# Tyranny of the majority

`kaal:entity:tyranny-of-the-majority`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 5 claims that carry the concept tag `tyranny-of-the-majority`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

5 claims across 3 works, 2018 to 2024.

**2018**

- [3125822-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-002) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Reputation value in any decentralized reputational system can be corrupted through three channels: direct purchase of reputation, automated worthless work, and degeneration of the system into a majority of inexpert opinions.
  > In any such decentralized reputational system there is always the potential to corrupt the value of reputation by purchasing it directly, or through automated worthless work, or through the degeneration of a majority of inexpert opinions.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822
- [3125822-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-003) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The problems of corruption, Sybil attacks, and tyranny of the majority have plagued every previous autonomous decentralized reputation platform, so they are the design constraints any new architecture must meet.
  > These are the respective problems of corruption, Sybil attacks, and tyranny of the majority that have plagued all previous autonomous, decentralized reputation platforms.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822
- [3125822-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-015) [mechanism/argued] -- Tyranny of the majority is countered by a time delay in announcing upvote results, so that experts cannot see the majority position before they commit their own stake.
  > The second mechanism that counters the tyranny of the majority is the time-delay in announcing the results of upvotes, so experts cannot plainly see the majority position before posting their stake.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

**2021**

- [3782210-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- One-person-one-vote governance fails on technical questions because half the members have less than average expertise yet equal power, which incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of pursuing the most effective decisions.
  > Under a one-person-one-vote system, half of the mem- bers have less than average expertise, but equal power. This incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of following the most effective decisions.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

**2024**

- [5254152-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-014) [condition/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- High governance scores require explicit mechanisms that prevent common governance failures, specifically the tyranny of the majority and the tragedy of the commons, such as reputation based voting, multi round voting, or incentive alignment.
  > High scores, such as 9 or 10, indicate the presence of mechanisms to prevent common governance failures, such as the tyranny of the majority or the tragedy of the commons.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/tyranny-of-the-majority.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.