{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/special-interests",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:special-interests",
 "name": "Special interests",
 "termCode": "special-interests",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
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 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
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   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
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   "value": 4
  },
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   "value": [
    "2013",
    "2014"
   ]
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-037",
   "text": "A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors in the competition to shape rules.",
   "abstract": "A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking. In the competition to shape rulemaking, smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors) (Olson 1965).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-038",
   "text": "During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, temporarily overcoming the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups so as to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process (Ostrom 1990).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "during and after crises"
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008",
   "text": "Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are generally not enacted at the moment appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.",
   "abstract": "Because rulemak- ing is subject to regulatory cycles22 and a classic collective action problem23, rules are generally not enacted when appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017",
   "text": "The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized special interest groups and latent groups, because inadaptable outcomes raise the stakes for both.",
   "abstract": "The inadaptability of rules and the stable and presumptively optimal rulemak- ing in the current regulatory framework may intensify the competition be- tween the two groups because it increases the stakes for both interest groups.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "rules are assumed to be stable and not easily adaptable"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'special-interests'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}