entity · derived

Too big to fail

6 claims across 5 works, 2010–2012.

Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying too-big-to-fail. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.

Every claim under this term

1558614-037 2010 failure: The Dodd-Frank Act is notable for what it omits: it does not break up the largest banks, does little to help smaller and regional banks compete, and because compliance is burdensome and expensive may
1908473-014 2011 failure: The incentive effects of corporate governance controls may not operate in systemically important financial institutions, because managers and owners who anticipate a bailout commitment adjust their ri
1998455-017 2012 failure: Contingent capital rules could contribute to overriding the moral reasoning of decision makers, in which case contingent capital would actually increase, not reduce, risk incentives for institutions t
1998455-018 2012 failure: Regular corporate governance controls may not work in systemically important financial institutions, because those institutions are considered too big to fail and their leaders, anticipating a bailout
2061166-010 2012 mechanism: Reliance on public bail-outs, unaccompanied by any threat that management, shareholders and creditors would share significant losses, created an asymmetric incentive for excessive risk taking by finan
2097160-020 2012 failure: Ordinary SIFI creditors have suboptimal incentives to monitor management because they implicitly expect that the government will provide bailout funding given the nature of the entity.