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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/strategic-behavior",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:strategic-behavior",
 "name": "Strategic behavior",
 "termCode": "strategic-behavior",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-040",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-040",
   "text": "Strategic maneuvering by creditors before a bankruptcy filing or during plan negotiations could distort the incentive structure the sequential trigger proposal depends on.",
   "abstract": "Strategic maneuvering of creditors prior to filing for bankruptcy protection or during the negotiations leading up to plan confirmation could distort the herein-proposed incentives for constituents.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Strategic behavior can arise equally at the conversion stage and at the voting rights increase"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-004",
   "text": "Strategic behavior by fund advisers around the assets under management registration threshold produces a strong increase in the measured discontinuity at that threshold.",
   "abstract": "Strategic actions by fund advisers lead to a strong increase in the discontinuity around the AUM registration threshold.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers whose AUM floats above and below $150 million",
    "months May through August 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-014",
   "text": "Most of the 87 strategic funds keep their AUM very close to the $150 million disclosure threshold, oscillating around it rather than moving decisively above or below it.",
   "abstract": "We notice that only few hedge funds sensibly decrease or increase their AUM under or above the threshold and then keep such position. Most funds in the sample have AUM very close to the threshold, with oscillations around it.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "strategic subsample of 87 funds",
    "January to October 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-015",
   "text": "The largest number of strategic funds moving their AUM below $150 million occurs in the April to May 2012 window, which suggests a lagged response to the March 30, 2012 registration effective date.",
   "abstract": "The largest positive spike, which corresponds to the largest number of funds that decreased their AUM below $150 million is in the period April-May 2012, possibly suggesting some lagged effect of the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "strategic subsample",
    "period April to May 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-029",
   "text": "The Dodd-Frank Act registration threshold creates incentives strong enough that some advisers opt out of registration and disclosure by strategically changing their AUM size to stay below $150 million.",
   "abstract": "It is possible that the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act introduces incentives that are powerful enough to cause some hedge fund advisers to opt out of Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure through a strategic change of AUM size.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers with AUM floating around the $150 million threshold"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-031",
   "text": "Some large advisers reduce their AUM in the months from May to August 2012, which strongly increases the discontinuity around the registration threshold and separates the two groups more sharply, though the effect vanishes late in the sample period.",
   "abstract": "In particular, some large advisers reduce their AUM. This leads to a strong increase in the discontinuity around the AUM registration threshold, suggesting a stronger separation between the two groups. The effect vanishes during the last months of our sample period.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "strategic subsample of 87 advisers",
    "May to August 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389416-039",
   "text": "The mandatory registration requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act affects the hedge fund industry asymmetrically, with advisers whose AUM floats around the $150 million threshold showing evidence of strategic AUM reduction.",
   "abstract": "Our regression analysis also suggests that the mandatory registration requirement imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act affects the hedge fund industry asymmetrically.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers with AUM near the $150 million threshold"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0e1c4615b104821577498d9655de43b9c5c3e985bb0215f56c038b8232be65c3",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-003",
   "text": "In a rigid competitive hierarchy governed by secular laws, internal corruption arises because each member's optimal strategy is to push the written rules to their limit, while externally any change in the problems the group faces can find the hierarchy unready.",
   "abstract": "Rigid competitive hierar- chies with secular laws face internal corruption as members' optimal strategy is to push the rules to the limit. From the outside, any change in the problems the group faces can find the hierarchy unready to face the new challenge.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "competitive hierarchies",
    "power relations codified in secular law"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2",
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  }
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 "description": "8 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'strategic-behavior'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}