# Voting `kaal:entity:voting` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `voting`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 6 works, 2021 to 2023. **2021** - [3782217-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-009) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Condorcet's Jury Theorem cuts both ways: larger groups of slightly stupid people, defined as being wrong slightly more than half the time, are worse than smaller groups of stupid people, so the idiocy of the mob is the counterbalance to the wisdom of the crowd. > larger groups of slightly stupid people are worse than smaller groups of stupid people. The idiocy of the mob is the counterbalance to the wisdom of the crowd. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217 - [3808867-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-013) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Elected representatives are incentivized to maintain their own power of office rather than to vote for outcomes reflecting the presumptive wishes and needs of their constituents. > Voted representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes that reflect the presumptive wishes and needs of their constituents but for maintaining their own power of office. Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867 - [3808867-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-019) [mechanism/argued] -- Unlike their centralized predecessors, decentralized technologies enable, for the first time in history, improved incentive designs that help overcome the insufficiencies in the voting outcomes of representative democracies. > Unlike their centralized predecessors, decentralized technologies, for the first time in history, enable improved incentive designs that help overcome the insufficiencies in voting outcomes of representative democracies. Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867 - [3808867-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-020) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Upgrading existing representative democracies with decentralized supplemental voting systems may require constitutional or democratic support, and the availability of that support is dubious at best. > Of course, such upgrades to existing representative democracies may require constitutional or democratic support which is dubious at best. Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867 - [3931933-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3931933-031) [condition/asserted] -- Changes to the Shasper Network codebase require Shasper Network governance votes. > Shasper Network governance votes are required to make changes to the codebase. To further Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933 - [3949098-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-034) [mechanism/argued] -- Conflicts of interest from DAOIC members participating on the public side of a deal are minimized because the loosely coupled reputation staking vote and its transition to a tightly coupled vote are transparent to the public. > However, such practices are rather limited because of the transparent nature of the loosely coupled RNFT voting on a particular deal and the transition to tightly coupled voting. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 - [3949098-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-039) [design/argued] -- Ratio adjustments are the DAOIC's key tool for strategic increases in profitability and overall policy, and they should be subject to a member vote conducted through the decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms. > Ratio adjustments provide a key tool for strategic increases in profitability and overall DAOIC policy. Ratio adjustments should be subject to DAOIC member vote following the decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms (Calcaterra & Kaal et al (2019)). Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 **2022** - [4067783-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-018) [design/asserted] -- DAO governance should use a two vote model that distinguishes a loosely coupled vote, where no reputation is at stake, from a tightly coupled vote, where the voter's reputation is at stake. > 2. Two vote model a) loosely coupled vote (no reputation at stake), b) tightly coupled vote (reputation at stake) Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783 **2023** - [4529715-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-009) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Governance scores across the studied DAOs average 3.81 out of 10, with only a couple of DAOs scoring 7 or higher and the vast majority scoring 5 or less. > The average DAO scores for governance is 3.81 out of 10. With only a couple DAOs scoring 7 or higher, the vast majority of DAOs scored at 5 or less. Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715 - [4529715-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-032) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A reputation system that rewards voting with the majority, as Bridge Mutual uses, can be manipulated by users who create multiple wallets and always vote with the majority. > reliance solely on voting outcomes may present some vulnerability, as it could potentially be manipulated by users creating multiple wallets and voting with the majority. Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/voting.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.