{
 "failure_mode": "plutocratic-capture",
 "specific_names": [
  "Cheap small cap launch capture",
  "Early whale supply capture",
  "External governance takeover",
  "Fungible Asset Governance Corruption",
  "Fungible governance capture",
  "Majority power capture",
  "Majority rule minority discrimination",
  "Minority stakeholder governance capture",
  "One Token One Vote Plutocracy",
  "One token one vote proportional control",
  "Polarizing outcomes of one token one vote",
  "Priority Hijacking by Large Donors",
  "Purchasable governance rights",
  "Token plutocracy",
  "Unchecked Individual Donor Agenda",
  "Undemocratic Foundation Power Structure",
  "Whale capture through purchasable voting power",
  "bench capture by prior engagement",
  "buy vote and dump arbitrage",
  "corruption through vote delegation",
  "default oligarchy",
  "delegate-vote-buying",
  "founder-token-concentration",
  "governance arbitrage through purchasable voting power",
  "local elite capture",
  "non-meritocratic-authority-allocation",
  "passive-purchasable-ownership",
  "pay to vote centralization and attack exposure",
  "priceable-corruption-cost",
  "stake weighted governance capture",
  "tiered-voting-disenfranchisement",
  "timing mismatch between information and enactment",
  "token gated membership tiers",
  "token-fragmentation",
  "token-weighted-juror-capture",
  "whale-attack",
  "whale-mediated-governance"
 ],
 "count": 37,
 "claims": [
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008",
   "claim": "Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are generally not enacted at the moment appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.",
   "specific_name": "timing mismatch between information and enactment",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts",
   "year": "2014",
   "quote": "Because rulemak- ing is subject to regulatory cycles22 and a classic collective action problem23, rules are generally not enacted when appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3125822-017",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-017",
   "claim": "The author concedes an arbitrage attack is feasible when experts fail to police their expertise and a significant share of the technically fungible tokens is offered on an exchange, since a malicious actor can then buy 51 percent of the tokens, vote against common sense, and sell before the tokens lose value.",
   "specific_name": "buy vote and dump arbitrage",
   "conditions": [
    "requires expert policing to be absent",
    "requires a liquid exchange holding a large share of tokens"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "However, it is feasible that an arbitrage opportunity could evolve if the experts do not police their expertise. If a significant percentage of the (technically fungible) tokens were put on sale in a token exchange, a malicious actor would have the opportunity to 1) buy 51% of tokens",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3125822-030",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-030",
   "claim": "When the bench of arbiters is small, a powerful private user can capture it in advance by spending heavily to engage the bench through separate contracts, mirroring the way powerful firms pay retainers to judges in the United States legal system.",
   "specific_name": "bench capture by prior engagement",
   "conditions": [
    "applies when the bench of an expertise tag is small",
    "applies when pseudonymous identity is revealed or anonymity is neglected"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "when the bench is small, a powerful private user could spend a great deal of money engaging the bench with separate contracts beforehand, as happens today in the U.S. when traditional judges are given regular consulting fees by powerful firms to ensure preferential treatment in the future.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3125827-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-014",
   "claim": "Because almost all other blockchains distribute perfectly fungible currency tokens through initial sales or mining, there is a clear, computable answer to how much it would cost to corrupt or destroy a chain running a proof of stake protocol on cryptocurrency stakes.",
   "specific_name": "priceable-corruption-cost",
   "conditions": [
    "PoS chains whose stakes are perfectly fungible currency tokens"
   ],
   "source": "Secure Proof of Stake Protocol",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "Either way, these tokens are almost always perfectly fungible currencies, so there is a clear answer to how much it would cost to corrupt or destroy blockchain running a PoS protocol based on cryptocurrency stakes.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3125827-019",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-019",
   "claim": "Any blockchain whose soft forks are decided through private communication between famous token holding whales is ultimately less secure than legacy centralized systems, which at least address centralized security risks deliberately.",
   "specific_name": "whale-mediated-governance",
   "conditions": [
    "off chain governance conducted privately among large holders and developers"
   ],
   "source": "Secure Proof of Stake Protocol",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "Any blockchain subject to such governance is ultimately less secure than legacy centralized systems which pointedly address centralized security risks.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3441904-023",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-023",
   "claim": "In delegated proof of stake protocols the significant block validation power of elected nodes leads to corruption, because those nodes are incentivized to bribe voters to be elected as delegates in exchange for some of the newly inflated tokens.",
   "specific_name": "delegate-vote-buying",
   "conditions": [
    "delegated proof of stake protocols such as EOS, Lisk, and Ark"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "That power leads to corruption. Block validation nodes in delegated proof of stake protocols are incentivized to bribe voters to be elected as delegates in exchange for some of the newly inflated tokens.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3396522-019",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-019",
   "claim": "The cryptocurrency market structure is fundamentally convoluted because each project requires its own volatile token, which is equivalent to forcing grocery shoppers to buy a different currency for every store and every product.",
   "specific_name": "token-fragmentation",
   "conditions": [
    "describes the market from inception through 2019"
   ],
   "source": "Stable Cryptocurrencies",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "The market structure of cryptocurrencies from its inception to 2019 can be compared to mandating customers who wish to purchase groceries to purchase a different currency for each store they visit and for each product chosen in such store.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3709041-019",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-019",
   "claim": "Vote delegation inevitably reintroduces corruption into a microdemocratic system, because representatives may seek to bribe or purchase votes to gain power, so delegation necessitates a policing system.",
   "specific_name": "corruption through vote delegation",
   "conditions": [
    "applies where microdemocratic systems permit delegation of voting power"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain Technology for Good",
   "year": "2020",
   "quote": "Yet, the delegation of voting power inevitably allows corruptive element back into the system as certain representatives may wish to bribe or purchase votes to provide them with more power in the system.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3799320-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-014",
   "claim": "When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt that governance design for their own gain.",
   "specific_name": "Fungible governance capture",
   "conditions": [
    "fungible assets used as the dominant governance incentive",
    "actors who are identifiable"
   ],
   "source": "A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3799320-027",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-027",
   "claim": "Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which allocate more power to holders of a significant share of total token supply.",
   "specific_name": "Token plutocracy",
   "conditions": [
    "one token one vote governance designs"
   ],
   "source": "A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then-popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one-token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3808852-035",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-035",
   "claim": "Government decentralization at the local level can favor local elites and may overcomplicate the coordination of national policies.",
   "specific_name": "local elite capture",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "Decentralization and Feedback Effects",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Furthermore, government decentralization at the local level can favor local elites and may overcomplicate the coordination of national policies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3808873-038",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-038",
   "claim": "When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design for their own gain; merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.",
   "specific_name": "Fungible Asset Governance Corruption",
   "conditions": [
    "DAO governance using fungible assets and identifiable actors"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralization Neutralizers",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3808873-039",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-039",
   "claim": "One token one vote on chain governance produces plutocracy: it allocates more power to holders of a significant share of supply so that majority token holders have more power than all other holders combined, reintroducing the defects of one share one vote legacy designs.",
   "specific_name": "One Token One Vote Plutocracy",
   "conditions": [
    "on chain voting mechanisms of the early 2020s"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralization Neutralizers",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "A one- token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token. Majority token holders have more power than the rest of the token holders combined.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782214-006",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-006",
   "claim": "Declining to adopt explicit or formal rules is itself a governance choice, and it defaults to rule by might; since might in these systems is defined by wealth, the resulting order is oligarchy.",
   "specific_name": "default oligarchy",
   "conditions": [
    "platforms where power tracks token holdings or computing power"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Governance",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Choosing no explicit or formal rules is still a governance choice. That choice de- faults to the prehistoric rule of might makes right. Since might is defined by wealth, they've chosen oligarchy.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782201-024",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-024",
   "claim": "Because voting power in the 2016 DAO could be purchased, the exact cost of destroying it was calculable, and had it lasted longer than a month someone would eventually have amassed the money to arbitrage its trivial governance structure.",
   "specific_name": "governance arbitrage through purchasable voting power",
   "conditions": [
    "governance systems in which voting power is purchasable"
   ],
   "source": "Future of Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Voting power could be purchased, so we know precisely how much money it would cost to destroy the RWOQ DAO. If it were more successful, and lasted longer than a month, someone would have eventually amassed the money to arbitrage the trivial governance structure.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3981021-028",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-028",
   "claim": "Reputation staking overcomes the polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes produced by one token one vote voting mechanisms.",
   "specific_name": "Polarizing outcomes of one token one vote",
   "conditions": [
    "governance systems choosing between token weighted and reputation weighted voting"
   ],
   "source": "How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "First, it overcomes the all too common polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes of one- token-one-vote voting mechanisms.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3808867-017",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-017",
   "claim": "Majority rule in microdemocratic systems can produce discrimination against minorities, because a majority that is itself unaffected by a rule it instantiates can impose a discriminatory impact on a minority that is disproportionately affected.",
   "specific_name": "Majority rule minority discrimination",
   "conditions": [
    "majority rule voting systems"
   ],
   "source": "How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Similarly, majority rule may mean discrimination of the minority. A majority that is unaffected by a rule they instantiate may have a discriminatory impact on a minority that is disproportionately affected by the change in the rules.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782210-029",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-029",
   "claim": "Concentration of power is the greatest threat to any decentralized organization, because a single member or sub-coalition that gains a majority of power in an inherently democratic organization will eventually control it no matter what safeguards are in place, at which point the organization is no longer decentralized.",
   "specific_name": "Majority power capture",
   "conditions": [
    "democratic decentralized organizations",
    "especially profit-devoted and therefore competitive ones"
   ],
   "source": "The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "The idea is that if a single member, or even a sub-coalition, gains j\\% of the power in an inherently dem- ocratic organization, they will eventually control it, no matter what the safeguards are.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4067783-005",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-005",
   "claim": "Governance by fungible tokens lets whales control a fundraiser DAO, which is antithetical to decentralized governance, and selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens creates the risk of hostile takeover or looting.",
   "specific_name": "Whale capture through purchasable voting power",
   "conditions": [
    "governance rights attached to fungible, purchasable tokens"
   ],
   "source": "DAO Fallacies",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "Governance through fungible tokens in fundraiser DAOs allows whales to control the DAO, which is antithetical to the idea of DAOs overall and decentralized governance of DAOs specifically. More specifically, selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens risks hostile takeovers or looting.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4067783-011",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-011",
   "claim": "Insider rug pulls are not the only exploit path: a DAO can also be attacked from the outside whenever its governance grants voting power through fungible tokens.",
   "specific_name": "External governance takeover",
   "conditions": [
    "governance voting power is denominated in fungible tokens"
   ],
   "source": "DAO Fallacies",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "But these inside rug pulls are not the only exploitative mechanism within DAOs. DAOs can also be exploited from the outside if the DAO's governance allows fungible voting power.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4067783-015",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-015",
   "claim": "Governance in most DAOs is severely underdeveloped, which leaves a minority of stakeholders defining governance, and that minority control in turn produces mediocre and poorly developed proposals.",
   "specific_name": "Minority stakeholder governance capture",
   "conditions": [
    "DAOs still in early governance experimentation"
   ],
   "source": "DAO Fallacies",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "Governance is severely underdeveloped in most DAOs which results typically in a minority of stakeholders that define governance. This, in turn, often result in mediocre and poorly-developed proposals.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4067783-033",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-033",
   "claim": "Braintrust demonstrates that innovation in work structure does not cure governance design: despite redefining work outcomes, it uses a suboptimal one token, one vote model that grants proportional control over network governance.",
   "specific_name": "One token one vote proportional control",
   "conditions": [
    "governance by one token, one vote"
   ],
   "source": "DAO Fallacies",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "Despite its advances in innovation for redefining work outcomes, Braintrust uses a suboptimal governance model with a one token, one vote system for proportional control over how the network is governed.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4015908-013",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-013",
   "claim": "Small market cap launches at very cheap initial prices carry the potential for team and whale purchase abuses, which is why equitable treatment of the public requires significant project-controlled liquidity.",
   "specific_name": "Cheap small cap launch capture",
   "conditions": [
    "small market capitalization",
    "very low initial token price"
   ],
   "source": "Fair Token Launch",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "Small market cap launches at very cheap initial prices bring with them the potential abuses of team and whale purchases.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4015908-024",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-024",
   "claim": "DAO governance built on fungible governance tokens is disfavored and dangerous because governance rights can be bought on open exchanges, whereas non-fungible reputation governance assures the highest levels of decentralization.",
   "specific_name": "Purchasable governance rights",
   "conditions": [
    "DAO governance rights are tradeable on open exchanges"
   ],
   "source": "Fair Token Launch",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "DAO governance that revolves around fungible governance tokens is disfavored and dangerous in this context as governance rights can be bought on open exchanges. By contrast, non-fungible reputation governance of the DAO assures highest levels of decentralization.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4015908-028",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-028",
   "claim": "Whale purchases that soak up token supply at the earliest possible time in a launch are the key problem fair launch platforms address, because they can be the origin of significant centralization that harms the project for the entirety of its active market engagement.",
   "specific_name": "Early whale supply capture",
   "conditions": [
    "whales able to buy large amounts at the earliest moment of a launch"
   ],
   "source": "Fair Token Launch",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "of whale token purchases that soak up supply at the earliest possible time in the token launch. Such whale purchases can be the origin of significant centralization of a token launch that may harm the project for the entirely of its active market engagement.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4529715-027",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-027",
   "claim": "Meaningful accessibility in a DAO is impossible if voting rights and ownership are merely passive purchasable assets, no different from traditional stock.",
   "specific_name": "passive-purchasable-ownership",
   "conditions": [
    "purchasable governance tokens"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis",
   "year": "2023",
   "quote": "accessibility will not be possible if voting rights and ownership are merely passive purchasable assets, not unlike traditional stock today.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4529715-030",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-030",
   "claim": "VitaDAO's one token one vote structure leaves it susceptible to the 51 percent or whale attack, a vulnerability made worse because the VITA token is primarily purchasable.",
   "specific_name": "whale-attack",
   "conditions": [
    "one token one vote with a purchasable token"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis",
   "year": "2023",
   "quote": "Because Vita uses a one token one vote, they are susceptible to the 51% problem, or \"Whale Attack.\" This problem is further exacerbated because the Vita token is primarily a purchasable token.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4529715-031",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-031",
   "claim": "Allocating twenty percent of total token supply to the four person founding team, as Angel Protocol does, means the organization can never become fully decentralized.",
   "specific_name": "founder-token-concentration",
   "conditions": [
    "founding team holds 20 percent of supply"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis",
   "year": "2023",
   "quote": "will possess 20% of the total tokens in supply. This concentration of tokens in the individuals who created this DANO, will never fully allow Angel Protocol to become fully decentralized.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4529715-038",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-038",
   "claim": "Kleros has weak attack resistance because juror selection is proportional to staked fungible tokens; staking reputation rather than tokens to select jurors would remedy this.",
   "specific_name": "token-weighted-juror-capture",
   "conditions": [
    "token staked juror selection"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis",
   "year": "2023",
   "quote": "As such, Kleros has weak attack resistance. This could be changed by utilizing a reputation system to stake rather than tokens in order to select the jurors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4529715-040",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-040",
   "claim": "When only a minority of members, such as Audius node operators, can stake or earn weighted votes, the majority of token holders occupy the same powerless position as an ordinary shareholder in a corporation.",
   "specific_name": "tiered-voting-disenfranchisement",
   "conditions": [
    "tiered voting where staking is restricted to node operators"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis",
   "year": "2023",
   "quote": "The downside of their structure is that only a minority of users are able to use staking or weighted tokens for voting. Thus, a majority of token holders remain in the same position as any general shareholder of a corporation relative to their power.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4796714-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-014",
   "claim": "Proof of Stake consensus centralizes control in proportion to the quantity of tokens held, so governance built on such chains is skewed in favor of the wealthy rather than distributed.",
   "specific_name": "stake weighted governance capture",
   "conditions": [
    "applies to Proof of Stake chains such as Ethereum",
    "concerns token weighted governance power"
   ],
   "source": "AI Governance",
   "year": "2024",
   "quote": "Similarly, Proof of Stake (PoS) consensus mechanisms, as implemented in Ethereum and other blockchains, centralize control based on the quantity of tokens held, potentially skewing governance in favor of the wealthy.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5254152-027",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-027",
   "claim": "Requiring users to purchase governance tokens in order to vote both centralizes power in majority token holders and leaves the DAO highly vulnerable to 51 percent and sock puppet attacks, as illustrated by Gelato DAO which scored 1 on both decentralization and attack resistance.",
   "specific_name": "pay to vote centralization and attack exposure",
   "conditions": [
    "DAOs where voting requires purchasing fungible governance tokens"
   ],
   "source": "DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024",
   "year": "2024",
   "quote": "It is highly centralized as users must purchase governance tokens to vote, limiting power to majority token holders (D: 1). The platform is highly vulnerable to 51% and sock puppet attacks due to the purchasable governance tokens (A: 1).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5254152-037",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-037",
   "claim": "Tiered membership models that tie governance rights and influence to token holdings introduce imbalance and a centralization element into DAO governance, as scored for Bankless DAO.",
   "specific_name": "token gated membership tiers",
   "conditions": [
    "DAOs with contributor tiers or access levels keyed to token ownership"
   ],
   "source": "DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024",
   "year": "2024",
   "quote": "The tiered membership model ties rights and influence to token holdings, creating an imbalance and centralization element in its governance (G: 4).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4685567-003",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-003",
   "claim": "Impact 1.0 foundations developed plutocratic power structures because their leaders and trustees were never democratically elected, and Impact 3.0 addresses this by adding WEB3 collaborative democratic measures on top of the existing foundation structures.",
   "specific_name": "Undemocratic Foundation Power Structure",
   "conditions": [
    "private foundation governance",
    "Impact 3.0 still relies on foundation structures"
   ],
   "source": "Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0",
   "year": "2024",
   "quote": "further improve Impact 1.0 private foundations by adding collaborative WEB3 democratic measures that address plutocratic power structures in Impact 1.0 foundations that originated in the lack of democratic elections of Impact 1.0 foundations' organizations' leaders or trustees.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4685567-004",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-004",
   "claim": "Because Impact 1.0 entrusted individual donors rather than donor collectives with identifying which problems to solve, individual philanthropists can reshape underfunded causes according to their own ideals without meaningful checks and balances or crowd wisdom.",
   "specific_name": "Unchecked Individual Donor Agenda",
   "conditions": [
    "Impact 1.0 and 2.0 philanthropic strategies",
    "high net worth individual and corporate donors"
   ],
   "source": "Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0",
   "year": "2024",
   "quote": "Individual philanthropists can leverage underfunded causes and reshape them according to their ideals without significant checks and balances or crowd wisdom considerations.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4685567-009",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-009",
   "claim": "The absence of an efficient marketplace lets big dollar donors hijack the priorities of impact intermediaries such as foundations, donor advised funds, NGOs and fiscal sponsors, producing a feast or famine pattern for fundable projects.",
   "specific_name": "Priority Hijacking by Large Donors",
   "conditions": [
    "intermediated philanthropy without a central marketplace"
   ],
   "source": "Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0",
   "year": "2024",
   "quote": "Because of the lack of an efficient marketplace, impact intermediaries, such as foundations, DAFs, NGOs, and fiscal sponsors, among others, often experience their priorities being hijacked by big-dollar donors. This often results in a feast or famine situation for fundable projects in Impact 1.0.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5887242-034",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5887242-034",
   "claim": "Every existing legal order allocates amendment authority by territory, wealth, appointment, or historical accident, and none allocates it exclusively by objectively demonstrated and continuously revalidated expertise.",
   "specific_name": "non-meritocratic-authority-allocation",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "The UDLC DAO Operationalizing a Continuously Evolving Universal Digital Law Codex Through Weighted",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "Every existing legal order allocates amendment authority either by territory (national legislatures), wealth (corporate boards), appointment (treaty organizations, bar associations), or historical accident (tenured judiciary).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The UDLC DAO Operationalizing a Continuously Evolving Universal Digital Law Codex Through Weighted (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5887242"
  }
 ]
}