# Top down regulation

`kaal:entity:top-down-regulation`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `top-down-regulation`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2013 to 2017.

**2013**

- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025) [definitional/asserted] -- The common denominator between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and other reform proposals is a top down regulatory approach of direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.
  > a noteworthy common denominator between SOX and Dodd-Frank and other reform proposals is the use of a top down regulatory approach, i.e. direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-027) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Governance adjustments are often enacted merely to address the problem perceived in the given market environment and the then existing economic conditions, without regard to possible future developments.
  > Governance adjustments are often enacted merely to address the then perceived problem in the given market environment and in the then existing economic conditions, without regard to possible future developments.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-028) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Following enactment, governance adjustments are often later repealed or diluted, and anticipation of future developments plays no significant role in the top down approach to regulation.
  > Worse yet, following the enactment, governance adjustments are often later repealed or diluted. 41 Anticipation of future developments and pre-emption of possible future crises does not play a significant role in the top down approach to
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**2017**

- [2922176-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-009) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Top-down corporate governance reform measures rarely, if ever, produce genuine change in the governance or culture of firms, and are commonly met with indifference, skepticism, or hostility from management.
  > In practice, top- down corporate governance reform measures rarely, if ever, result in a genuine change in the governance and culture of firms.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/top-down-regulation.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.