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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/survey-evidence",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:survey-evidence",
 "name": "Survey evidence",
 "termCode": "survey-evidence",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
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   "value": [
    "2009",
    "2017"
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1428387-013",
   "text": "Valuing thinly traded assets with exchange quotes is unsound because the price for less frequently traded assets may not indicate fair market value at the time of valuation, yet nearly a quarter of surveyed funds relied exclusively on such quotes.",
   "abstract": "Using exchange quotes is problematic if applied to thinly traded assets, as the price for less frequently traded assets may not be indicative of fair market value at the time of valuation,46 and nearly a quarter of survey participants relied exclusively on these quotes to value assets.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387",
   "datePublished": "2009",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "thinly traded or infrequently traded assets"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "6aa3a280dc6750723be2389f3af2aabf3a16c4ce20e49fcdaddd7f2ea95a67aa",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-012",
   "text": "National regulators reached opposite conclusions on the same question: unlike the OFR, FSB and IOSCO, the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority concluded from its first comprehensive survey of London's hedge fund industry that the industry poses no systemic risk.",
   "abstract": "In contrast with the OFR, FSB and IOSCO, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom concluded in its first comprehensive survey of London's hedge fund industry that the hedge fund industry poses no systemic risk to the financial system.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "London hedge fund industry as surveyed by the FSA",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-029",
   "text": "More than forty percent of respondents in a prior study disagreed with the definitions or instructions in Form PF.",
   "abstract": "Over forty percent of respondents in a prior study suggested that they disagreed with definitions or instructions in Form PF.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in the author's prior private fund disclosure study"
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   "status": "current"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-016",
   "text": "A 2013 survey found that Form PF compliance costs for first time filers were under $10,000 for 59.18 percent of respondents, while subsequent annual Form PF filings cost no more than $5,000 for 57.14 percent of respondents.",
   "abstract": "While Form PF compliance costs for first time filers were under $10,000 (59.18% of respondents), the cost of subsequent annual Form PF filings amounted to no more than $5,000 (57.14% of respondents),",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "larger quarterly filers incurred substantially higher costs"
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   "status": "current"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-004",
   "text": "Prior survey evidence indicates that the hedge fund industry adjusted well to the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure requirements, and that the actual impact of those rules was much less significant than the private fund industry had feared.",
   "abstract": "In summary, prior surveys suggest that the hedge fund industry seems to be adjusting well to the registration and disclosure requirements of Dodd- Frank. The impact of the registration and disclosure rules appears to be much less significant than feared by the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "short-term period immediately following the 2012 effective date",
    "based on survey responses from registered private fund advisers"
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   "status": "current"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-020",
   "text": "A majority of private fund adviser respondents in both surveys, 72 percent in 2012 and 75 percent in 2015, did not plan any strategic response, meaning any action to avoid or limit the impact of Title IV.",
   "abstract": "Figure 2 indicates that in both 2012 and 2015 a majority (72% and 75%) of private fund adviser respondents did not plan a strategic response to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. \"Strategic responses\" in both surveys describe actions taken to avoid or limit the impact of Title IV.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in 2012 (N = 94) and 2015 (N = 69)"
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-021",
   "text": "The share of advisers reporting that they changed their communications with investors nearly doubled from 25 percent in 2012 to 47 percent in 2015, a shift the author attributes to advisers increasing investor communications on advice of counsel.",
   "abstract": "a substantially higher rate of responses (47% in 2015 versus 25% in 2012) suggests that respondents changed their communications with investors. Since 2012, many private fund advisers have changed and increased their communications with in- vestors, often based on advice from counsel.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-022",
   "text": "Although rare in absolute terms, structural responses grew: at least part of the industry is increasingly changing the legal structure of its funds and closing funds to new investors in response to the post-2012 regulatory changes.",
   "abstract": "Most notably, the comparative data in Figure 4 suggest that at least a part of the industry is increasingly changing the legal structure of their fund(s) and closing funds to new investors in response to the regulatory changes",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "least common actions reported in the 2012 and 2015 surveys",
    "rates doubled or tripled between the two surveys from a low base"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-024",
   "text": "Between 2012 and 2015 the annual cost of Dodd-Frank compliance doubled for many survey respondents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range into the $100,000 to $200,000 range.",
   "abstract": "In fact, the data suggest that the annual cost of compliance doubled for many survey respon- dents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range to the $100,000 to $200,000 range.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "respondents to the 2012 and 2015 surveys",
    "self-reported total compliance costs"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-025",
   "text": "The shift of reported compliance hours out of the 251 to 500 hour band and into the 100 to 250 hour band suggests the industry became more effective at satisfying Dodd-Frank reporting obligations between 2012 and 2015.",
   "abstract": "One possible explanation is that the industry became more effective in satisfying the reporting obligations of Dodd-Frank in the interim between 2012 and 2015.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "hours reported for Dodd-Frank Act compliance specifically, not all federal regulation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-026",
   "text": "If compliance hour requirements are treated as a proxy for compliance cost, the survey data indicate that the cost of complying with all federal regulation, not just Dodd-Frank, increased between 2012 and 2015.",
   "abstract": "Assuming that compliance hour re- quirements are proxies for compliance costs, the comparative data in Figure 9, like that in Figure 7, suggest that the cost structure for all federal regulation increased between 2012 and 2015.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "conditional on hours being a valid proxy for cost",
    "all federal regulation applicable to private fund advisers"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-027",
   "text": "Private fund advisers increasingly factor the regulatory structure into decisions about the size of their assets under management, a shift partly explained by the higher post-Dodd-Frank cost structure, since higher AUM and the corresponding fee revenue can offset higher compliance costs.",
   "abstract": "Private fund advisers are increasingly taking the regulatory structure into account in determining their AUM. This can par- tially be explained with the higher overall post-Dodd-Frank-Act cost structure for the industry, which is shown in Figures 6, 8, and 9.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of 2012 and 2015 survey respondents",
    "AUM sizing decisions"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-030",
   "text": "Sensitivity to the Form PF quarterly reporting threshold rose sharply: only 19 percent of 2012 respondents took the $1.5 billion threshold into account, compared with 33 percent in 2015.",
   "abstract": "In 2012, only 19% of respondents took the Form PF quar- terly threshold into account, whereas 33% of respondents in 2015 found the threshold relevant.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in 2012 and 2015",
    "the $1.5 billion Form PF quarterly reporting threshold"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-032",
   "text": "A majority of respondents in both surveys, 76.1 percent in 2012 and 65 percent in 2015, believed the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect their reporting funds' earnings.",
   "abstract": "Figure 16 illustrates that the majority of survey respondents in both the 2012 survey (76.1%) and 2015 survey (65%) believed that the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect reporting funds' earnings.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in 2012 and 2015",
    "perceived effect on fund earnings, not measured returns"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-035",
   "text": "Among advisers who saw an earnings effect, the attributed cause shifted from direct expense to opportunity cost between 2012 and 2015, with opportunity cost references rising from 9 percent to 32 percent while increased expense references fell from 53 percent to 36 percent.",
   "abstract": "and 2015, investment advisers saw the costs on fund earnings increasingly asso- ciated with opportunity costs (rates rose from 9% in 2012 to 32% in 2015) and not with increased expenses (rates fell from 53% in 2012 to 36% in 2015).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "only respondents who reported an effect on fund earnings",
    "2012 and 2015 surveys"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-036",
   "text": "By 2015 a clear majority of respondents, 93 percent, attributed effects on their investment management company's profits to additional expenses associated with the Dodd-Frank Act, and no respondent reported no additional expenses, compared with 19 percent in 2012.",
   "abstract": "Figure 19 illustrates that a clear majority of respondents in 2015 (93%) be- lieved that the profits of their investment management company were affected by additional expenses associated with the Dodd Frank Act.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents reporting on management company profits",
    "2012 and 2015 surveys"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-009",
   "text": "Surveys of private fund managers conducted in 2012 and 2015 show that a clear majority of managers believed increased compliance costs negatively affect the industry.",
   "abstract": "Kaal (2013a, 2016b) demonstrated in surveys of private fund managers conducted in 2012 and 2015 that a clear majority of private fund managers believed that increased compliance costs negatively affect the industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents among private fund managers",
    "2012 and 2015 surveys"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-010",
   "text": "Private fund managers themselves distinguish costs from returns: a majority of surveyed managers opined that Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure requirements do not affect the returns of the private fund industry, even though compliance costs affect the profitability of their management companies.",
   "abstract": "the majority of private fund manager respondents opined that registration and disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act do not affect the returns of the private fund industry (Kaal 2013a, 2016b).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents among private fund managers",
    "2012 and 2015 surveys"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-041",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2959730-041",
   "text": "Survey responses from blockchain using private investment fund advisers show that their fee structure deviates from the traditional 2/20 model, with responding managers reporting alternative fee structures that benefited their clients.",
   "abstract": "The graph illustrates that the fee structure of those private investment fund advisers that use blockchain technology (and responded to the survey) deviates from the traditional 2/20 model.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "n=59 survey responses drawn from the dataset",
    "the author could not obtain responses from all managers in the dataset"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ebd86972d8817b0c1c80326ae5564476983cedba3f258ff3b2610f156b93fb50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998097-015",
   "text": "The second survey found long-term negative effects of Title IV: 34.9 percent of respondents expected it to affect the industry over the next five years through additional expenses, and 32.6 percent expected it to create barriers to entry for new private fund market entrants.",
   "abstract": "More than a third of respondents (34.9%) opined that Title IV will affect the private fund industry in the next five years because of additional expenses, and nearly a third (32.6%) opined that it will create barriers to entry to private fund market entrants. 50% of",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "2015 survey of registered investment advisers",
    "N=69"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0955054f49c7011d33c285579bb046e6b284e42755b10fd2546a728c202669d5",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "20 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'survey-evidence'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}