# Stewardship codes

`kaal:entity:stewardship-codes`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `stewardship-codes`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 1 works, 2017 to 2017.

**2017**

- [2922176-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-012) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Corporate governance initiatives designed to encourage long-term thinking rarely work as policymakers expect them to.
  > Corporate governance initiatives that encourage long-term thinking rarely work as expected by policymakers.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176
- [2922176-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Mobilizing investors as stewards leads managers to ask the wrong questions about sustainable success: rather than pushing firms toward innovation and relevancy, such measures simply reinforce the centralized shareholder primacy view they were meant to soften.
  > In fact, mobilizing investors may actually lead managers to ask the wrong kind of questions about what needs to be done to ensure sustainable success. Rather than incentivizing a focus on innovation and relevancy, such measures merely reinforce the centralized shareholder primacy view.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176
- [2922176-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Stewardship pressures push companies toward an unhealthy focus on short-term dividends and share buybacks designed to please the stock market, the opposite of the long-term orientation the codes intend.
  > Indeed, stewardship pressures often expose companies to an unhealthy focus on short-term dividends and share buybacks designed to please the stock market.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/stewardship-codes.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.