# Voting power

`kaal:entity:voting-power`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `voting-power`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 5 works, 2019 to 2024.

**2019**

- [3441904-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-022) [empirical/evidenced] -- Token concentration in existing decentralized protocols is extreme: on and around September 12, 2017, 4.11 percent of bitcoin addresses controlled 96.53 percent of the total bitcoin supply.
  > For instance, on and around September 12, 2017, 4.11% of the bitcoin addresses controlled 96.53% of the total bitcoin supply.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2021**

- [3799320-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-027) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which allocate more power to holders of a significant share of total token supply.
  > Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then-popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one-token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

**2022**

- [4067783-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-005) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Governance by fungible tokens lets whales control a fundraiser DAO, which is antithetical to decentralized governance, and selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens creates the risk of hostile takeover or looting.
  > Governance through fungible tokens in fundraiser DAOs allows whales to control the DAO, which is antithetical to the idea of DAOs overall and decentralized governance of DAOs specifically. More specifically, selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens risks hostile takeovers or looting.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783
- [4067783-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Insider rug pulls are not the only exploit path: a DAO can also be attacked from the outside whenever its governance grants voting power through fungible tokens.
  > But these inside rug pulls are not the only exploitative mechanism within DAOs. DAOs can also be exploited from the outside if the DAO's governance allows fungible voting power.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783

**2023**

- [4529715-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-040) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- When only a minority of members, such as Audius node operators, can stake or earn weighted votes, the majority of token holders occupy the same powerless position as an ordinary shareholder in a corporation.
  > The downside of their structure is that only a minority of users are able to use staking or weighted tokens for voting. Thus, a majority of token holders remain in the same position as any general shareholder of a corporation relative to their power.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715

**2024**

- [4900878-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900878-026) [mechanism/argued] -- Tokens solve the quantification problem in quantum economics by serving as measurable units of value and governance: token denominated voting power in a DAO makes social influence and decision making power countable, supplying the consistent set of units the framework lacked.
  > Tokenomics offers a practical solution through the use of tokens as quantifiable units of value and governance.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and Tokenomics (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900878

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/voting-power.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.