavior for the common good risks undermining individual effort, whereas blockchain technology's autonomous and anonymous decentralized coordination of individual action can deliver common good outcomes without suppressing individualism and its welfare enhancing effects.
  > While centralized common good coordination of human behavior risks undermining individual effort, blockchain technology's autonomous and anonymous decentralized network coordination of individual human action can help overcome the threat to individualism and its welfare enhancing effects.
  Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/social-welfare.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.