# Systemic risk measurement

`kaal:entity:systemic-risk-measurement`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `systemic-risk-measurement`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2013 to 2017.

**2013**

- [2348463-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2348463-022) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Form PF disclosures have not been standardized, and anecdotal evidence indicates that the SEC and the FSOC may be working with contradictory, misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete systemic risk data.
  > Form PF disclosures have not yet been standardized, and anecdotal evidence suggests that the SEC and the FSOC could be working with contradictory, misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete systemic risk data in Form PF.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463

**2016**

- [2748096-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Any conclusion that hedge funds contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 is circumstantial or anecdotal, because the data needed to test it, on leverage, counterparty relations, AUM, and portfolio holdings, were not collected for any substantial period before the crisis.
  > Without such data for a substantial time period before the financial crisis, concluding that hedge funds may have had a role in the financial crisis is circumstantial or anecdotal.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096
- [2748096-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Systemic risk rankings that place a loosely defined other financial services sector above banking and insurance are of limited use, because the analysis does not clearly identify the firms included in that category even though a substantial portion of them may be hedge funds.
  > Their analysis, however, does not clearly identify firms included in this "other" financial services sector even though a substantial portion of these entities may be hedge funds.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096

**2017**

- [2998097-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because advisers and third party service providers can flatten out and sanitize the information disclosed in Forms ADV and PF, the resulting disclosures may be less useful to the FSOC and the SEC in determining the systemic risk posed by private funds.
  > Although the level of sanitizing of disclosures could not be verified, sanitized disclosures could be less useful for Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and SEC evaluation and their determination of the systemic risk posed by private funds.84
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/systemic-risk-measurement.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.