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 "author": {
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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4734750-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4734750-037",
   "text": "Two sided reputation scores discipline both sides of the micro task market: workers become less likely to accept offers from low reputation requesters, and low reputation workers are less likely to be retained.",
   "abstract": "If requesters have a lower reputation score, workers become less likely to accept requesters",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Code Review DAO (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4734750",
   "datePublished": "2024",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6607458-038",
   "text": "Computative Economics is not a generalization of digital platform economics, because platform economics extends Neoclassical Economics while remaining within its primitives, whereas the computative primitives differ and the equilibrium concept is recursive rather than competitive.",
   "abstract": "Computative Economics is not a generalization of platform economics. Its primitives differ. A computative agent is not a platform user in the platform-economic sense, and the equilibrium concept is recursive rather than competitive.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458",
   "datePublished": "2026",
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