# Survey methodology

`kaal:entity:survey-methodology`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 19 claims that carry the concept tag `survey-methodology`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

19 claims across 5 works, 2012 to 2016.

**2012**

- [2150377-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-012) [empirical/evidenced] -- This Article reports the first survey study of hedge fund advisers conducted after the SEC's registration effective date, drawing on a population of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before March 30, 2012.
  > This Article presents the results of the first survey study with hedge fund advisers after the SEC's registration effective date. The population consists of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before the SEC's registration effective date for private funds, March 30, 2012.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-013) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The hedge fund industry's concern with confidentiality and privacy is itself an obstacle to empirical research: it made obtaining a substantial effective sample size for this study difficult, independent of the survey design.
  > Given the particular concern in the hedge fund industry regarding confidentiality and privacy, obtaining a substantial effective sample size for this study proved difficult.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-014) [empirical/evidenced] -- Persistent multi-channel follow-up, by fax, e-mail, and telephone, yielded ninety-four completed surveys, a 7.42% response rate from a population of 1267, which is substantially higher than response rates in prior surveys of this industry.
  > This procedure proved successful and yielded ninety-four completed surveys, a response rate of 7.42% of a population of 1267. This response rate is substantially higher than the response rate of prior surveys in a related context.175
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-015) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Mandated disclosure does not automatically produce usable public data: although Form ADV requires advisers to disclose chief compliance officer contact information, the SEC dataset omitted it and contained no e-mail addresses, so researchers could not reach the officers responsible for compliance.
  > Although Form ADV requires advisers to disclose the contact information for their chief compliance officer, the dataset provided by the SEC did not list this information and did not include e-mail addresses.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-016) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The standard remedies for selection bias are not reliably corrective: simulation studies show that many techniques used to prevent selection bias problems have mixed success rates, can worsen rather than improve estimates, and may skew results under ordinary circumstances.
  > Simulation studies have shown that many of the techniques used to prevent selection bias problems have mixed success rates, can worsen rather than improve estimates, and may skew results under ordinary circumstances.187
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-017) [design/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A treatment and control design is unavailable for studying registration effects, because managers who did not have to register have no exposure to the treatment and therefore cannot generate informative responses about its effects.
  > Interviewing the treatment group, hedge fund managers who had to register, and a control group, hedge fund managers who did not have to register, would not have yielded appropriate responses because the control group would have had no exposure to the effect of the treatment, registration.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-019) [empirical/evidenced] -- Comparison of the responding sample against the full registered population on Form ADV parameters shows the sample is not biased toward any particular subgroup of hedge fund advisers, and gives no indication that respondents differ from nonrespondents.
  > The descriptive statistics demonstrate that the sample is not biased and does not favor a particular subgroup of hedge fund advisers.189 There is no indication that respondents who did respond to the survey were different from individuals who did not respond.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-035) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Prior surveys of hedge fund manager expectations left the central questions unanswered because they were fielded before the registration effective date and used substantially smaller samples, so they measured anticipation rather than experience.
  > These prior studies left many questions unanswered because they were conducted before the registration effective date and had substantially lower sample sizes.204
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-041) [condition/asserted] -- The study's findings are bounded in time: because the data was collected within three months of the registration effective date, the study shows trends and perceptions but does not provide insights on the long-term implications of the registration and disclosure requirements.
  > Although this study shows trends and perceptions within the industry, it does not provide insights on the long-term implications of the registration and disclosure requirements because the data was collected within a relatively short time period after the registration requirements took effect.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377

**2014**

- [2389423-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-022) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Selection bias is a valid concern in this study because of the lower sample sizes available for Models 1 through 5.
  > While selection bias is generic problem in social sciences, concerns over selection bias in this study due to the lower sample sizes for Model 1-5 is a valid concern
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423
- [2447306-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-006) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- High quality private fund data is scarce because the industry's entrenched interest in confidentiality combined with decades of regulatory exemption from registration and transparency requirements left no reservoir of comparable disclosure to study.
  > Because of the private fund industry's particular interest in confidentiality and privacy and decades-old regulations that allowed the industry to remain exempt from registration and transparency requirements, high quality private fund data are rather limited.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306
- [2447306-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-007) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Enlarging the sample does not cure selection bias in non-statistical sampling: a bigger sample neither compensates for the bias of non-statistical techniques nor guarantees that the sample is representative.
  > Increasing the sample size does not necessarily compensate for the potential selection bias of non-statistical techniques or guarantee the representativeness of the sample.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306
- [2447306-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-010) [empirical/evidenced] -- Despite contacting the entire population of 3669 SEC-registered private fund advisers by fax and e-mail over more than five months, the study obtained only 52 respondents, a response rate of 0.014 percent.
  > After multiple attempts to reach the entire population in over five months, respondents ([n=52]) (0.014%) answered questions in several categories designed to identify the effectiveness of Form PF.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306

**2016**

- [2732915-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-005) [empirical/evidenced] -- The survey achieved a response rate of 5.44 percent from a population of 1267 registered private fund advisers.
  > The response rate for this survey was 5.44% of a population of 1267.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915
- [2732915-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-006) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because private fund advisers prefer confidentiality and generally oppose publicity, most do not respond to survey questions, which makes obtaining a substantial effective sample size for survey studies of this industry difficult.
  > Most private fund advisers do not respond to survey questions so obtaining a substantial effective sample size for survey studies with private fund advisers is difficult.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915
- [2732915-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-007) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Guaranteeing complete anonymity is essential to obtaining a sufficient response rate from private fund advisers, but that guarantee prevents a broader descriptive statistical analysis of the sample.
  > The anonymity of survey responses did not allow a broader descriptive statistical analysis of the sample. The author guaranteed complete anonymity to all survey respondents, which is an essential element in obtaining a sufficient response rate.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915
- [2739479-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-017) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Survey research on private fund advisers is structurally constrained because these advisers traditionally oppose publicity and hold a strong preference for confidentiality and privacy, which makes a substantial effective sample size difficult to obtain.
  > The 2012 and 2015 surveys were subject to sampling constraints. Private fund advisers traditionally oppose publicity and have a strong preference for confi- dentiality and privacy.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2739479-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-018) [condition/argued] -- Neither the 2012 nor the 2015 sample is biased, and the comparison across the two populations is consistent because respondents in both surveys were equally subject to Title IV compliance obligations.
  > Neither the population sample for the 2012 survey188 nor the 2015 follow-up study189 sample are biased. The comparison of the two populations is consistent and unbiased because respondents in both surveys are equally required to com- ply with Title IV.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2739479-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-019) [mechanism/argued] -- The decline in survey response rate between 2012 and 2015 is itself evidence of the private fund industry's relatively rapid adaptation to the new statutory and regulatory regime.
  > The decline in response rate may itself be suggestive of the relatively rapid adaptation to changes brought about by the new statutory and regulatory regime.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479

## Verify

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    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/survey-methodology.md | sha256sum

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