{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/stakeholder-governance",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:stakeholder-governance",
 "name": "Stakeholder governance",
 "termCode": "stakeholder-governance",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/stakeholder-governance.md",
 "sha256": "e5293f6f4296d291275a95b4a56cd5882c77284fdaf7e17170363c1bb5e6d209",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2010",
    "2026"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-019",
   "text": "Because the Aufsichtsrat owes its duty of loyalty to the firm rather than to shareholders alone, and because non shareholder constituencies such as employees and creditors are more risk averse than diversified shareholders, German supervisory boards may take a more conservative attitude toward risk than U.S. shareholder oriented boards.",
   "abstract": "The Aufsichtsrat's legal duty of loyalty to the firm as distinct from its shareholders thus may dictate a more conservative attitude toward risk than that of a shareholder oriented board of di- rectors in the United States.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "German courts treat the duty as protecting the interests of the firm, not only shareholders",
    "reinforced by codetermination"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6244278-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6244278-023",
   "text": "High-reputation agents that govern protocol evolution act as stewards not because they were programmed to be, but because the institutional architecture makes stewardship the rational strategy for agents with deep accumulated stake.",
   "abstract": "They are stewards: not because they were programmed to be, but because the institutional architecture makes stewardship the rational strategy for agents with deep accumulated stake.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI's Mother's Instinct Engineered Consequence Emergent Ethics and the Institutional Trajectory Toward Agentic Alignment (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6244278",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "requires recursive governance by the same reputation-weighted consensus that governs task validation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "53533cdcc081184e7a376516ad4fece0a64ce49f6c8931b6a2c2e98ed914a84b",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'stakeholder-governance'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}