# Tragedy of the commons `kaal:entity:tragedy-of-the-commons` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `tragedy-of-the-commons`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 9 claims across 8 works, 2018 to 2024. **2018** - [3125822-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-013) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The tragedy of the commons arises in any system lacking a well designed incentive structure; in blockchain proof of stake design this is the nothing at stake problem, where unregulated systems lead pseudonymous users to abuse the system. > Similarly, the tragedy of the commons occurs in any system which does not have well designed incentive structure. This is called the "nothing at stake" problem in blockchain proof of stake design, where unregulated systems lead pseudonymous users to abuse the system. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 - [3125827-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-006) [condition/asserted] -- Staking tokens with the potential for slashing is necessary to avoid the tragedy of the commons in a validation pool. Voting without something at risk does not produce honest evaluation of contributions. > The staking of tokens, with its potential for slashing, is necessary to avoid the tragedy of the commons. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 **2020** - [3709041-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Microdemocracies must confront the tragedy of the commons, because voters acting on self-interest independent of the totality of voters may, without controls, deplete or spoil shared resources such as the environment and public goods. > Acting for their own self-interest may be contrary to the common good of all voters. Without controls, some self-interested voters may be depleting or spoiling resources they share with the rest of society, such as the environment, public goods, among others. Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041 **2021** - [3782198-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The incentive design in which originators of TCP requests pay the bill failed to solve web hosting costs, because the Tragedy of the Commons asserted itself and porn and pirated file sharing, sometimes set up by the ISPs themselves to game the payment design, consumed available bandwidth. > This didn't solve the problem, as naturally the Tragedy of the Commons9 asserted itself. Porn sites and pirated file sharing (often set up by the ISPs themselves to game the payment design10) quickly used up any available bandwidth. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782198-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-036) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The Tragedy of the Commons is a natural consequence of allowing anonymous participation, which is why the unfiltered layers of platforms such as Twitter, YouTube comments, and Reddit display toxic results. > The Tragedy of the Commons is a natural consequence of al- lowing anonymous participation. Anyone who has spent a few hours delving past the top filtered contributions on platforms such as Twitter, YouTube comments, or Reddit can observe the toxic results of anonymity. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782210-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-014) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation must be staked and risked on votes over work evidence, because otherwise the system suffers the Tragedy of the Commons nothing-at-stake problem; staking ensures every expert is motivated to police every reputation-staked action in order to protect the value of their own investment. > To avoid the Tragedy of the Commons (the nothing-at- stake problem, "skin in the game"), reputation must be staked and risked with votes on work evidence. This ensures all experts are motivated to police every reputation- staked action, to protect the value of their investment. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 - [3782220-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-006) [design/argued] -- Building secure walls with well-designed doors is the proper way to embody conservative and liberal values together in an economic system: walls protect the group from the Tragedy of the Commons and malicious threats, while doors admit fresh input from anyone willing and able to help. > Building secure walls with well-designed doors is the proper way to embody both values, integrating them harmoniously in your economic system. You need to secure your system from ruin, build walls to protect your group from the Tragedy of the Commons and malicious threats. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220 - [3808867-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Microdemocratic systems must solve the tragedy of the commons, because without controls self interested voters acting independently of the totality of voters may deplete or spoil shared resources such as the environment and public goods. > Without controls, some self-interested voters may be depleting or spoiling resources they share with the rest of society, such as the environment, public goods, among others. Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867 **2024** - [5254152-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-014) [condition/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- High governance scores require explicit mechanisms that prevent common governance failures, specifically the tyranny of the majority and the tragedy of the commons, such as reputation based voting, multi round voting, or incentive alignment. > High scores, such as 9 or 10, indicate the presence of mechanisms to prevent common governance failures, such as the tyranny of the majority or the tragedy of the commons. Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/tragedy-of-the-commons.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.