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   "text": "Venture capital can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation because venture capitalists' financial allocations to innovative projects generate feedback that regulators can use.",
   "abstract": "We show that venture capital can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation. Venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects can provide feedback for dynamic regulation of disruptive innovation.",
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   "text": "The empirical base for the argument is a PitchBook dataset covering 77,508 completed United States venture capital deals involving 37,298 companies across all venture capital stages from 2005 to 2015.",
   "abstract": "To illustrate venture capital's ability to identify innovation trends, we use a PitchBook Data, Inc. dataset on venture capital deals in the United States with 77,508 deals involving 37,298 companies from 2005 to 2015.",
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   "text": "The data analysis shows that venture capitalists' finance allocation, and the implicit assessment of innovative products and businesses it embodies, generates highly relevant institution specific and industry specific decentralized information on innovation trends.",
   "abstract": "The data analysis shows that venture capitalists' finance allocation and the implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generates highly relevant institution- and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends.",
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   "text": "Data on venture capital investments lets regulators see where innovation trends are forming and what risks they entail before the disruptive innovation materializes, which is the specific remedy for regulation's reactive timing.",
   "abstract": "Data on VC investments allows regulators to see where innovation trends exist and what possible risks are entailed before disruptive innovation materializes.",
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   "text": "Industry specific venture capital investment data allows regulators to anticipate regulatory needs in the industries carrying the highest levels of disruptive innovation, and the level of disruptive innovation can be quantified by the venture capital dollars flowing into those industries.",
   "abstract": "For instance, information on industry-specific VC investments allows regulators to anticipate regulatory needs in certain industries that are associated with the highest levels of disruptive innovation. Disruptive innovation may here be quantified with the VC dollar investment in such industries.",
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   "text": "By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions from venture capital investment data ex ante, before disruptive innovation creates problems, regulators could anticipate regulatory needs instead of reacting to them.",
   "abstract": "By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions with optimized information from VC investments ex-ante, before disruptive innovation creates problems, regulators could anticipate regulatory needs.",
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   "text": "The authors concede a limitation of their own proposal: the innovation potential identified by venture capital finance allocation may not always be shared by the market at large.",
   "abstract": "the innovation potential identified by venture capital finance allocation may not always be shared by the market at large.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
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   "text": "Venture capital has outrun regulation and regulation is now too slow to react, and that lag itself damages the process.",
   "abstract": "VC has outrun regulation and regulation is too slow to react, hurting the process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
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   "text": "The notice and comment procedures of the SEC are too slow, and the SEC's outdated micromanagement of markets is itself slowing down venture capital.",
   "abstract": "SEC are too slow; moreover the micromanagement of the markets is overdone by the SEC and, being outdated, is slowing down vc.",
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   "text": "Data derived from venture capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation, because venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects supply feedback for dynamic regulation.",
   "abstract": "We show that data derived from venture capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation. Venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects can provide feedback for dynamic regulation of",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "Venture capital deal flow, meaning the totality of potential deals and business plans screened by venture capitalists, would provide the optimal assessment of innovation trends, but that data is not available, so realized investment allocations must be used as a second-best proxy.",
   "abstract": "innovation trends. While deal flow, that is, the totality of potential deals and business plans screened by venture capitalists, would provide an optimal assessment of innovation trends, deal flow data is not available. We therefore use venture capital investment",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "The study's evidence base is a PitchBook dataset of 77,508 United States venture capital deals involving 37,298 companies from 2005 through 2015, covering all venture capital deals and all venture capital stages.",
   "abstract": "innovation trends, we use a PitchBook Data, Inc. dataset on venture capital deals in the United States. The dataset comprises 77,508 deals involving 37,298 companies from 2005 through 2015. It includes all VC deals and all VC stages.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "A more granular assessment of venture capital investments in Big Data and software as a service can provide regulators with much needed feedback on the regulatory needs associated with those areas.",
   "abstract": "8-11 below. A more granular assessment of the VC investments in Big Data and SaaS can provide much needed feedback for regulators on associated regulatory needs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "Although aggregate venture capital sector data arguably only confirms what media reporting already showed for 2005 to 2015, the venture capital data, especially examined granularly, may provide earlier signals for regulators to identify areas of prospective regulatory need.",
   "abstract": "only confirms media reporting on innovation trends between 2005 and 2015, the VC data used herein may provide earlier signals for regulators to identify possible areas of regulatory need in the face of increasingly disruptive innovation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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    "granular rather than aggregate examination of the venture capital data",
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   "text": "The dominance of later stage venture capital investments could be read as risk-averse follow-on behavior, but venture capital funds are unlikely to make later stage investments unless portfolio companies substantially fulfilled their contractual performance obligations, which preserves the signal value of the data.",
   "abstract": "At the same time, however, VC funds are not likely to continue with later stage investments if contractual performance obligations/thresholds of their portfolio companies were not fulfilled to a substantial degree.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "Venture capitalists' finance allocation and their implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generate highly relevant institution-specific and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends.",
   "abstract": "finance allocation and the implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generates highly relevant institution- and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends. As such, venture capitalists' innovation-driven finance",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "Regulation is mostly reactive and follows business cycles rather than being proactive; data on venture capital investments lets regulators see where innovation trends are heading and what risks they entail before the disruptive innovation actually materializes.",
   "abstract": "Regulation is mostly reactive, following business cycles, rather than proactive. Data on VC investments allows regulators to see where innovation trends are going and the possible risks they entail before disruptive innovation materializes. Should regulators",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "Feedback effects from venture capitalists' finance allocations toward innovative products give rulemakers timely, decentralized, industry-specific and entity-specific information that allows them to adapt rules in anticipation of regulatory issues.",
   "abstract": "anticipatory rulemaking. Through the feedback effects that are facilitated by venture capitalists' finance allocations towards innovative products, rulemakers can obtain timely and decentralized industry- and entity-specific information that allows them to adapt",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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    "industries associated with the highest levels of disruptive innovation",
    "regulators able to access and analyze venture capital investment data"
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   "text": "The decline in later stage robotics and drone investment rounds in the United States does not indicate stalled technological development; companies relocate later stage development to other countries because of the regulatory disconnect that exists in the United States.",
   "abstract": "indicates that the technological development in this area is stalling. However, a closer look at the industry shows that companies relocate the later stage development to other countries due to the regulatory disconnect that exists in the United States.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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    "United States regulatory environment after 2011"
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-046",
   "text": "The authors concede that the trend for venture-capital-financed technology companies to stay private and the market undervaluation of formerly venture-capital-financed companies mean the innovation potential identified by venture capital finance allocation may not always be shared by the market at large.",
   "abstract": "technology companies, among others, to stay private129 and market undervaluation of formerly venture-capital-financed companies130 suggest that the innovation potential identified by venture-capital-finance allocation may not always be shared by the market",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "is_failure_mode": true,
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    "long-term market valuation of venture-capital-financed innovation",
    "companies remaining private rather than listing"
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   "text": "Even if regulators could obtain the depth of information needed for anticipatory rulemaking, acting on venture capital signals risks wasting scarce regulatory resources, because venture capital funds make many investments that do not succeed and companies still incubating may raise no clear regulatory issues.",
   "abstract": "anticipatory rulemaking, there may be risk of waste of scarce regulatory resources because VC funds make many investments, not all of which turn out to be successful. Moreover, if companies that received VC financing are still incubating, it may be largely",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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    "portfolio companies still in incubation"
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   "text": "Companies that received venture capital investments have outrun and continue to outrun regulation and regulatory efforts, and they drive innovation trends in the United States and abroad.",
   "abstract": "This paper adds to increasing evidence that companies that received VC investments have─and continue to─outrun regulation and regulatory efforts. Companies that received VC investments drive innovation trends in the United States and abroad.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-052",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-052",
   "text": "Venture capital investment allocation data can help facilitate anticipatory regulation of disruptive innovation, but it is only one of several emerging data sources usable for signaling in regulatory process optimization.",
   "abstract": "facilitate anticipatory regulation associated with disruptive innovation, but it emphasizes that VC investment allocation data is only one form of the emerging data sources that can be used as signaling for regulatory process optimization. Other data sources are and may",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "availability of additional and emerging data sources beyond venture capital"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-033",
   "text": "Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and give at least some estimate of where innovative trends exist and what regulatory challenges may accompany them.",
   "abstract": "DPAs and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2939127-021",
   "text": "Venture capital investment in blockchain startups has grown exponentially since 2012, which the authors read as an indicator of the technology's commercial maturity.",
   "abstract": "Figure 2 shows that venture capital (VC) investment in startup companies that utilize blockchain technology has increased exponentially since 2012.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "VC investment in blockchain startups, 2007 to 2016"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "abcef529c7200261c59eec43018375b3b26e3186239fb9d002bacc298dba26ff",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-013",
   "text": "Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions function as dynamic regulatory tools because they increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and facilitate feedback effects.",
   "abstract": "DPAs and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and facilitate feedback effects.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "regulators can observe the content of DPAs and venture capital investment trends"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-037",
   "text": "In the study's dataset the clear majority of private investment funds using blockchain technology are engaged in venture capital rather than hedge fund or private equity strategies.",
   "abstract": "Figure 3 shows that the clear majority of private investment funds in the dataset is engaged in venture capital.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on the type of fund coding for n=105 funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3002908-035",
   "text": "Fund type composition diverges across regions: in the United States hedge funds dominate the blockchain using sample, while in Europe venture capital funds clearly predominate.",
   "abstract": "the majority of private funds are hedge funds (10), tech funds (7), private equity (5), venture capitals (4) and others (2). In Europe, the distribution among the types of investors is different: the majority of the private funds identified are venture capitals (22)",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "n equals 105 funds classified by type"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "06a7b61e75f905ee07e422e875d83a65c5033a248a6e05a213523b034e5db534",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3002908-039",
   "text": "Initial coin offerings have overtaken venture capital as a funding channel for blockchain start ups, raising 331 million dollars in twelve months, and may become an alternative funding method for traditional companies as well.",
   "abstract": "Started as a phenomenon that is revolutionizing the way start-up companies investing in blockchain raise capital (in the last 12 months ICOs have raised $331 million, overtaking venture capitalists' investments),157 it may become an alternative method for many traditional companies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "twelve month window reported as of mid 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "06a7b61e75f905ee07e422e875d83a65c5033a248a6e05a213523b034e5db534",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-013",
   "text": "The disruption of venture capital by ICOs is in part self-inflicted: venture capital funds continuously invested in innovation while insufficiently innovating their own business model, leaving them exposed to a more efficient financing tool.",
   "abstract": "The disruptive effect of ICOs on the venture capital industry is in part the result of the venture capital fund lacking innovation. Paradoxically, venture capital funds continuously invested in innovation, while insufficiently innovating themselves.33",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "venture capital industry financing highly innovative start-ups"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-014",
   "text": "In the second quarter of 2017 ICO issuances exceeded venture capital financing of start-ups for the first time, with $210 million invested in ICOs versus $180 million invested into start-ups via traditional venture capital funds.",
   "abstract": "In the second quarter of 2017, ICO issuances exceeded venture capital financing of start-ups for the first time,34 with $210 million invested in ICOs versus $180 million invested into start-ups via traditional venture capital funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "second quarter of 2017",
    "crypto and blockchain start-up financing"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-015",
   "text": "The trend of ICO issuance exceeding venture capital financing can be expected to continue, because ICOs allocate capital more efficiently and at lower cost.",
   "abstract": "This trend can be expected to continue given the superior allocation of capital at lower cost via ICOs.35",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "crypto start-up financing after the second quarter of 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-016",
   "text": "ICOs are preferable to venture capital funding for many start-ups first and foremost because ICO promoters and their developers are not forced to sacrifice equity in the project in exchange for the funds they raise.",
   "abstract": "First and foremost, ICO promoters and their developers are not forced to sacrifice their equity in the project in exchange for the funds they raised.36",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "start-ups choosing between ICO and venture capital financing"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-017",
   "text": "Given the advantages of ICOs, traditional regulated IPOs and venture capital funds increasingly fail to adequately capitalize crypto and legacy ventures driven by new economic paradigms.",
   "abstract": "Given these ICO advantages, traditional regulated IPOs and venture capital funds increasingly fail to adequately capitalize crypto and legacy ventures driven by new economic paradigms.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "ventures driven by new economic paradigms, including crypto ventures"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-028",
   "text": "On bankruptcy or termination of the platform, token holders typically have no liquidity preference and no recourse at all once debt holders and outside creditors are satisfied, so unlike a venture capital seed investor with at least a simple liquidity preference, they typically lose everything they invested.",
   "abstract": "Again, by contrast, token holders typically lose everything they invested as they have no liquidity preference at all.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "bankruptcy or termination of the promoter's business or platform"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "164ce15b9eb1e8847ebcb073f5b23a96b4974ad0308d77469a9455d4a1ebeb38",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227967-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227967-006",
   "text": "In early Silicon Valley the contractual mechanisms lawyers designed, together with the lawyer dominated market for reputation, reduced information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors and were necessary to bring the demand and supply sides of venture capital together effectively.",
   "abstract": "Finally, the contractual mechanisms and the lawyer-dominated market for reputation reduced the information asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and investors and, as such, were necessary to bring the demand-side and supply-side of \"venture capital\" together effectively.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "venture capital markets with young and inexperienced entrepreneurs",
    "Silicon Valley from the early 1970s"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "f6e13b956f864ab32ec3305d095a35a127770327d75b3688f785cefc437d369f",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227967-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227967-007",
   "text": "A transaction engineer is a crucial intermediary who brings together, in a safe environment, parties holding different but mutually compatible interests and expertise.",
   "abstract": "In this sense, we can see how lawyers functioned as \"transaction engineers,\" i.e., crucial intermediaries that brought together in a \"safe\" environment various parties with different but mutually compatible interests and expertise.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "f6e13b956f864ab32ec3305d095a35a127770327d75b3688f785cefc437d369f",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3405660-014",
   "text": "Additional direct limitations on hedge funds spill over onto other private investment pools such as venture capital funds and structured financings, which do not present the same systemic risk concerns.",
   "abstract": "The imposition of additional limitations on hedge funds can impose unwarranted burdens on other types of private investment pools, such as venture capital funds and structured financings that do not raise the same concerns as hedge funds in terms of systemic risk.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "rules drafted broadly enough to capture private investment pools generally"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "cf507b1833071765bc13a5605f38c2591582eca85f40869e38b6ff075c04d29d",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-005",
   "text": "ICOs changed the venture funding market because they provide investors liquidity far faster than the traditional venture capital path to a late IPO or acquisition, letting venture funds capitalize on profits early.",
   "abstract": "By contrast, ICOs provide liquidity to investors much faster and allow venture capital funds to capitalize on existing profits early.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "venture capital funds invested in crypto start-ups"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-006",
   "text": "During the ICO boom years the venture capital market in the decentralized technology sector ground to a halt, and the later demise of the ICO market reversed the trend back toward venture funding.",
   "abstract": "During the ICO boom years, the venture capital market in the decentralized technology sector ground to a halt.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "decentralized technology sector during the ICO boom, roughly March 2017 to June 2018"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3409548-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3409548-031",
   "text": "The shift of the digital asset market back from the ICO model to the venture model since late 2017 has reduced, not increased, diversification for investors.",
   "abstract": "Since late 2017, the market for digital assets has moved back from the ICO model to the venture model, leading to less diversification.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Financial Technology and Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3409548",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "digital asset market after late 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "74227ab2656b06bfe4a29c942fc2ba26df9f476917e0a9f85ec038b8c3402c40",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-002",
   "text": "The funding sources for digital asset and blockchain startups cycled through four stages since 2016 and 2017: equity funding, then initial coin offerings, then equity offerings, then initial exchange offerings, and back to equity funding by the early 2020s.",
   "abstract": "Since 2016/17, the funding sources for digital asset startups and blockchain startups moved from equity funding to initial coin offerings (ICOs), to equity offerings, and initial exchange offerings (IEOs), just to return back to equity funding in the early 2020s.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "digital asset and blockchain startups",
    "2016 to early 2020s"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-006",
   "text": "By 2019 the ICO market had lost its defining advantage over venture capital: because most ICOs between 2018 and 2019 imposed one to three year lockups, neither market offered early liquidity to investors or issuers, making the two substantively similar.",
   "abstract": "Most ICOs during that period required one to three-year lockup period for their investors. Accordingly, the ICO market in 2019 is very similar to the venture market in the sense that neither of these markets offers early liquidity to investors and issuers.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "ICOs conducted between 2018 and 2019",
    "lockup periods of one to three years"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-008",
   "text": "ICO issuance exceeded venture capital financing of startups for the first time in the second quarter of 2017, with $210 million invested through ICOs against $180 million invested through traditional venture capital funds.",
   "abstract": "In the second quarter of 2017, ICO issuances exceeded venture capital financing of start-ups for the first time,56 with $210 million invested in ICOs versus $180 million invested into start-ups via traditional venture capital funds.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "second quarter of 2017",
    "blockchain and crypto startups"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-016",
   "text": "Immature markets such as the market for digital assets in 2020 often cannot attract the institutional investors and venture capitalists who have sufficient operating experience in that market, which is a self reinforcing constraint on market development.",
   "abstract": "Immature markets, such as the market for digital assets in 2020 often cannot attract institutional investors and venture capitalists that have sufficient operating experience in that market.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "immature or nascent asset markets",
    "digital asset market as of 2020"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-017",
   "text": "Early stage investing in digital assets is a relationships business, and without access to a network of core industry expertise early stage investments in the digital asset industry are rarely successful.",
   "abstract": "Without access to a network of core expertise early stage investments in the digital asset industry are rarely successful.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "early stage investors in digital asset startups"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-005",
   "text": "In the proposed DAO investment club, members substitute reputation non fungible token staking for capital commitments on incoming deals, the public market supplies the funding for approved deals, and members are compensated through 20 percent of the public return on purchases minted into a fungible reputation token.",
   "abstract": "Instead of capital commitments, DAOIC members stake RNFTs on newly proposed incoming deals. The public market funds the DAOIC approved deals and the DAOIC members get paid via the 20% public ROP minting to fungible reputation token.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "DAOIC operating model",
    "a public market willing to co purchase approved deals"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-038",
   "text": "The key difference from the traditional venture capital model is that the DAOIC only makes its investment choices public and never provides investment analysis, so public co purchases are entirely voluntary.",
   "abstract": "The key difference from the traditional VC model is that even for the co-purchases through the market, the DAOIC only makes their investment choices public. The co-purchases by the public are entirely voluntary, the DAOIC never provides investment analysis etc.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "public co purchases alongside DAOIC deals"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-001",
   "text": "The rapid growth of digital asset startups into billion dollar businesses with little or no venture capital funding demonstrates that the traditional venture capital model alone was not enough to meet the funding needs of technology startups.",
   "abstract": "Digital assets startups that grow rapidly into billion-dollar businesses with little or no VC funding have demonstrated that the traditional venture capital model alone was not enough to meet the funding needs of technology startups.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "technology startups, especially digital asset startups"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-002",
   "text": "Decentralized reputation governance models in venture capital have the potential to upgrade the venture capital market.",
   "abstract": "This article shows that decentralized reputation governance models in venture capital have the potential to upgrade the venture capital market.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-003",
   "text": "Lack of liquidity is one of the biggest problems in the traditional venture capital ecosystem, and the traditional VC model disincentivizes generating early profits because capital is locked in for an extended period of time.",
   "abstract": "One of the biggest problems in the traditional VC ecosystem is lack of liquidity.4 The traditional VC model disincentivizes generating early profits.5 Capital is \"locked in\" or \"locked up\" for an extended period of time.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "traditional fiat venture capital funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-004",
   "text": "Early stage funding fell from thirty five to twenty seven percent of total VC funding as venture capitalists increasingly focused on funding later stage companies.",
   "abstract": "Early-stage funding fell from thirty-five to twenty seven percent of total VC funding as VCs increasingly focus on funding later-stage companies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-007",
   "text": "Deal evaluation and risk assessment in traditional venture capital is fraught with inaccuracies and suboptimal incentives.",
   "abstract": "Deal evaluation and risk assessment in traditional VC is fraught with inaccuracies and suboptimal incentives.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "traditional VC screening of early stage ventures"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-008",
   "text": "A drawback of the traditional VC evaluation process is that perceptual, emotional, and cognitive processes affect the investment decision alongside financial considerations, because the evaluation criteria are applied through subjective human decision making.",
   "abstract": "A potential drawback of this process is that perceptual, emotional, and cognitive processes impact the decision in addition to financial decisions because the evaluation criteria is made through subjective human decision-making.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "human applied VC screening criteria"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-009",
   "text": "None of the standard VC deal evaluation criteria reflect how a prospective deal may correlate with a deal already held in the capitalist's investment portfolio.",
   "abstract": "Additionally, none of those criteria reflect how a prospective deal may correlate with one already in the capitalist's investment portfolio.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-010",
   "text": "Significant information asymmetries in venture capital can lead portfolio company managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.",
   "abstract": "Finally, significant information asymmetries can lead managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "post investment stage of a VC financing"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-011",
   "text": "Because venture capitalists typically want to cash out their gains five to ten years after the initial investment, they play an active role in directing portfolio companies toward a merger, acquisition, or public offering, which can carry significant downsides for those companies and their products.",
   "abstract": "because capitalists typically want to cash-out their gains five to ten years after initial investments, they play an active role in directing the company towards a merger, acquisition, or public",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "VC backed portfolio companies approaching the exit window"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-015",
   "text": "As a rule of thumb in early investment rounds, the lower the information asymmetry the lower the payout, and below a certain threshold of established value venture capitalists will rarely invest at all.",
   "abstract": "As a rule of thumb in the early investment rounds, the lower the information asymmetry, the lower the payout. Below a certain threshold of established value, VCs will rarely invest.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "early investment rounds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-017",
   "text": "At its peak in the 2019 cycle the volume of initial coin offerings surpassed venture capital firms and business angels as a fundraising method for startups.",
   "abstract": "At its peak in the 2019 cycle, the volume of ICOs has surpassed VCs and BAs as a fundraising method for startups.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "the 2019 market cycle peak"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-018",
   "text": "Information asymmetries increase in traditional VC investment rounds because startups are incentivized to self censor when engaging with VCs, having little data to work with and being reluctant to overexpose themselves to prospective investors.",
   "abstract": "Information asymmetries increase in traditional VC investment rounds as startups are incentivized to self-censor when engaging with VCs, as they have little data to work with, and are reluctant to overexpose themselves to prospective investors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "early round engagement between startups and VCs"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-019",
   "text": "The typical VC fee based compensation structure can lead to serious shortcomings, including excessive fundraising, suboptimal investments, misevaluation, and overfunding of portfolio companies during a fund's holding period.",
   "abstract": "The typical VC fee-based compensation structure can lead to serious shortcomings, including excessive fundraising, suboptimal investments, misevaluation, and overfunding of the portfolio companies during a fund's holding period.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "fee based VC compensation arrangements"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-043",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-043",
   "text": "Reputation as capital has the potential to lower capital requirements for VC businesses significantly and to increase liquidity at unprecedented levels, because VCs can sell their fungible reputation tokens to the market as needed.",
   "abstract": "Reputation as capital has the potential to lower capital requirements for VC businesses significantly and increase liquidity at unprecedented levels because VCs fungible reputation tokens can be sold to the market as needed by.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "a functioning market for fungible reputation tokens"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-006",
   "text": "Fair launches shift capital formation from venture capitalism toward altruistic capitalism, because a digital asset startup that can successfully raise capital through a fair launch becomes less reliant on venture capital.",
   "abstract": "In essence, if a digital asset startup can successfully raise capital from a fair launch, the startup will be less inclined/reliant on venture capital.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "startup can successfully raise capital via fair launch"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4685567-037",
   "text": "For venture capital funds, an impact certificate listing performs a due diligence function, because the follow on investor inherits all the project performance data generated through the impact certificate marketplace.",
   "abstract": "Through the projects' success that is validated through the impact certificate, the venture capital follow-on investment benefits from all the project performance data that is generated through the impact certificate marketplace.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "projects with larger capital requirements over time",
    "impact validated through the certificate"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "87fb1be89d2661967ed2b0b673fe26448ded3bc3119b122177a4fc13ae5c085c",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "64 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'venture-capital'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}