# Unbundling

`kaal:entity:unbundling`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `unbundling`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

9 claims across 1 works, 2004 to 2004.

**2004**

- [617681-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-001) [design/argued] -- Bundling substantive corporate law together with adjudication, the arrangement that succeeded in Delaware, is likely to cause difficulties in Europe; Member States are most likely to succeed in post Centros and Inspire Art regulatory competition if they unbundle the corporate law product.
  > This bundling of statutory law and adjudication might, however, cause difficulties in Europe. We suggest that Member States are most likely to succeed in the regulatory competition following Centros and Inspire Art if they unbundle the corporate law product
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-007) [mechanism/argued] -- Mobility costs for a corporation are probably higher when changing the jurisdiction of incorporation means changing not only the applicable corporate law but also the courts that will apply it.
  > Finally, mobility costs are probably higher if changing jurisdictions of incorporation means changing not just the applicable corporate law, but also the courts that will apply that law.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-009) [mechanism/argued] -- A jurisdiction supplying corporate law as an unbundled statutory product faces low fixed costs, principally statute drafting, and near zero marginal costs, because additional users impose no new adjudication costs and registration costs are insignificant.
  > Fixed investment would be principally in drafting statutes. Each additional user of the jurisdiction's corporate law would not impose new adjudication costs, and the cost of registering additional corporate charters are relatively insignificant.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-010) [condition/argued] -- For an unbundled product of statutes only, the key to successful regulatory competition shifts from the supply side to the demand side: drafting statutes that appeal to large numbers of managers and investors outside the jurisdiction.
  > For this unbundled product of statutes only, the key to successful competition would be the demand side: drafting statutes that appeal to large numbers of managers and investors outside the jurisdiction so they will incorporate there.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-012) [empirical/evidenced] -- Delaware itself acknowledges the utility of unbundling statutes from adjudication, though not in its corporate law: its LLC statute specifically allows members or managers to agree in writing to arbitration of claims under the LLC agreement.
  > Delaware itself acknowledges the utility of unbundling statutes from adjudication, although not in its corporate law. In its LLC statute, Delaware specifically allows members or managers to agree in the LLC agreement, or in another writing, for arbitration of claims under the agreement.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-013) [mechanism/argued] -- To the extent adjudication over U.K. corporate law is expected to take place outside the U.K., the U.K. has not in fact exported a bundled product; its users are demonstrating a preference for an unbundled package.
  > To the extent adjudication over U.K. corporate law is expected to be carried out somewhere other than the U.K. the U.K. has not exported a bundled product at all.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-022) [predictive/argued] -- With an unbundled product more Member States might participate in regulatory competition over corporate law, which would speed up the learning process and likely result in better substantive corporate law.
  > With the unbundled product, more member states thus might participate in regulatory competition over corporate law, which would speed up the learning process76 and likely result in better substantive corporate law.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-024) [mechanism/argued] -- If statutes are unbundled from adjudication the judicial bias problem largely disappears, because statutes are at least facially neutral and discriminatory statutes would violate the EU treaty.
  > If on the other hand, statutes are unbundled from adjudication, this problem largely disappears because statutes are at least facially neutral
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- To the extent judges are biased toward expansively interpreting the reach of their own Member State's corporate law, corporations may unexpectedly be bound by rules of the state of incorporation on subject matter they believed lay outside corporate law.
  > To the extent judges are biased in favour of expansively interpreting the reach of their own Member State's corporate law, corporations might unexpectedly be bound by the Member State of incorporation's rules governing subject matter such as takeover defenses,
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/unbundling.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.