# Strategic voting

`kaal:entity:strategic-voting`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `strategic-voting`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 2 works, 2021 to 2023.

**2021**

- [3782203-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-011) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Plurality voting predictably produces a system that swings between two polarized parties who are less acceptable to the majority but strongly preferred by interested minorities, because voters are incentivized to vote for their preferred one of the perceived top two rather than waste their vote.
  > So plurality voting predictably leads to a system which swings between two polarized parties who are less acceptable to the majority, but strongly preferred by interested minorities—Duverger's Law.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203
- [3782203-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-012) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Given a process with static rules and finite, discrete execution, a sufficiently patient and clever minority can always corrupt the process and profit at the majority's expense while following the rules, so no perfect voting system exists.
  > A sufficiently patient and clever minority power can always corrupt the process and profit at the expense of the majority, assuming your process has static rules and finite, discrete execution. There is no perfect voting system.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**2023**

- [4529715-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Quadratic voting remains open to manipulation and strategic voting, and it depends on a robust and transparent voting system to count votes accurately.
  > However, quadratic voting also has some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for manipulation or strategic voting, and the need for a robust and transparent voting system to ensure that all votes are counted accurately.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/strategic-voting.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.