# Token design `kaal:entity:token-design` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 35 claims that carry the concept tag `token-design`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 35 claims across 14 works, 2018 to 2024. **2018** - [3128900-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-017) [design/asserted] -- Reputation tokens supply a staking mechanism that incentivizes high quality work and task completion by workers, and that simultaneously lets requesters verify and track worker quality, integrity, and quantity. > Through the reputation tokens, the Semada Protocol provides a micro task worker reputation staking mechanism that incentivizes high quality work and task completion by workers. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 - [3227933-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-038) [design/argued] -- Issuing coins or tokens across all ecosystem participants creates a level playing field and helps establish a flatter, community-owned platform that is not based on the traditional hierarchies between shareholders, executives, managers and staff. > As such, the issuance of coins or tokens creates a "level playing field." Crucially, this helps establish a flatter, "community-owned" platform, which isn't based on traditional hierarchies between the platform participants Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933 - [3249860-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-006) [mechanism/asserted] -- In decentralized systems the functions previously performed by policy designers, central bankers, and economists in centralized markets are taken over by the token designer for the respective token economy. > Whereas policy designers, central bankers, and economists previously coordinated market design and economic regulations in centralized systems, these functions are taken over by the token designer for the respective token economy. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-007) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The democratization of monetary policy in token economies creates a serious problem, because token designers lack the qualifications and institutional functions that centralized central banking distributes across multiple institutions and their staff. > This creates a serious problem for many token economies as the designers lack the qualifications and functions that are Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-008) [mechanism/asserted] -- An issuer's ICO strategy can pre-define the token economy's monetary policy by predetermining the fixed number of tokens created and issued in the ICO. > An issuers' ICO strategy can pre-define monetary policy by predetermining the fixed number of tokens created and issued in the ICO. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-009) [design/argued] *(failure mode)* -- To avoid a token price crash, escrow accounts holding unissued tokens should carry usage and access controls assuring investors that escrowed tokens will not be issued at a discount, with lockups or phased releases minimizing crash risk. > To avoid a token price crash, token escrow accounts should provide usage and access controls that assure investors that escrowed tokens will not be issued at a discount. Lockups of escrowed tokens for a specified time period or phased releases can also help minimize the risks of token price crashes. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-010) [mechanism/argued] -- Increasing the commercial benefits attached to a token heightens the aggregate demand for that token's given supply, which is why benefit adjustment functions as a quasi-fiscal policy tool. > First, the increase in commercial benefits associated with a token heightens the aggregate demand of the given token supply. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-012) [design/argued] -- Adjusting the commercial benefits of a token issuance lets the issuer avoid more drastic monetary interventions such as emergency sales, building token reserves, or changing the token supply in circulation. > Fourth, adjusting the commercial benefits associated with a given token issuance avoids more drastic monetary policy intervention by way of emergency sales, building token reserves, or a decrease or increase of token supply in circulation. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-014) [design/asserted] -- The balance between the commercial benefits and use cases attached to a token and the scarcity of its supply is critical in the issuance of a token offering. > The balance of commercial benefits of a token offering and associated use cases of the token in combination with supply scarcity is critical in the issuance of a token offering. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-017) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Many token whitepapers omit information necessary for a full economic analysis, and the research team could not find a single project among the top 100 that had examined blockchain governance fully. > Many whitepapers do not include all the information that would generally be necessary for a full economic analysis. For instance, the researchers could not find a project that had examined blockchain governance fully. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-029) [mechanism/asserted] -- Under a deflationary token model, prices are expected to increase because of the fundamental scarcity of token supply. > With a deflationary method, prices are expected to increase due to fundamental scarcity of token supply. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Unlike deflationary token models, inflationary token models permit the use of stability mechanisms, which is why inflationary designs may become more popular as the cryptocurrency market matures. > Unlike deflationary token models, inflationary token models allow the use of stability mechanisms. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-036) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- App-specific tokens exert less influence over value from other projects and typically fail to support a broader user market, because their limited use curtails user access. > App-specific tokens generally can exert less influence over the value from other projects. App-specific tokens also typically do not allow for a broader user market as the limited use of the token curtails user access. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-037) [empirical/evidenced] -- The data support the conclusion that interoperability as a means of survivability dictates token design, with a majority of tokens seeking a broader base of users by making the token interoperable. > The trends in the data again support that interoperability as a means of survivability dictates token design, e.g. a majority of tokens are looking to have a broader base of individuals by making their token interoperable. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-044](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-044) [empirical/evidenced] -- The emergence of inflationary token models and the increasing interoperability of token models are the core developments for the industry visible in the data. > The emergence of inflationary token models and the increasing interoperability of token models, visible in the data analysis, are core developments for the industry. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-045](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-045) [empirical/evidenced] -- Increased interoperability of tokens optimizes survivability, and the data suggest token designs are increasingly focused on longer term survivability designs. > Increased interoperability of tokens optimizes survivability. Given these trends, the data seems to suggest that token designs are increasingly focused on longer terms survivability designs. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 - [3249860-046](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-046) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Long-term survivability of token designs may depend more on infrastructure capabilities than on temporary fixes made within token designs themselves. > Yet, long-term survivability of token designs may be more tied to infrastructure capabilities and less to temporary fixes in token designs. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860 **2019** - [3396542-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-004) [definitional/asserted] -- The reputation tokens of the underwriting DAO are separate and distinct from the cash currency that insureds use to pay premia; the two must not be conflated. > It is important to note that the reputation tokens are separate and distinct from the cash currency that the insured use to pay their premia. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Decentralized Underwriting (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396542 - [3396542-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-006) [condition/asserted] -- Participation in underwriting is gated by token ownership: only token holders may underwrite insurance policies in the DAO, and inbuilt processes assign new business among them. > First, only token holders are allowed to participate in underwriting insurance policies. Inbuilt processes are used to assign new business to token holders. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Decentralized Underwriting (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396542 - [3396542-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-016) [design/argued] -- Unlike prior token research, the purpose of issuing tokens here is not only to raise capital but also to give owners the opportunity and incentive to develop the DAO's business. > Another key difference is that in our study, the purpose of issuing tokens is not only to raise capital but also to provide the owners the opportunity and incentive to develop the business of the DAO. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Decentralized Underwriting (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396542 - [3396542-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-033) [design/argued] -- The design's innovative features stem from tokens serving several purposes at once: as reward for risk taking and as a substitute for both reputation and capital. > In sum, many of the innovative features of this design stem from the fact that the tokens serve multiple purposes: as reward for risk- taking, and a substitute for reputation and capital. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Decentralized Underwriting (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396542 - [3396542-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-035) [design/asserted] -- The governance rules of the DAO can be set up so as to ensure that minority token holders are appropriately protected. > The governance rules of the DAO can be set up so as to ensure that minority token holders are appropriately protected. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Decentralized Underwriting (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396542 - [3396542-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-036) [design/asserted] -- Assuming all agents are active underwriters, the DAO's rules can be designed so that the proportion of policies an agent writes in the long run is commensurate with that agent's proportion of token holdings. > In general, assuming all agents are active underwriters, the rules can be designed to ensure that the proportion of policies written by an agent in the long run is commensurate with the proportion of the agent's token holdings. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Decentralized Underwriting (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396542 - [3406323-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-039) [design/argued] -- A DAO's profit distribution weights across present workers, past workers, protocol designers, and governance designers should match the DAO's current values, since a greater share for new workers attracts new workers, a greater share for older workers signals long term stability, and a greater share for protocol designers attracts innovation. > A greater share for new workers will attract new workers, a greater share for the older workers will signal long-term stability, while a greater share for the protocol designers will attract more innovation. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323 - [3441904-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-038) [design/argued] -- Optimized DAO governance should pay members only indirectly, through fungible salary tokens issued in proportion to non fungible merit tokens, because the indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the design more attack resistant and stable in the long run. > The indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the governance design more attack resistant and stable in the long run. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 **2020** - [3606663-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-022) [design/argued] -- Token design must be treated as an iterative process in which data collection and flexibility in core design parameters are essential, because prior crypto economic assumptions routinely turn out to be suboptimal once the network grows and user preferences change. > Data collection and flexibility in core design parameters are essential because prior crypto-economic assumptions often materialize as suboptimal in the light of network growth and changing user and consumer preferences. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 **2021** - [3782203-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-036) [design/argued] -- Paying contributors in reputation tokens rather than fees, and then distributing all fees as a periodic reputation weighted salary, defeats the sockpuppet attack because splitting a holding across many accounts yields exactly the same share of fees. > A periodic reputation-weighted salary will distribute all fees the DAO earns to all members. Individuals who perform tasks that bring fees to the DAO will be rewarded with reputation tokens, not the fees. Members who own more reputation tokens share in a larger percentage of the fees. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 - [3782214-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-024) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation can be objectively valued by estimating the probability of future business deals, taking the expected value of that probability, and computing the present value of those deals, which is what makes reputation function as a promise of future rewards. > Reputation gives the promise of future rewards. Reputation can be objectively valued, by estimating the probability of future business deals, taking the expected value of that probability, and calculating the present value of those business deals. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3808852-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The DAO focus on enhancing the value of fungible tokens can produce short termism and can cause ethical and governance issues to be ignored, even as it frees non-performance reputational penalties from racial and cultural bias. > Yet, the focus on the value enhancement of fungible tokens can lead to short termism and may ignore ethical and governance issues. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852 - [3949098-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-005) [design/argued] -- In the proposed DAO investment club, members substitute reputation non fungible token staking for capital commitments on incoming deals, the public market supplies the funding for approved deals, and members are compensated through 20 percent of the public return on purchases minted into a fungible reputation token. > Instead of capital commitments, DAOIC members stake RNFTs on newly proposed incoming deals. The public market funds the DAOIC approved deals and the DAOIC members get paid via the 20% public ROP minting to fungible reputation token. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3962614-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-024) [definitional/asserted] -- Reputation tokens are separate and distinct from the fiat currency or other fungible tokens used to pay for investments in portfolio companies. > It is important to note that the reputation tokens are separate and distinct from the fiat currency or other fungible tokens that may be used to pay for investments in portfolio companies. Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 **2022** - [4021599-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4021599-016) [definitional/argued] -- Utility tokens are tokens with an intrinsic utility for a good or service: they emphasize the uses of the token and typically give users access to a product or service or give rewards that incentivize desirable behavior on the platform. > The term utility token is used to identify tokens that have an intrinsic utility for a good or service. Utility tokens emphasize the uses of the token and typically give their users access to a product or service or give rewards to incentivize desirable behavior on the respective platform.25 Wulf A. Kaal, Securities Versus Utility Tokens (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4021599 - [4021599-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4021599-018) [design/argued] -- Rather than replacing legacy financial services as securities tokens do, utility tokens are designed to give users future access to a product or service that may or may not exist at the time of the utility token issuance. > Rather than replacing legacy financial services like securities tokens, utility tokens are designed to provide users with future access to a product or service that may or may not exist at the time of the utility token issuance.29 Wulf A. Kaal, Securities Versus Utility Tokens (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4021599 - [4021599-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4021599-020) [design/asserted] -- Utility tokens are not created by their issuers for investment purposes; they are designed to be used for their specific utility in a given context. > investment purposes.32 They are designed to be used for their specific utility in a given context.33 Wulf A. Kaal, Securities Versus Utility Tokens (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4021599 **2024** - [4755632-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-035) [definitional/asserted] -- Reputation tokens are stipulated as non-transferable tokens that cannot be valued and that merely mirror a scoreboard of a member's reputation within the community, rather than functioning as tradable assets. > "Reputation Tokens" are non-transferable tokens that cannot be valued and represent the reputation a member has within the community. They simply mirror a scoreboard. Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/token-design.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.