# Stable rules

`kaal:entity:stable-rules`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 29 claims that carry the concept tag `stable-rules`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

29 claims across 9 works, 2013 to 2024.

**2013**

- [2267560-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-025) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information.
  > Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, de-centralized, and institution-specific information.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2273857-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-008) [empirical/argued] -- Congress, financial regulators, and the financial regulation literature rely almost exclusively on rules presumed to be stable and optimal, which is the common denominator of regulatory responses to crises.
  > Congress, financial regulators, and the literature on financial regulation rely almost exclusively on "stable" and presumptively "optimal" rules.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A regulatory framework that relies exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules cannot adequately address future challenges, and the amendments, revisions, and retractions such a framework generates create substantial transaction costs and uncertainty.
  > A regulatory framework that relies exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules may not be able to adequately address future challenges. Amendments, revisions, and retractions of existing rules create substantial transaction costs and uncertainty.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-043](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-043) [definitional/asserted] -- Dynamic regulation is the antithesis of static, stable, and presumptively optimal regulation, and it is intended to counterbalance the effects of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than replace them.
  > Dynamic regulation may be seen as the antithesis of static, stable, and presumptively "optimal" regulation and it may help counterbalance the effects of stable and presumptively optimal rules.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-002) [design/argued] -- Stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, so contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance are a promising supplement for improving the duty of oversight.
  > After outlining why stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, the author provides some initial thoughts on how contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversight.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025) [definitional/asserted] -- The common denominator between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and other reform proposals is a top down regulatory approach of direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.
  > a noteworthy common denominator between SOX and Dodd-Frank and other reform proposals is the use of a top down regulatory approach, i.e. direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Governance adjustments made through stable rules in reaction to a systemic shock can result in suboptimal governance outcomes, market volatility, and economic loss.
  > Governance adjustments via stable rules in reaction to a systemic shock can result in suboptimal governance outcomes, market volatility, and economic loss.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-029) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The economic conditions and the corresponding requirements for optimal and stable rules are constantly evolving, so rules fixed at one moment lose their fit over time.
  > However, the economic conditions and the corresponding requirements for optimal and stable rules are constantly evolving.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-031) [design/argued] -- The shortcomings of stable rules, especially the perpetual need for rule enactment and revision, justify a supplemental dynamic approach to regulating the financial industry that enhances and extends the established regulatory framework rather than replacing it.
  > The shortcomings of stable rules, especially the perpetual need for rule enactment and revision, could justify a supplemental dynamic approach to regulating the financial industry.43 Dynamic regulation would not replace the established regulatory framework but could enhance and extend it.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-034) [design/asserted] -- Dynamic Regulation may enable regulators to anticipate future changes and challenges and to adapt stable rules accordingly.
  > 4.) Dynamic Regulation may enable regulators to anticipate future changes and challenges and adapt stable rules accordingly.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-035) [design/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Using court decisions and stable rules to make the oversight role more robust could be insufficient, whereas contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversight.
  > Using court decisions and stable rules to make "the oversight role more robust to ensure that directors pay greater attention to their monitoring responsibilities" 49 could be insufficient. By contrast, contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversight.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**2014**

- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The shortcomings of the existing rulemaking framework cannot be adequately addressed from within that framework, because its structure rests on the assumption that rules ought to be stable and presumptively optimal.
  > They are unlikely to be adequately addressed within the existing institutional infrastructure be- cause the structure of the existing regulatory framework is based on the as- sumption that rules ought to be stable and presumptively optimal to address a given regulatory problem.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**2016**

- [2740477-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-017) [definitional/asserted] -- The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, agencies, self regulatory bodies, and the regulation literature itself, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.
  > The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, regulatory agencies, self- regulatory bodies, and the literature on regulation, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.84
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-018) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If rulemakers cannot adequately protect their constituents through stable and presumptively optimal rules, then regulatory supplements that facilitate anticipatory rulemaking are justified.
  > making it increasingly less likely that rulemakers will be able to effectively protect the public via stable and presumptively optimal rules. If rulemakers cannot adequately protect their constituents, regulatory supplements facilitating anticipatory rulemaking may be justified.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-024) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Accepting suboptimal rules temporarily buys rule certainty and predictability but guarantees a later cycle of revision, amendment, and repeal, so rulemakers trade short term certainty for a costly correction process.
  > Temporary acceptance of suboptimal rules increases temporary rule certainty and predictability, but it also precipitates the inevitable need for rule revision, amendments, and repeals
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The current process of rule revisions, amendments, and repeals used to fix the inevitable shortcomings of stable rules is costly, time consuming, and in the authors' estimation cannot keep track of future innovations and the regulatory needs they create.
  > The current process of rule revisions, amendments, and repeals to address inevitable shortcomings of stable rules is costly, time-consuming, and cannot in our estimation keep track of future innovations and corresponding regulatory needs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-027) [mechanism/argued] -- The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial and error rulemaking, and regulatory cycles all derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than from independent causes.
  > The collective action problem of rulemaking, problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-032) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The existing framework for optimal rules is self reinforcing: it perpetuates rulemaking processes that produce more optimal rules requiring costly revision, updating, and revocation, so suboptimal rules and suboptimal processes reproduce each other.
  > The existing regulatory framework for optimal rules reinforces rulemaking processes that perpetuate optimal rules, necessitating costly rule revision, updating, and revocation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2808132-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-002) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Ex post facts-based, trial-and-error rulemaking combined with stable and presumptively optimal rules often produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes, and those outcomes are no longer sustainable in an environment of exponential disruptive innovation.
  > of these. The ex-post facts-based and trial-and-error-rulemaking with stable and presumptively optimal rules7 in the existing regulatory framework8 often produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes that are no longer sustainable in an environment of
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-016) [condition/argued] -- The ex post facts-based approach to rulemaking worked historically because the optimal requirements for rules only become clear once stable and presumptively optimal rules have already emerged as suboptimal; the availability of that information is therefore a prerequisite for rulemaking.
  > change. The ex-post facts-based approach to rulemaking has functioned in the existing regulatory framework because optimal requirements for rules do become clear when stable and presumptively optimal rules emerge as suboptimal. A prerequisite for
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-018) [definitional/asserted] -- Stable and presumptively optimal rules are created to address regulatory issues that lawmakers perceive through centralized information under then-existing economic and market conditions, and are drafted as permanent solutions to those perceived issues.
  > presumptively optimal rules.76 Such stable and presumptively optimal rules are created to address perceived regulatory issues identified by lawmakers through centralized information in the then-existing economic and market conditions. Stable and
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-019) [condition/argued] -- Because rulemakers are increasingly unlikely to be able to protect the public through stable and presumptively optimal rules alone, regulatory supplements that enable anticipatory rulemaking become justified.
  > rulemakers will be able to effectively protect the public via stable and presumptively optimal rules. If rulemakers cannot adequately protect their constituents, regulatory supplements facilitating anticipatory rulemaking may be justified.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-026) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Despite their insufficient anticipatory capabilities and known downsides, stable and presumptively optimal rules remain the uniform response to perceived regulatory issues.
  > amendments, and repeals to address such shortcomings. Despite its insufficient anticipatory capabilities and all the downsides that are associated with it, stable and presumptively optimal rules remain the uniform response to perceived regulatory issues.94
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2808132-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-028) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules themselves, not from unrelated institutional defects.
  > problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules.108 Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the use of institution-specific,
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2831040-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-008) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Rulemakers rely almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules meant to be permanent solutions, and that reliance ignores the ever changing rule environment driven by exponential growth in technology and innovation.
  > created to attain permanent solutions for perceived regulatory issues (Kaal 2014b) ignores the ever-changing environment for rules driven by the exponential growth of technology and the associated exponential growth of innovation
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- An existing regulatory infrastructure built on stable and presumptively optimal rules is largely incapable of addressing the ever increasing unknown future contingencies associated with disruptive innovation.
  > the existing regulatory infrastructure with stable and presumptively optimal rules is largely incapable of addressing the ever-increasing unknown future contingencies associated with disruptive innovation
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040
- [2831040-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-036) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Rules operate as a feedback effect on the rulemaking process itself: rules with suboptimal characteristics result from institutional arrangements and then reinforce those suboptimal arrangements, and stable presumptively optimal rules reinforce an institutional structure that perpetuates stability in rules.
  > Existing rules create a feedback effect for the rulemaking process itself. Rules with suboptimal characteristics are the results of institutional arrangements and reinforce suboptimal institutional arrangements and rulemaking processes.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

**2017**

- [2957645-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-004) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The existing regulatory infrastructure, resting on stable and presumptively optimal rules, is largely incapable of addressing the unknown future contingencies associated with disruptive innovation.
  > Finally, the existing regulatory infrastructure, with stable and presumptively optimal rules, is largely incapable of addressing the unknown future contingencies associated with disruptive innovation.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645

**2024**

- [4796714-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Strict legacy regulation built on stable and presumptively optimal rules and enforced at the AI development stage can inadvertently stifle innovation by imposing rigid constraints before a model is fully developed or deployed.
  > Strict legacy type regulations with stable and presumptively optimal rules83 enforced at the development stage of AI might inadvertently stifle innovation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/stable-rules.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.