# Voting models

`kaal:entity:voting-models`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 5 claims that carry the concept tag `voting-models`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

5 claims across 2 works, 2023 to 2024.

**2023**

- [4529715-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- One person one vote governance carries the risk of majority tyranny, in which the majority imposes its will on minority groups, and it is unsuited to decisions requiring specialized knowledge.
  > However, one person one vote governance also has some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for majority tyranny, where the majority can impose their will on minority groups.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715
- [4529715-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Quadratic voting remains open to manipulation and strategic voting, and it depends on a robust and transparent voting system to count votes accurately.
  > However, quadratic voting also has some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for manipulation or strategic voting, and the need for a robust and transparent voting system to ensure that all votes are counted accurately.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715

**2024**

- [5254152-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-001) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- One-person-one-vote in DAOs equalizes voting power across participants regardless of financial stake, but it creates the risk of majority tyranny.
  > This model ensures equal voting power for all participants, promoting democratic decision-making but potentially leading to majority tyranny.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152
- [5254152-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-002) [mechanism/asserted] -- Quadratic voting suppresses domination by any single participant because the cost of each additional vote rises quadratically, making concentrated control prohibitively expensive.
  > The cost of additional votes increases quadratically, making it prohibitively expensive for any one individual to dominate the voting process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152
- [5254152-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-004) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Reputation based governance allocates decision power by past contribution and community standing, which promotes transparency and trust, but reputation is difficult to measure objectively.
  > This model allocates decision-making power based on participants' past contributions and reputation within the community, promoting transparency and trust but challenging to measure objectively.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/voting-models.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.