# System attacks

`kaal:entity:system-attacks`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `system-attacks`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 2 works, 2019 to 2019.

**2019**

- [3406323-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-040) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes there is a way to subvert the rules for individual profit at the expense of the group, a result the author attributes to the Folk Theorems of game theory.
  > For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323
- [3406323-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-041) [design/asserted] -- A dynamic, changing set of governance rules can address the problem that any static rule set is gameable, and can establish the incentives necessary to stop such abuses.
  > A dynamic, changing set of governance rules can address the conundrum, and can set up the incentives necessary to stop the abuses.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323
- [3411897-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-040) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes, there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group, which is why static decentralized governance rules can always be gamed and only dynamic, changing rules can address the problem.
  > For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/system-attacks.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.