# Vote buying

`kaal:entity:vote-buying`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 5 claims that carry the concept tag `vote-buying`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

5 claims across 5 works, 2021 to 2025.

**2021**

- [3782201-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-024) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because voting power in the 2016 DAO could be purchased, the exact cost of destroying it was calculable, and had it lasted longer than a month someone would eventually have amassed the money to arbitrage its trivial governance structure.
  > Voting power could be purchased, so we know precisely how much money it would cost to destroy the RWOQ DAO. If it were more successful, and lasted longer than a month, someone would have eventually amassed the money to arbitrage the trivial governance structure.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201

**2022**

- [4015908-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-024) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- DAO governance built on fungible governance tokens is disfavored and dangerous because governance rights can be bought on open exchanges, whereas non-fungible reputation governance assures the highest levels of decentralization.
  > DAO governance that revolves around fungible governance tokens is disfavored and dangerous in this context as governance rights can be bought on open exchanges. By contrast, non-fungible reputation governance of the DAO assures highest levels of decentralization.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908

**2023**

- [4529715-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Fungible governance tokens expose a DAO to vote buying and other forms of manipulation.
  > However, fungible governance tokens also have some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for vote buying or other forms of manipulation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715

**2024**

- [5254152-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-003) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Fungible governance tokens deliver liquidity and transparency in DAO voting rights, but because they are tradable they simultaneously create exposure to vote buying and manipulation.
  > These tokens represent voting rights and can be traded, providing liquidity and transparency but also risking vote buying and manipulation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152

**2025**

- [5583610-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If LER rewards are set so generously that they effectively purchase shareholder votes, the program becomes disproportionate or coercive and courts will invalidate it.
  > If LERs are disproportionately or coercively implemented, such as for example overly generous voucher rewards that effectively buy stockholder votes, then LER would violate the applicable requirements and risk invalidation by courts.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/vote-buying.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.