{
 "failure_mode": "enforcement-gap",
 "specific_names": [
  "Attack-induced decentralization",
  "Boundary probing under codified law",
  "Decapitation strategy failure",
  "Escalating policing costs",
  "Formal rule subversion (Folk Theorem)",
  "Group structures excluded from voluntary reorganization",
  "Incompleteness of static rule sets",
  "Instrument-specific rule misses strategy-level risk",
  "Judicial invalidation unwinds registration",
  "Juror competence and bias in decentralized adjudication",
  "Letter-of-the-law rule gaming",
  "ODR and DDR fail New York Convention due process",
  "Policing overhead drain",
  "Regulation cannot reach private standard setting",
  "Regulator inaction despite identified risk",
  "Regulatory Vacuum for Autonomous Products",
  "SIFI threshold underinclusion",
  "Subadviser regulatory gap",
  "Uncapped synthetic leverage",
  "Vacated rule reversion",
  "absent-corrective-mechanism",
  "agreement-omitted-from-charter",
  "anonymity-defeats-embedded-law",
  "arbitrary-rulemaking-vacatur",
  "bundled-product-suboptimality",
  "civil-law-adjudication-discount",
  "code-not-interpretable-by-courts",
  "coerced-programmer-cannot-override-majority",
  "corporate-death-penalty-overstated",
  "crypto-tax-underreporting",
  "de facto retraction through non-enforcement",
  "delayed-enforcement",
  "denial-of-specific-performance-nullifies-agreement",
  "enforcement-impracticability",
  "exchange-regulatory-gap",
  "executory-buy-sell-avoided-in-bankruptcy",
  "forensic-latency-and-privacy-opacity",
  "governance-vacuum-mistrust",
  "inconsistent judicial application of old Rule 2019",
  "ineffective preemptive remediation",
  "informal retraction of politically motivated rules",
  "legitimacy-deficit-of-legacy-courts",
  "low success rate of self remediation",
  "minimum compliance capture",
  "nlp-static-rule-gap",
  "no implied private right of action under the IAA",
  "no-european-substitute",
  "no-private-right-offshore",
  "non enforcement of Form PF obligations",
  "non-enforcement of controversial provisions",
  "noncompliant-anonymous-participants",
  "opt-in-class-size-ceiling",
  "post-crisis oversight decay",
  "post-term-governance-reversion",
  "precedent-deficit-in-arbitration",
  "reform-does-not-stick",
  "regulator commitment failure",
  "regulator declines to set effectiveness standard",
  "regulatory vacuum for maximally decentralized products",
  "regulatory-compliance-gap",
  "reliance on public enforcement only",
  "remedy-scale-mismatch",
  "repeal-induced-legal-gaps",
  "scienter gap for incompetent due diligence",
  "self regulation gap",
  "settlement-not-reform",
  "signal undercut by unattainable liability threshold",
  "signalling failure of an unreachable liability standard",
  "speculative-damages-inadequate-remedy",
  "supplemental-guidance-ineffective",
  "unanimity-blocks-innovation",
  "unenforceable-charter-arbitration-clause",
  "unenforceable-erasure-rights-on-chain",
  "unenforceable-statutory-grant",
  "unproven-compliance-adoption",
  "unreachable oversight liability threshold",
  "unstoppable autonomous organization",
  "waiver-loophole-persists",
  "waste standard too narrow"
 ],
 "count": 80,
 "claims": [
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:617681-011",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-011",
   "claim": "The quality problems in Delaware adjudication mean it is not a foregone conclusion that the bundled product of statutes plus specialized courts leads to optimal results.",
   "specific_name": "bundled-product-suboptimality",
   "conditions": [
    "U.S. corporate law and Delaware in particular"
   ],
   "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
   "year": "2004",
   "quote": "These questions about the quality of Delaware adjudication suggest that it is not a foregone conclusion that the bundled product leads to optimal results.",
   "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:617681-016",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-016",
   "claim": "The weak link in a bundled package offered by a civil law Member State is likely to be its system of adjudication rather than its statute.",
   "specific_name": "civil-law-adjudication-discount",
   "conditions": [
    "civil law Member States marketing corporate law to investors used to common law systems"
   ],
   "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
   "year": "2004",
   "quote": "The weak link in the bundled package offered by a civil law jurisdiction is thus likely to be its system of adjudication rather its statute.",
   "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:617681-030",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-030",
   "claim": "For cross border enforcement the critical question is not whether a judgment will be enforced in another Member State but when: eventual enforcement is insufficient if a party has time to remove assets, and delayed injunctions can be worthless.",
   "specific_name": "delayed-enforcement",
   "conditions": [
    "EU Member States that generally do enforce each other's judgments"
   ],
   "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
   "year": "2004",
   "quote": "In many instances, the critical question is not whether a judgment will be enforced in another Member State, but when. \"Eventually\" is an insufficient answer if damages cannot be collected because a party has time to remove assets elsewhere.",
   "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:617681-032",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-032",
   "claim": "Error correction is weak for Member State corporate law adjudication: national legislatures are unlikely to intervene unless judicial error affects domestic interests, so managers and investors would rather face slow learning judges in their home country.",
   "specific_name": "absent-corrective-mechanism",
   "conditions": [
    "EU level intervention being slow and therefore a weak deterrent"
   ],
   "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
   "year": "2004",
   "quote": "National legislatures could intervene and change corporate law, but unless judicial error affects domestic interests, legislatures are unlikely to do so. Managers and investors thus would probably prefer to confront slow learning judges in their home country.",
   "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:617681-040",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-040",
   "claim": "One objection to arbitration of corporate governance disputes holds in Europe as in the United States: arbitration as ordinarily used yields little relevant precedent.",
   "specific_name": "precedent-deficit-in-arbitration",
   "conditions": [
    "arbitration as it is used in most commercial contexts"
   ],
   "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
   "year": "2004",
   "quote": "Coffee has one objection to arbitration of corporate governance disputes that is as persuasive in Europe as in the United States. Arbitration, as it is used in most contexts, yields little relevant precedent.",
   "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:617681-042",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-042",
   "claim": "Unless the Member State of incorporation specifically provides in its corporate statute that arbitration is permissible when allowed in the charter or a shareholders agreement, investors run the risk that courts refuse to enforce the arbitration provision.",
   "specific_name": "unenforceable-charter-arbitration-clause",
   "conditions": [
    "closely held corporations may rely on a shareholders agreement instead of the charter"
   ],
   "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
   "year": "2004",
   "quote": "specifically provide in its corporate statute that arbitration is permissible if allowed in either the corporate charter or (for a closely held corporation) in a shareholders' agreement. Otherwise, investors run the risk that courts refuse to enforce the arbitration provision.",
   "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:1558614-023",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-023",
   "claim": "Because U.S. law frames the inquiry around corporate waste, and most risk taking does not meet the waste standard, showing that a decision was hazardous or excessively risky is not enough to rebut the business judgment rule in the United States.",
   "specific_name": "waste standard too narrow",
   "conditions": [
    "U.S. courts presume absence of corporate waste and ask only whether that presumption is rebutted"
   ],
   "source": "Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in",
   "year": "2010",
   "quote": "Because most risk taking does not meet the definition of corporate waste, a showing of hazard or excessive risk is insufficient to rebut the 98 business judgment rule in the United States.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2061166-013",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-013",
   "claim": "The German voluntary reorganization procedure has a structural gap: groups of financial institutions, financial holding groups and conglomerates cannot petition for protection under it, even though these are precisely the entities that qualify as systemically important and pose the highest risk to market stability on failure.",
   "specific_name": "Group structures excluded from voluntary reorganization",
   "conditions": [
    "voluntary reorganization procedure under the German Financial Institution Reorganization Act",
    "not applicable to the involuntary procedure initiated by the supervisor under the German Banking Act"
   ],
   "source": "Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring",
   "year": "2012",
   "quote": "Unlike the involuntary reorganization procedure initiated by the Supervisory Authority under the German Banking Act,333 groups of financial institutions, financial holding groups, or conglomerates are not eligible to petition for protection under the voluntary reorganization procedure.",
   "citation": "Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2029983-013",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-013",
   "claim": "Because Section 929P did not restore private rights of action, the most powerful weapon in plaintiffs' arsenal, the fraud-on-the-market theory in class actions, is thwarted wherever the transaction took place outside the United States.",
   "specific_name": "no-private-right-offshore",
   "conditions": [
    "private class actions over non-U.S. transactions",
    "SEC and DOJ actions remain possible"
   ],
   "source": "Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral",
   "year": "2012",
   "quote": "most powerful weapon in plaintiffs' arsenal, the fraud-on-the- market theory in class actions, is thus thwarted in those in- stances where transactions are outside the United States.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2029983-016",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-016",
   "claim": "Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts, which in turn depresses settlement amounts and damages awards.",
   "specific_name": "opt-in-class-size-ceiling",
   "conditions": [
    "European collective procedures that require plaintiffs to opt in"
   ],
   "source": "Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral",
   "year": "2012",
   "quote": "Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2029983-018",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-018",
   "claim": "Despite signs of movement in that direction, there is as yet no genuine European substitute for the U.S. securities class action brought under the fraud-on-the-market theory.",
   "specific_name": "no-european-substitute",
   "conditions": [
    "as of the article's 2012 assessment of European collective procedures"
   ],
   "source": "Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral",
   "year": "2012",
   "quote": "There are some signs that European law could be moving in this direction, although thus far there is no genuine Europe- an substitute for the U.S. securities class action under the fraud-on-the-market theory.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2150377-006",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-006",
   "claim": "The SEC's 2004 attempt to reach hedge fund advisers failed as a matter of administrative law: in July 2006 the D.C. Circuit vacated the hedge fund rule in Goldstein v. SEC as an instance of arbitrary rulemaking, because the SEC had no authority to define a term the Advisers Act left undefined.",
   "specific_name": "arbitrary-rulemaking-vacatur",
   "conditions": [
    "SEC rulemaking under the Investment Advisers Act",
    "where the statutory term client is not otherwise defined"
   ],
   "source": "Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act",
   "year": "2012",
   "quote": "Eventually, in July 2006, the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein v. SEC vacated the hedge fund rule as an instance of arbitrary rulemaking by the SEC.71",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-001",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-001",
   "claim": "The nearly insurmountable standard for liability in oversight cases in the United States undermines the signalling of the expected standard of conduct, and this could have long-term implications for American corporate law.",
   "specific_name": "signalling failure of an unreachable liability standard",
   "conditions": [
    "United States, Delaware corporate law",
    "oversight or duty to monitor claims"
   ],
   "source": "A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "The nearly insurmountable standard for liability in oversight cases and its effect on signalling the expected standard of conduct could have long-term implications for corporate law in the United States.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-008",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-008",
   "claim": "Delaware's signalling of expected conduct is undermined when the state simultaneously imposes a near insurmountable standard for liability in cases involving breaches of the duty of oversight.",
   "specific_name": "signal undercut by unattainable liability threshold",
   "conditions": [
    "Delaware as the signalling jurisdiction",
    "oversight breach claims"
   ],
   "source": "A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "Most importantly, Professor Fairfax explains why, while Delaware law may signal the most appropriate standard of conduct, 15 Delaware's signaling of expected conduct is undermined if it imposes a near insurmountable standard for liability in cases involving breaches of the duty of oversight.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2273857-023",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-023",
   "claim": "Once crises recede, regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium, and this dichotomy causes reform legislation and deregulatory legislation to be enacted in quick succession.",
   "specific_name": "post-crisis oversight decay",
   "conditions": [
    "after markets return to normalcy"
   ],
   "source": "Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "Following crises, the process is reversed and regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium. As a result of this dichotomy, reform and deregulatory legislation are often enacted in quick succession.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2273857-030",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-030",
   "claim": "In the absence of crises the intensity of regulation diminishes, because regulators cannot commit to long-term regulatory strategies and instead fall back on private strategies such as self-regulation to overcome resource constraints.",
   "specific_name": "regulator commitment failure",
   "conditions": [
    "non-crisis periods",
    "regulators facing resource constraints"
   ],
   "source": "Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "In the absence of crises, however, the intensity of regulation diminishes because regulators are unable to commit to long-term regulatory strategies and instead use private strategies like self-regulation to overcome resource constraints.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2273857-032",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-032",
   "claim": "Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act were amended and revised, and some of their most controversial provisions were never enforced.",
   "specific_name": "non-enforcement of controversial provisions",
   "conditions": [
    "United States federal securities and financial regulation"
   ],
   "source": "Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "Both SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act were amended and revised. Some of their most controversial provisions were not enforced.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2273857-033",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-033",
   "claim": "Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the attorney up-the-ladder reporting mandate, has gone effectively unenforced: there is no evidence that the SEC ever charged an attorney with a violation of that section, even though lawyers were inevitably aware of executive misconduct in numerous instances.",
   "specific_name": "de facto retraction through non-enforcement",
   "conditions": [
    "SEC enforcement practice under Section 307 of SOX"
   ],
   "source": "Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "there is no evidence that the SEC ever charged an attorney with a violation of Section 307.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2273857-035",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-035",
   "claim": "The SEC's failure to interpret Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley, while not a formal retraction, shows that Section 402 is another instance of politically motivated rulemaking that later has to be scaled back.",
   "specific_name": "informal retraction of politically motivated rules",
   "conditions": [
    "rules enacted under post-crisis political pressure"
   ],
   "source": "Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "While not a formal retraction, the SEC's lack of interpretation underscores that section 402 provides another instance of politically motivated rulemaking that later has to be scaled back.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2348463-010",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2348463-010",
   "claim": "Old Bankruptcy Rule 2019 was applied inconsistently in practice, with courts interpreting it with a high degree of variability both across and within jurisdictions.",
   "specific_name": "inconsistent judicial application of old Rule 2019",
   "conditions": [
    "period before the 2011 revision of Rule 2019"
   ],
   "source": "Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "Old Rule 2019 had been applied inconsistently in practice. Courts interpreted old Rule 2019 with a high degree of variability, both across and within jurisdictions.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2348463-023",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2348463-023",
   "claim": "Because the SEC is still working out the appropriate use of Form PF and still improving the form and its instructions, its enforcement division is unlikely to open investigations into alleged misreporting or failures to report.",
   "specific_name": "non enforcement of Form PF obligations",
   "conditions": [
    "period while Form PF remains unstandardized"
   ],
   "source": "Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "While the SEC is still ascertaining the appropriate use of Form PF and improving Form PF and the instructions to it, it is unlikely that the SEC's enforcement division will start investigations into alleged misreporting or failures to report.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2337268-040",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-040",
   "claim": "Enforcement of the IAA's prohibited transactions provision is limited because the Supreme Court in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis held that a violation of that provision does not support an implied private right of action.",
   "specific_name": "no implied private right of action under the IAA",
   "conditions": [
    "violations of the IAA prohibited transactions provision"
   ],
   "source": "Investment Adviser Regulation",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "The enforcement of a violation of prohibited transactions under the IAA is limited. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis107 the Supreme Court determined that a violation of the IAA's prohibited transactions provision108 does not allow for implied private rights of action.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2337268-041",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-041",
   "claim": "With private enforcement foreclosed, enforcement of the IAA's prohibited transactions provision depends entirely on injunctive relief, administrative sanctions, and criminal prosecution, all of which require public actors to move.",
   "specific_name": "reliance on public enforcement only",
   "conditions": [
    "enforcement against violations of the prohibited transactions provision"
   ],
   "source": "Investment Adviser Regulation",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "Accordingly, the enforcement of the IAA's prohibited transactions provision is relegated to injunctive relief, administrative sanctions, and criminal prosecution.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2317580-002",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-002",
   "claim": "The liability standard for breach of fiduciary duty is set so high that courts rarely find directors in violation, because only a board's sustained or systematic failure to exercise oversight can produce liability.",
   "specific_name": "unreachable oversight liability threshold",
   "conditions": [
    "director oversight liability under Caremark and its progeny"
   ],
   "source": "The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties",
   "year": "2013",
   "quote": "The standard for liability is so high that it is hard for courts to find directors in violation of their fiduciary duties.2 Only a board's sustained or systematic failure to exercise oversight can result in liability.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-027",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-027",
   "claim": "The effectiveness of existing preemptive remedial measures is in question, because the majority of governmental contracts are executed only after those measures have already proved unsuccessful.",
   "specific_name": "ineffective preemptive remediation",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "the majority of governmental contracts are executed after preemptive remedial measures have proved unsuccessful85, calling into question the effectiveness of existing preemptive remedial measures.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-034",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-034",
   "claim": "Preemptive remedial measures have a low success rate, as evidenced by the fact that more than 60 percent of deferred and non prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 refer to preemptive remedial measures that preceded them.",
   "specific_name": "low success rate of self remediation",
   "conditions": [
    "D/NPAs executed between 1993 and 2013"
   ],
   "source": "Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "The low success rate of preemptive re- medial measures, evidenced by the fact that over 60% of D/NPA executed between 1993 and 2013 refer to preemptive remedial measures103",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-006",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-006",
   "claim": "Existing corporate criminal liability combined with the absence of clear Department of Justice standards for charging businesses can push organizations to adopt unproven compliance programs and generate other inefficiencies.",
   "specific_name": "unproven-compliance-adoption",
   "conditions": [
    "holds where DOJ charging standards remain vague"
   ],
   "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "The existing corporate criminal liability in combination with a lack of clear DOJ standards for charging businesses may also lead organizations to adopt unproven compliance programs and create other inefficiencies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-007",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-007",
   "claim": "The authors contest the conventional wisdom that a corporate criminal indictment amounts to a corporate death penalty, pointing to recent guilty pleas in which BNP Paribas paid a record fine and Credit Suisse kept its investment banking license.",
   "specific_name": "corporate-death-penalty-overstated",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "Several recent plea deals call into question the 'death penalty' the- ory.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-009",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-009",
   "claim": "The McCallum Memorandum failed as a corrective because it only supplemented rather than replaced the Thompson Memorandum and did little if anything to curb the widespread use of attorney client and work product privilege waivers in deferred prosecution agreements.",
   "specific_name": "supplemental-guidance-ineffective",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "McCallum Memo did not replace the Thompson Memorandum; it only supple- mented it and did little, if anything, to quell the widespread use of attorney-client and work-product privilege waivers in DPAs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-010",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-010",
   "claim": "The McNulty Memorandum did not resolve the privilege waiver problem because it still left prosecutors ample opportunity to treat a corporate defendant's unwillingness to waive attorney client privilege as bearing on cooperation, and its attorney's fees provision had similar shortcomings.",
   "specific_name": "waiver-loophole-persists",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "The McNulty Memoran- dum still provided ample opportunity for prosecutors to use the corporate de- fendant's lack of willingness to waive attorney-client privilege in the cooperation determination126",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-034",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-034",
   "claim": "Because non and deferred prosecution agreements typically run for a limited term, it remains unclear whether the governance reforms they impose survive in the long term.",
   "specific_name": "reform-does-not-stick",
   "conditions": [
    "applies because N/DPAs have a limited duration"
   ],
   "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "Given that N/DPAs typically have a limited duration/term, it re- mains unclear if N/DPA-related governance reforms can be successful in the long- term, i.e., if they \"stick.\"",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-035",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-035",
   "claim": "If corporate wrongdoing is not in fact caused by deficient corporate governance, then the governance reform imposed through a non or deferred prosecution agreement is merely a method of settlement rather than a lasting reform effort.",
   "specific_name": "settlement-not-reform",
   "conditions": [
    "holds where the wrongdoing has no identifiable governance cause"
   ],
   "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "If corporate wrongdo- ing is not the result of lacking corporate governance, it seems possible that N/DPA related governance reform is just a method of settlement rather than a lasting re- form effort.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-036",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-036",
   "claim": "The underlying corporate governance problems in United States corporations may be more severe than non and deferred prosecution agreements are capable of adequately addressing.",
   "specific_name": "remedy-scale-mismatch",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "The underlying corporate governance problems in U.S. corporations could be more severe than N/DPAs can adequately address.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2629451-028",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-028",
   "claim": "The negative market reaction at the end of the N/DPA term is the market acknowledging that suboptimal governance practices are likely to resume once the term expires.",
   "specific_name": "post-term-governance-reversion",
   "conditions": [
    "post-expiration windows in Figures 4 and 4a"
   ],
   "source": "Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements",
   "year": "2015",
   "quote": "In turn, we interpret the negative market reaction at ENDPAT in Figures 4 and 4a as the market's acknowledgment that post N/DPA term expiration suboptimal governance practices are likely to continue",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2715083-024",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-024",
   "claim": "The subadvisory route leaves a regulatory gap: none of the mutual fund manager's obligations, such as daily valuation, public and SEC reporting, or independent boards, reach the private fund adviser serving as subadviser.",
   "specific_name": "Subadviser regulatory gap",
   "conditions": [
    "private fund managers subadvising a mutual fund, subfund, or account"
   ],
   "source": "Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "none of the mutual fund manager's regulatory obligations (such as daily valuation, public/SEC reporting, independent boards, etc.) apply to the private fund subadviser.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2748096-028",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-028",
   "claim": "The SIFI designation regime does not reach hedge funds in practice: because the asset threshold is set high, at $50 billion or more in aggregate total consolidated assets, hedge funds are unlikely to be designated as systemically important financial institutions.",
   "specific_name": "SIFI threshold underinclusion",
   "conditions": [
    "U.S. SIFI designation under the Dodd-Frank Act",
    "$50 billion aggregate total consolidated asset threshold"
   ],
   "source": "Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "However, hedge funds are unlikely to be designated as SIFIs because of the high threshold on AUM.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2811718-020",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-020",
   "claim": "Deficient due diligence does not create securities fraud liability unless it is intentional or highly reckless; conduct that is merely negligent or professionally incompetent falls short of the scienter requirement.",
   "specific_name": "scienter gap for incompetent due diligence",
   "conditions": [
    "securities fraud claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5",
    "PSLRA pleading standard"
   ],
   "source": "Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "Courts hold that the lack of due diligence, beyond merely being negligent or just professionally incompetent, must be intentional or highly reckless.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2811718-040",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-040",
   "claim": "Despite bringing enforcement actions over misrepresentations about due diligence, the SEC has not taken a rigid enforcement position on whether particular due diligence industry practices are effective, and has merely acknowledged that practices became more robust after the financial crisis.",
   "specific_name": "regulator declines to set effectiveness standard",
   "conditions": [
    "SEC enforcement posture as of 2016"
   ],
   "source": "Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "Despite a number of enforcement actions that deal with misrepresentation in relation to due diligence,46 the SEC has not taken a rigid enforcement position on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of due diligence industry practices.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2739479-002",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-002",
   "claim": "The SEC's 2004 attempt to require hedge fund adviser registration failed: after the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule in Goldstein v. SEC, the overwhelming majority of private fund advisers that had registered under the 2004 requirements deregistered.",
   "specific_name": "Vacated rule reversion",
   "conditions": [
    "SEC rulemaking under the Investment Advisers Act before Dodd-Frank",
    "after the 2006 Goldstein decision"
   ],
   "source": "The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "High- lighting the significant opposition of the private fund industry to the rule, the over- whelming majority of private fund advisers that had registered under the SEC's 2004 registration requirements deregistered after Goldstein.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2732915-008",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-008",
   "claim": "After the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC's 2004 hedge fund adviser registration rule in Goldstein v. SEC, the overwhelming majority of private fund advisers who had registered under that rule deregistered.",
   "specific_name": "Judicial invalidation unwinds registration",
   "conditions": [
    "private fund advisers registered under the SEC 2004 rule",
    "after the 2006 Goldstein decision"
   ],
   "source": "The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "The overwhelming majority of private fund advisers that had registered under the SEC's 2004 registration requirements deregistered after the Goldstein decision.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2811729-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-014",
   "claim": "The SEC's interpretation of Section 18 leaves a mutual fund subject to no statutory limitation or cap on its ability to borrow through the use of derivative instruments, provided the fund adheres to its asset segregation obligations.",
   "specific_name": "Uncapped synthetic leverage",
   "conditions": [
    "mutual funds using derivatives under SEC Section 18 guidance as of 2016"
   ],
   "source": "Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "In sum, the SEC's position has meant that a mutual fund is not subject to a statutory limitation or cap on its ability to borrow through the use of derivative instruments, if the fund adheres to its asset segregation obligations.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2811729-015",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-015",
   "claim": "Proposed Rule 18f-4 would be highly limited in mitigating liquidity and other risks in an unconstrained mutual fund portfolio, because material leverage, counterparty, and liquidity risks in such a fund can arise from investments in a range of non-derivative instruments that the rule does not reach.",
   "specific_name": "Instrument-specific rule misses strategy-level risk",
   "conditions": [
    "proposed Company Act Rule 18f-4 as proposed in December 2015",
    "unconstrained mutual funds with broad investment authority"
   ],
   "source": "Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "in mitigating significant liquidity or other risks in a UMF portfolio is therefore potentially (highly) limited, as material leverage, counter-party, liquidity, and other risks to a particular UMF could arise from the fund's investments in a range of non-derivative instruments,",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2811729-037",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-037",
   "claim": "Given the risks to retail investors of investing in complex unconstrained mutual funds and the SEC's own concern about the retailization of private funds, it is unclear why the SEC has not acted to enhance protections for retail purchasers of unconstrained mutual fund shares.",
   "specific_name": "Regulator inaction despite identified risk",
   "conditions": [
    "SEC regulatory posture as of 2016"
   ],
   "source": "Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection",
   "year": "2016",
   "quote": "Given the risks to retail investors of investing in relatively complex UMFs, and the SEC's overall concern about the \"retailization\" of private funds, it is unclear why the SEC has not taken action to enhance protections for retail investors seeking to purchase shares of a UMF.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2998033-017",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-017",
   "claim": "Cryptocurrency gains are massively underreported to the IRS: despite Bitcoin rising from under twenty dollars in 2013 to over twelve hundred dollars in 2017, the IRS received only around 900 Form 8949 filings indicating crypto gain or loss over four years.",
   "specific_name": "crypto-tax-underreporting",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "While the value of Bitcoin in 2013 under $20 and its value appreciated to over $1200 in 2017, in the past four years, the IRS has only received around 900 Form 8949 that would indicate some gain or loss from cryptocurrencies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3002908-007",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-007",
   "claim": "Enforcement against the blockchain is unlikely to work because it is maintained and owned by a distributed group of anonymous users worldwide who would not likely recognize or comply with any legal authority.",
   "specific_name": "noncompliant-anonymous-participants",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "The blockchain is entirely maintained and owned by a distributed group of anonymous users located throughout the planet who would not likely recognize or comply with any legal authority.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3002908-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-014",
   "claim": "Crypto gains are being massively underreported: despite Bitcoin rising from under twenty dollars in 2013 to over twelve hundred dollars in 2017, the IRS received only about 900 Forms 8949 indicating crypto gain or loss over four years.",
   "specific_name": "crypto-tax-underreporting",
   "conditions": [
    "US federal tax reporting, four year window ending 2017"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "While the value of Bitcoin in 2013 under $20 and its value appreciated to over $1200 in 2017, in the past four years, the IRS has only received around 900 Form 8949 that would indicate some gain or loss from cryptocurrencies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-003",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-003",
   "claim": "If the jurisdictional means necessary for conflict resolution mechanisms covering Ethereum blockchain based smart contracting are absent, consumers will mistrust the new technology, and that mistrust can undermine the evolution of the blockchain based crypto economy.",
   "specific_name": "governance-vacuum-mistrust",
   "conditions": [
    "Ethereum blockchain based smart contracting"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Not having the required jurisdictional means necessary for conflict resolution mechanisms for Ethereum blockchain-based smart contracting, may invoke consumer mistrust in the new technology. This can then undermine the evolution of the blockchain-based crypto economy.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-004",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-004",
   "claim": "Personal jurisdiction technically still applies to parties transacting in encrypted distributed smart contracts, but the practicability of enforcement is impossible because physical identifiers are separated from the encrypted distributed contracts.",
   "specific_name": "enforcement-impracticability",
   "conditions": [
    "parties anonymized through public-key encryption and virtual private networks"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "While technically personal jurisdiction would still apply to parties transacting in encrypted distributed smart contracts, the practicability of enforcement is impossible given the separation of physical identifiers and encrypted distributed smart contracts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-014",
   "claim": "Even if a state or the federal government passed a law granting a court authority over blockchain smart contract disputes, it is hard to see how the court could in fact exercise that authority short of limiting access to the internet itself.",
   "specific_name": "unenforceable-statutory-grant",
   "conditions": [
    "anonymous parties transacting on public blockchains"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "But even if a given State or even the Federal Government were to pass a law that would grant such authority to a court, it is hard to see how the court would in fact exercise such authority, short of limiting access to the internet itself.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-017",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-017",
   "claim": "Because smart contracts are coded for computer programming rather than for a human observer, courts may not be able to hypothesize a reasonable human's interpretation of a given smart contract.",
   "specific_name": "code-not-interpretable-by-courts",
   "conditions": [
    "contract interpretation disputes over coded smart contracts"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Because of the emphasis on code for computer programming (and artificial intelligence), courts may not be able to hypothesize a reasonable human's interpretation of a given smart contract.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-019",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-019",
   "claim": "Real world court decisions on smart contract disputes, even where attainable, may not carry the same legitimacy and authority for the parties as intra-blockchain dispute resolution mechanisms.",
   "specific_name": "legitimacy-deficit-of-legacy-courts",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "In other words, real world court decisions even if attainable may not have the same legitimacy and authority as other intra-blockchain dispute resolution mechanism may have.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-020",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-020",
   "claim": "Even if courts were given authority to order changes to smart contract code, a programmer coerced by a court could not override the will of the majority of anonymous international blockchain users to make an effective change.",
   "specific_name": "coerced-programmer-cannot-override-majority",
   "conditions": [
    "decentralized blockchains maintained by an anonymous global user majority"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Even if courts were given such authority, no programmer so coerced by the court would be able to override the will of the majority of anonymous international blockchain users to make an effective change.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-027",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-027",
   "claim": "Without strong external pressure from existing regulatory structures and a distributed jurisdiction responsive to that pressure, the anonymity of smart contracting will ultimately undermine the coding of existing legal rules into smart contracts.",
   "specific_name": "anonymity-defeats-embedded-law",
   "conditions": [
    "anonymous parties transacting through Ethereum and virtual private networks"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Without strong external pressures from existing regulatory structures and a distributed jurisdiction for crypto transactions that is responsive to such pressure, the anonymity of smart contracting will ultimately undermine the coding of existing legal rules into smart contracts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3017612-027",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3017612-027",
   "claim": "A buy-sell agreement survives bankruptcy more reliably when it is not merely executory: because bankruptcy trustees may void executory agreements, an agreement that obliges both the shareholders and the entity to buy and sell is more likely to be enforced.",
   "specific_name": "executory-buy-sell-avoided-in-bankruptcy",
   "conditions": [
    "shareholder becomes insolvent or enters bankruptcy"
   ],
   "source": "Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Under US Law, bankruptcy trustees may void any agreement that is \"executory,\" so to the extent a buy-sell agreement requires shareholders and the entity to buy and sell, it is more likely to survive bankruptcy.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017612"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3017612-033",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3017612-033",
   "claim": "Shareholders frequently fail to place their agreements in the charter or bylaws, sometimes through ignorance or inadvertence and sometimes deliberately, because charters are public records and the parties prefer not to expose their arrangement to outsiders.",
   "specific_name": "agreement-omitted-from-charter",
   "conditions": [
    "closely held corporations"
   ],
   "source": "Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Still, shareholders often fail to include their shareholder agreements in the charter or bylaws—whether by ignorance or inadvertence.124 Sometimes this is intentional because charters are public records, and shareholders may not want their agreements open to outsiders.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017612"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3017612-037",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3017612-037",
   "claim": "Damages are usually an inadequate remedy for breach of a shareholder agreement because they are too speculative, even where the aggrieved shareholder holds a direct cause of action.",
   "specific_name": "speculative-damages-inadequate-remedy",
   "conditions": [
    "breach of a valid shareholder agreement"
   ],
   "source": "Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Damages for breaches of provisions of valid shareholder agreements are often too speculative to provide and adequate remedy, even though the individual has a direct cause of action.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017612"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3017612-038",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3017612-038",
   "claim": "Because damages rarely provide an adequate remedy for breach of a shareholder agreement, refusing specific enforcement amounts in substance to declaring the agreement invalid.",
   "specific_name": "denial-of-specific-performance-nullifies-agreement",
   "conditions": [
    "suits to enforce shareholder voting agreements"
   ],
   "source": "Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Most often a suit for damages does not provide an adequate remedy for a breach of a shareholder agreement, so the denial of specific enforcement essentially declares the agreement invalid.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017612"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2922176-011",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-011",
   "claim": "Corporate governance intermediaries such as lawyers, accountants, auditors and consultants respond to governance requirements with minimum compliance, applying minimal effort for maximum compliance.",
   "specific_name": "minimum compliance capture",
   "conditions": [
    "intermediaries advising listed companies"
   ],
   "source": "The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Corporate governance intermediaries often satisfy corporate governance requirements through minimum compliance with the rules and regulations.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3117224-017",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-017",
   "claim": "Although federal securities law is the main instrument countries use to regulate ICO technology, there is also concern about regulating exchanges, which may fall outside federal securities laws at least in part.",
   "specific_name": "exchange-regulatory-gap",
   "conditions": [
    "top 25 ICO countries"
   ],
   "source": "Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "Although (federal) securities law is the main way countries are regulating this technology, there is also concern about the regulation of exchanges within such countries which may fall outside of the federal securities laws, at least in part.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3125827-024",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-024",
   "claim": "A healthy expertise will have near unanimous consensus on every evidence of work validation pool, and that very unanimity creates an impediment to development, because honest members risk their stakes by voting for untested changes.",
   "specific_name": "unanimity-blocks-innovation",
   "conditions": [
    "well functioning expertise where all members run the same validated algorithms"
   ],
   "source": "Secure Proof of Stake Protocol",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "A healthy expertise will continually have near-unanimous consensus on every evidence-of-work validation pool. This creates an impediment to development.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782198-030",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-030",
   "claim": "The GDPR's removal remedy cannot be enforced against a public blockchain: scrubbing private information would require more than half of the network's nodes to change their entire protocol and restart the chain, and would have to be repeated for every violating entry.",
   "specific_name": "unenforceable-erasure-rights-on-chain",
   "conditions": [
    "applies to open, uncensorable blockchains such as Bitcoin holding personal data"
   ],
   "source": "Contemporary Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "More than half of the network's nodes would be required to change their entire protocol to scrub the data and restart the blockchain. This would need to happen every time information was found on the blockchain which violated the GDPR.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3808873-026",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-026",
   "claim": "Regulatory solutions tracked the characteristics of issuers, so the more decentralized, censorship resistant and autonomous products that regulators could not control were left in a regulatory vacuum that limited their expansion, reach and evolution.",
   "specific_name": "Regulatory Vacuum for Autonomous Products",
   "conditions": [
    "jurisdiction specific regulatory frameworks of the early 2020s"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralization Neutralizers",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "As a result, the more decentralized products that were more censorship resistant, autonomous, and could not be controlled by regulatory agencies, were largely left in a regulatory vacuum that limited their expansion, reach, and evolution.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782214-031",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-031",
   "claim": "Code is law smart contracts deliver a genuine leap in efficiency and clarity through digital self execution, but their supposed self regulation will always ultimately fall short, which is why an appeals capacity is necessary in any business deal.",
   "specific_name": "self regulation gap",
   "conditions": [
    "any business arrangement executed by self enforcing code"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Governance",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "While code-is-law smart con- tracts give a technological leap in efficiency and clarity, with efficient digital self-exe- cution, their supposed self-regulation will always be ultimately lacking.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782201-030",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-030",
   "claim": "The more decentralized products are, meaning more censorship resistant, autonomous, and beyond regulatory control, the more they are left in a regulatory vacuum, and the resulting legal uncertainty limits their expansion, reach, and evolution.",
   "specific_name": "regulatory vacuum for maximally decentralized products",
   "conditions": [
    "people coins as distinct from government coins and corporate coins"
   ],
   "source": "Future of Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "As a result, the more decen- tralized products that are more censorship resistant, autonomous, and cannot be con- trolled by regulatory agencies, are largely left in a regulatory vacuum. The associated legal uncertainty limits their expansion, reach, and evolution.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782193-011",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-011",
   "claim": "No set of written rules can be made complete: the Folk Theorems demonstrate that however rules are written, strategies exist that follow those rules yet profit the individual at the expense of the group, so a perfect secular constitution is impossible.",
   "specific_name": "Incompleteness of static rule sets",
   "conditions": [
    "any static, formally specified set of rules governing a group"
   ],
   "source": "Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "The Folk theories demonstrate that how- ever the rules are written, strategies exist which follow the rules, yet profit the indi- vidual at the expense of the group.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782193-012",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-012",
   "claim": "When a law is written down rigorously, specifying precisely what is acceptable and unacceptable, competition obliges people to find the most efficient behavior available inside those rules, which is typically behavior located right at the boundary of what is permissible.",
   "specific_name": "Boundary probing under codified law",
   "conditions": [
    "competitive environments",
    "rigorously codified rules"
   ],
   "source": "Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "When a law is written down rigorously, specifying precisely what is acceptable and not acceptable, people are obligated by competition to find the most efficient behavior possible within those rules.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782193-023",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-023",
   "claim": "A decentralized organization cannot be conquered by attacking it from the outside: when attacked, the group merely decentralizes further, and its members become more autonomous and more devoted to the founding principles of the organization.",
   "specific_name": "Attack-induced decentralization",
   "conditions": [
    "external coercive attack on a politically decentralized group"
   ],
   "source": "Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "This illustrates that a decentralized organization cannot be conquered by attacking it from the out- side. When you do, the group merely decentralizes further. Members become more autonomous and more devoted to the principles upon which the organization was founded.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782193-024",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-024",
   "claim": "The Spanish strategy of capturing or killing a group's leader, which succeeded against the Aztec and Incan empires, was impossible to apply to the Apaches because they had no static, official rulers and no rigid power hierarchy to manipulate.",
   "specific_name": "Decapitation strategy failure",
   "conditions": [
    "Spanish colonial expansion in the Americas",
    "groups whose leadership is by example rather than coercion"
   ],
   "source": "Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "The Apaches had no static, official rulers, which made it impossible for the Spanish to replay their strategy of killing or controlling the leader of each new territory they invaded. The Apaches had no rigid power hierarchy to manipulate.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3808867-022",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-022",
   "claim": "Regulating centralized technology conglomerates addresses only part of the problem, because even fully regulated conglomerates retain the power to set standards and norms for emerging technologies that government cannot effectively trace; microdemocratic decision making can set such standards outside their control metrics.",
   "specific_name": "Regulation cannot reach private standard setting",
   "conditions": [
    "centralized technology conglomerates that increasingly act like governments"
   ],
   "source": "How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Even if fully regulated, centralized technology conglomerates still have the power to set standards and norms for emerging technologies that government cannot effectively trace.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782192-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-014",
   "claim": "When the letter of the law becomes more important than the spirit of the law, internal competition for power makes the winning strategy to push behavior to the limit of what is acceptable.",
   "specific_name": "Letter-of-the-law rule gaming",
   "conditions": [
    "formal rule based governance inside a centralized hierarchy",
    "internal competition for power"
   ],
   "source": "Introduction to Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "When the letter of the law is more important than the spirit of the law, then internal competition for power within the hierarchy reveals the best strategy is to push your behavior to the limit of what is acceptable.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782192-015",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-015",
   "claim": "As members constantly probe the edge of acceptable behavior, policing the rules becomes more expensive, the rules become divorced from the shared goals, and relationships become brittle and formal instead of warm and loose.",
   "specific_name": "Escalating policing costs",
   "conditions": [
    "organizations relying on formal rule enforcement"
   ],
   "source": "Introduction to Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "As members constantly probe the edge of acceptable behavior, policing the rules becomes more expensive. The rules become divorced from the shared goals. Relationships become brittle and formal instead of warm and loose.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782192-017",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-017",
   "claim": "The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted: strategies always exist that follow the rules and still allow a minority player to profit at the expense of the majority.",
   "specific_name": "Formal rule subversion (Folk Theorem)",
   "conditions": [
    "any formally specified rule set analyzed as a repeated game"
   ],
   "source": "Introduction to Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "The Folk Theorems of Game Theory (explained in Chapter ^) prove the point that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted. Strategies al- ways exist which follow the rules and yet allow a minority player to profit at the ex- pense of the majority.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782210-003",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-003",
   "claim": "Strict legal enforcement is an inefficient remedy for opportunism because every unit of energy devoted to policing is energy that could instead have been used to cooperate productively.",
   "specific_name": "Policing overhead drain",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Strict legal enforcement is not efficient, because all energies devoted to policing are ener- gies that could be used to cooperate productively.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4529715-007",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-007",
   "claim": "Regulatory compliance is the weakest of all six categories, averaging 3.01 out of 10, and Services DAOs are the only category to outperform that average.",
   "specific_name": "regulatory-compliance-gap",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis",
   "year": "2023",
   "quote": "The average score for DAOs in this category is the lowest of any category at 3.01 out of 10. Services DAOs was the sole category of DAOs that outperformed this average score with 4 out of 5 DAOs scoring 5 or greater.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4796714-022",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-022",
   "claim": "AI powered DAOs that autonomously generate revenue are especially hard to regulate or dismantle, because the same blockchain security features that protect the organization also make it difficult to intervene once it is operational.",
   "specific_name": "unstoppable autonomous organization",
   "conditions": [
    "applies to autonomously revenue generating AI DAOs",
    "arises from blockchain immutability and security guarantees"
   ],
   "source": "AI Governance",
   "year": "2024",
   "quote": "Furthermore, AI-powered DAOs that autonomously generate revenue pose unique challenges in regulation and potential dismantling, as the inherent security features of blockchain technology make it difficult to intervene or alter these entities once they are operational.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4957318-022",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-022",
   "claim": "Removing laws without fully understanding their current applications or interdependencies creates legal gaps and unintended policy outcomes, so the act of cleanup can itself weaken regulatory or protective frameworks.",
   "specific_name": "repeal-induced-legal-gaps",
   "conditions": [
    "where repeal proceeds without mapping of downstream dependencies"
   ],
   "source": "The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance",
   "year": "2024",
   "quote": "Removing laws without fully understanding their current applications or interdependencies could create legal gaps or unintended policy outcomes.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5245185-018",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5245185-018",
   "claim": "Latency in blockchain forensic analysis limits real time detection, and existing compliance services offer no strategy for overseeing transactions on privacy focused blockchains where opacity defeats traditional forensic methods.",
   "specific_name": "forensic-latency-and-privacy-opacity",
   "conditions": [
    "forensic transaction analysis",
    "privacy preserving blockchains"
   ],
   "source": "How can we Best Monitor AI Agents",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "forensic analysis, limiting real-time detection, and provides no strategy for overseeing transactions on privacy-focused blockchains where opacity hampers traditional methods.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How can we Best Monitor AI Agents (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5245185"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5245185-030",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5245185-030",
   "claim": "Natural language processing driven compliance assumes static legal frameworks, so novel transaction types generated by evolving AI agents outstrip predefined rules and go undetected by centralized systems that lack external validation.",
   "specific_name": "nlp-static-rule-gap",
   "conditions": [
    "NLP based rule application to transaction data",
    "novel transaction types produced by agent evolution"
   ],
   "source": "How can we Best Monitor AI Agents",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "NLP-driven compliance assumes static legal frameworks, yet AI agents' evolution introduces novel transaction types that outstrip predefined rules, undetected by centralized systems lacking external validation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How can we Best Monitor AI Agents (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5245185"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5554218-016",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-016",
   "claim": "Neither online dispute resolution nor decentralized dispute resolution complies with the minimum due process requirements defined and acknowledged in the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which is ratified and enforced in 172 states.",
   "specific_name": "ODR and DDR fail New York Convention due process",
   "conditions": [
    "disputes over tokenized real world assets",
    "awards intended for cross-border recognition and enforcement"
   ],
   "source": "Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "It is important to note that neither ODR nor DDR comply with the minimal requirements of due process as defined and acknowledged in the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,47 which is ratified and enforced in 172 States.",
   "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5554218-017",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-017",
   "claim": "Decentralized dispute resolution relies on decentralized networks of jurors, which raises unresolved concerns about juror competence and bias.",
   "specific_name": "Juror competence and bias in decentralized adjudication",
   "conditions": [
    "complex disputes over tokenized real world assets"
   ],
   "source": "Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "DDR's reliance on decentralized networks raises concerns about juror competence and bias, as noted by Salger.",
   "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218"
  }
 ]
}