# Special interests

`kaal:entity:special-interests`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `special-interests`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2013 to 2014.

**2013**

- [2267560-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-037) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors in the competition to shape rules.
  > A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking. In the competition to shape rulemaking, smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors) (Olson 1965).
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-038) [mechanism/evidenced] -- During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, temporarily overcoming the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.
  > During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups so as to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process (Ostrom 1990).
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**2014**

- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are generally not enacted at the moment appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.
  > Because rulemak- ing is subject to regulatory cycles22 and a classic collective action problem23, rules are generally not enacted when appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017) [mechanism/argued] -- The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized special interest groups and latent groups, because inadaptable outcomes raise the stakes for both.
  > The inadaptability of rules and the stable and presumptively optimal rulemak- ing in the current regulatory framework may intensify the competition be- tween the two groups because it increases the stakes for both interest groups.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/special-interests.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.