# Trial and error rulemaking

`kaal:entity:trial-and-error-rulemaking`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `trial-and-error-rulemaking`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 3 works, 2016 to 2017.

**2016**

- [2740477-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-001) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Ex post trial and error rulemaking built on stable and presumptively optimal rules produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes that are no longer sustainable once disruptive innovation grows exponentially.
  > The ex-post trial-and-error-rulemaking with stable and presumptively optimal rules7 in the existing regulatory framework8 often produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes that are no longer sustainable in an environment of exponential disruptive innovation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-002) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Under exponential disruptive innovation the information rulemakers need arrives too late for trial and error rulemaking to be effective, regulatory issues grow more complex, and unknown future contingencies in the rulemaking process increase substantially.
  > relevant information for rulemaking is less likely to materialize soon enough for traditional trial-and-error rulemaking to be effective, regulatory issues become increasingly complex, and unknown future contingencies increase substantially in the rulemaking process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2740477-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-016) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Ex post trial and error rulemaking requires as a precondition that information about optimized rule requirements becomes available, and in an age of exponential innovation that information may never materialize or may arrive too late for the method to work.
  > A prerequisite for ex-post trial-and- error rulemaking is thus the availability of the information on optimized rule requirements. In an age of exponential innovation, that information may not materialize at all or may not materialize in time for the trial-and-error rulemaking to be effective.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477
- [2831040-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-007) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Facts based, ex post, trial and error rulemaking cannot anticipate the regulatory issues created by innovation, so rulemakers may never recognize, or may recognize only much too late, which new regulatory demands apply to a given innovation.
  > Because facts-based, ex-post, trial-and-error-rulemaking cannot anticipate regulatory issues created by innovation, rulemakers may not at all–or
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

**2017**

- [2957645-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-002) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Facts-based, ex-post, trial-and-error rulemaking cannot anticipate the regulatory issues created by innovation, so rulemakers may not realize, or may realize far too late, what new regulatory demands a given innovation generates.
  > First, because facts-based, ex-post, trial-and-error rulemaking cannot anticipate regulatory issues created by innovation, rulemakers may not realize—or may realize much too late—what new regulatory demands apply to a given innovation and its associated regulatory issue.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-012) [mechanism/argued] -- Anticipatory regulation, which uses institution-specific and timely information together with feedback effects to create new rules, can minimize costly and suboptimal ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules.
  > Anticipatory regulation uses institution-specific, timely information and feedback effects to create new rules.24 Anticipatory dynamic regulation can help minimize costly and suboptimal ex-post, trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules.25
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/trial-and-error-rulemaking.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.
