{
 "failure_mode": "smart-contract-rigidity",
 "specific_names": [
  "Automated self help violates mandatory remedy rules",
  "Codeless Human Backstop Gap",
  "Immutability blocks judicial modification",
  "Incomplete contracting in code",
  "Irreversible self execution rigidity",
  "Loophole exploitation under rigid coded terms",
  "No appeal or mitigation in automated enforcement",
  "asymmetric encumbrance abuse",
  "backstop-absent-guarantee-failure",
  "cancel-out-on-unanticipated-events",
  "cancel-out-on-unfulfilled-parameters",
  "code-is-law-absolutism",
  "ex-ante-incompleteness-of-hardcoded-policy",
  "immutability trap",
  "immutability-blocks-remedies",
  "inevitable-smart-contract-imperfection",
  "intent-interpretation-gap",
  "irreversible self execution",
  "limits-of-full-automation",
  "minimum performance degeneration",
  "missing-default-rules",
  "no-breach-no-remedy",
  "no-partial-performance",
  "no-real-time-governance-upgrade",
  "non codifiable information is discarded",
  "perfect design fallacy",
  "review delay causing contract obsolescence",
  "rigidity of smart contract logic",
  "rigidity-of-mathematical-logic",
  "transferability-creates-attack-points",
  "unwise-protocol-centralization"
 ],
 "count": 34,
 "claims": [
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-016",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-016",
   "claim": "Breach of a smart contract is arguably not even possible, because the contract simply will not execute if a parameter is not fulfilled.",
   "specific_name": "no-breach-no-remedy",
   "conditions": [
    "fully self executing smart contracts on Ethereum"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Arguably, breach of a smart contract is not even possible, the contract simply will not execute if a parameter is not fulfilled.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-018",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-018",
   "claim": "To institute traditional remedies where a smart contract transaction disadvantages one of the parties, courts would have to change the blockchain, and that is computationally and practically impossible.",
   "specific_name": "immutability-blocks-remedies",
   "conditions": [
    "transactions already executed and added to an immutable blockchain"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "courts would have to change the blockchain in order to institute remedies in the traditional sense that could pertain to the smart contract in question. However, that scenario is computationally and practically impossible.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:2992962-030",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-030",
   "claim": "Problems with smart contracts are inevitable because of subjectivity in human relationships, bounded rationality of coders and contracting parties, incomplete foresight, incomplete information, and opportunistic behavior.",
   "specific_name": "inevitable-smart-contract-imperfection",
   "conditions": [
    "commercial smart contracting between human parties"
   ],
   "source": "Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution",
   "year": "2017",
   "quote": "Problems with smart contracts are inevitable because of the subjectivity in human relationship, bounded rationality of coders and contracting parties, incomplete foresight, incomplete information, and opportunistic behavior.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3125822-032",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-032",
   "claim": "Parties to a smart contract must avoid asymmetric encumbrance of assets, because in an anonymous blockchain environment where assets cannot be recovered from parties further down the transaction tree, an asymmetrically bound party can unfairly exert power by triggering a dispute.",
   "specific_name": "asymmetric encumbrance abuse",
   "conditions": [
    "anonymous or pseudonymous counterparties",
    "assets must be bound in the smart contract"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "Therefore, it is incumbent upon the parties not to enter into an asymmetric contract of bound assets, lest one party may unfairly exert power over the other by encumbering assets in a dispute.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3266953-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-014",
   "claim": "Smart contracts cannot by themselves carry human business interactions, because those interactions require flexibility in interpreting intent that is at odds with the merciless mathematical logic of smart contract code.",
   "specific_name": "rigidity of smart contract logic",
   "conditions": [
    "business collaborations with unanticipated eventualities or partial performance"
   ],
   "source": "Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "Human business interactions require a flexibility that is at odds with the merciless mathematical logic of smart contracts.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3266953-015",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-015",
   "claim": "A pure code is law smart contract between anonymous parties creates a zero sum scenario in which each party is incentivized to deliver only the minimum that satisfies the rigid self executing terms, so this type of business ultimately degenerates.",
   "specific_name": "minimum performance degeneration",
   "conditions": [
    "self executing contracts between often anonymous parties",
    "no reputation at stake"
   ],
   "source": "Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper",
   "year": "2018",
   "quote": "This creates a zero-sum scenario where both parties are entirely incentivized to provide the minimum possible to fulfill the perfectly rigid self-executing contract. This type of business ultimately degenerates as people will spend extra effort to deliver the minimum acceptable products.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3441904-013",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-013",
   "claim": "Unlike corporate governance systems, the decentralized nexus of incomplete smart contracts has no supply of majoritarian default rules to fill its gaps, and corporate law's default rules are largely incompatible because they are based on natural language.",
   "specific_name": "missing-default-rules",
   "conditions": [
    "blockchain based entities organized through smart contracts"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Unlike existing corporate governance systems, however, the decentralized nexus of incomplete smart contracts does not have a supply of majoritarian default rules that could fill incomplete code-based smart contracts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3441904-014",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-014",
   "claim": "The core governance failure of the original 2016 DAO was its inability to create dynamic governance protocol upgrades in real time through dynamic feedback loops, because its voting structure was built for investment proposals rather than governance design.",
   "specific_name": "no-real-time-governance-upgrade",
   "conditions": [
    "the original 2016 DAO",
    "flaws materializing in already deployed code"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "The core governance failure illustrated by the 2016 DAO is its failure to create dynamic governance protocol upgrades in real-time through dynamic feedback loops.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3373393-038",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-038",
   "claim": "Without a decentralized human backstop to code, the immutability of the blockchain and its cryptographic security systems may not be able to create truly transactional guarantees and trust between principals and agents.",
   "specific_name": "backstop-absent-guarantee-failure",
   "conditions": [
    "complex agency relationships"
   ],
   "source": "Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Similarly, without a decentralized human backstop to code, the immutability of the blockchain and its cryptographic security systems may not be able to create truly transactional guarantees and trust between principals and agents in the integrity of their contractual relationship.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3406323-032",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-032",
   "claim": "Smart contracts fail to accommodate human business interaction because code does not follow the same logic on similar terms as natural human language, so the flexibility in interpreting intent that human dealings require cannot be ensured.",
   "specific_name": "rigidity-of-mathematical-logic",
   "conditions": [
    "human business interactions requiring interpretation of intent"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Human interaction requires flexibility in interpreting intent that cannot be ensured by smart contracting because smart contract code does not follow the same logic on similar terms as natural human language.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3406323-033",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-033",
   "claim": "Smart contracts undermine the parties' ability to continue collaborating when unanticipated eventualities arise, because in most cases of unfulfilled parameters the contract will simply cancel out rather than allow partial performance.",
   "specific_name": "cancel-out-on-unanticipated-events",
   "conditions": [
    "contracts where parties may fulfill only a portion of an intended collaboration"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Smart contracts also undermine counterparties' ability to continue collaboration when unanticipated eventualities arise. In most cases of unfulfilled parameters, the smart contract will simply cancel out.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3411897-032",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-032",
   "claim": "Human business interactions require a flexibility that is at odds with the merciless mathematical logic of smart contracts, so smart contracting cannot ensure the flexible interpretation of intent that human interaction requires.",
   "specific_name": "rigidity-of-mathematical-logic",
   "conditions": [
    "human commercial relationships requiring interpretation of intent"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Human business interactions require a flexibility that is at odds with merciless mathematical logic of smart contracts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3411897-033",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-033",
   "claim": "Smart contracts undermine counterparties' ability to continue collaborating when unanticipated eventualities arise, because in most cases of unfulfilled parameters the smart contract will simply cancel out rather than allow partial performance.",
   "specific_name": "cancel-out-on-unfulfilled-parameters",
   "conditions": [
    "unanticipated eventualities and partial performance scenarios"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Smart contracts also undermine counterparties' ability to continue collaboration when unanticipated eventualities arise. In most cases of unfulfilled parameters, the smart contract will simply cancel out.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3405401-009",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-009",
   "claim": "Despite their benefits, smart contracts are subject to significant limitations because human business interactions require a flexibility that is at odds with the merciless mathematical logic of smart contracts.",
   "specific_name": "rigidity-of-mathematical-logic",
   "conditions": [
    "human business interactions rather than fully mechanical exchanges"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Despite the significant benefits of smart contracting for business and society, smart contracts are subject to significant limitations. Human business interactions require a flexibility that is at odds with merciless mathematical logic of smart contracts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3405401-010",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-010",
   "claim": "Smart contracting cannot ensure the flexibility in interpreting intent that human interaction requires, because smart contract code does not follow the same logic on similar terms as natural human language.",
   "specific_name": "intent-interpretation-gap",
   "conditions": [
    "interpretation of party intent is required"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Human interaction requires flexibility in interpreting intent that cannot be ensured by smart contracting because smart contract code does not follow the same logic on similar terms as natural human language.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3405401-011",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-011",
   "claim": "Smart contracts undermine the ability of counterparties to continue collaborating when unanticipated eventualities arise, because in most cases of unfulfilled parameters the smart contract will simply cancel out.",
   "specific_name": "cancel-out-on-unanticipated-events",
   "conditions": [
    "unanticipated eventualities arise",
    "contract parameters go unfulfilled"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Smart contracts also undermine counterparties' ability to continue collaboration when unanticipated eventualities arise. In most cases of unfulfilled parameters, the smart contract will simply cancel out.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3405401-012",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-012",
   "claim": "Human business interaction typically requires the possibility that each party may fulfill only a portion of an intended collaboration, a partial performance option that mathematically rigid smart contracts do not accommodate.",
   "specific_name": "no-partial-performance",
   "conditions": [
    "partial performance is contemplated by the parties"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "Human business interaction also typically requires the possibility that each party may fulfill only a portion of any intended collaboration.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3405401-022",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-022",
   "claim": "The transferability of the stores of value entailed in cryptocurrencies creates core points of attack and undermines the very nature of decentralization.",
   "specific_name": "transferability-creates-attack-points",
   "conditions": [
    "cryptocurrencies and other transferable stores of value"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "The transferability of stores of value entailed in cryptocurrencies creates core points of attack and undermines the very nature of decentralization.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3396522-026",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-026",
   "claim": "Full hardcoding is impossible: no stable cryptocurrency can encode all required policies and policy actions with full transparency, because future policy needs cannot be anticipated ex ante.",
   "specific_name": "ex-ante-incompleteness-of-hardcoded-policy",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "Stable Cryptocurrencies",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "No stable cryptocurrency can hardcode all required policies and policy making actions with full transparency as future policy cannot be fully anticipated ex ante, before the needs occur.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3402701-032",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-032",
   "claim": "The day-to-day stability mechanism can be fully automated by algorithm, but monetary and fiscal policy choices cannot be: the algorithm's parameters must be chosen by hand and adjusted regularly to balance security against efficiency.",
   "specific_name": "limits-of-full-automation",
   "conditions": [
    "stability mechanisms operating in changing markets"
   ],
   "source": "Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles",
   "year": "2019",
   "quote": "However, monetary and fiscal policy choices cannot be fully automated. The parameters for the algorithm must be chosen by hand and adjusted regularly to balance security with maximal efficiency in response to network performance",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3652481-009",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-009",
   "claim": "The immutability of blockchain ledgers is itself a vulnerability, because once a DAO is in operation its essential construction is very difficult to alter should a bug in the code appear.",
   "specific_name": "immutability trap",
   "conditions": [
    "a bug exists in deployed DAO code"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design",
   "year": "2020",
   "quote": "The immutable nature of blockchain ledgers could also make the DAO vulnerable to attacks because it is so difficult to alter the essential construction of the DAO once the system is in operation, should a bug in the code arise.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3606663-032",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-032",
   "claim": "Because human interactions in business are often too complex to be fully codified objectively, DeFi systems that exclude all non objective information from their analysis do not fully utilize available information, which limits their efficiency and usefulness.",
   "specific_name": "non codifiable information is discarded",
   "conditions": [
    "DeFi products analyzing only objectively recordable and verifiable inputs",
    "complex commercial interactions"
   ],
   "source": "Digital Asset Market Evolution",
   "year": "2020",
   "quote": "However, human interaction in business are often too complex to be fully codified objectively. By excluding all non- objective information from the product analysis, all available information may not be fully utilized which limits efficiency and potential usefulness of DeFi",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782203-004",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-004",
   "claim": "Protocol centralization, meaning rigid and immediately enforced rules such as those executed by smart contracts, leads to instability unless it is implemented wisely.",
   "specific_name": "unwise-protocol-centralization",
   "conditions": [
    "smart contract enforced protocols",
    "politically decentralized networks"
   ],
   "source": "A Technical Perspective on Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "However, protocol centralization leads to instability if it is not implemented wisely.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782203-022",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-022",
   "claim": "Despite its alluring simplicity, the Code is Law credo taken as an absolute is not an efficient solution for business, because unintended consequences of contracts arise in almost every business arrangement.",
   "specific_name": "code-is-law-absolutism",
   "conditions": [
    "commercial smart contract relationships",
    "unintended consequences of contract execution"
   ],
   "source": "A Technical Perspective on Decentralization",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Despite how alluring the simplicity of the Code-is-Law credo is, that extreme pu- ritanical line is not an efficient solution for business.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3808873-042",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-042",
   "claim": "A decentralized human backstop to code is a core and often overlooked infrastructure requirement, because without it the immutability of the blockchain and its cryptographic security may not create genuine transactional guarantees or trust between principals and agents in the integrity of their contractual relationship.",
   "specific_name": "Codeless Human Backstop Gap",
   "conditions": [
    "decentralized algorithmic systems mediating principal agent contractual relationships"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralization Neutralizers",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Without a decentralized human backstop to code, the immutability of the blockchain and its cryptographic security systems may not be able to create truly transactional guarantees and trust between principals and agents in the integrity of their contractual relationship.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782214-015",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-015",
   "claim": "Rigid code is law smart contracts over fungible currency are built to guarantee irreversible, unreviewable, self executing outcomes, which is a poor match for business because business ventures very rarely proceed exactly as imagined at the outset.",
   "specific_name": "irreversible self execution",
   "conditions": [
    "contracts involving fungible currency exchange",
    "commercial arrangements with uncertain execution"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Governance",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "Further, rigid \"code is law\" smart contracts involving fungible currency exchanges are designed to guarantee irreversible, unreviewable, programmed self-execution. Very rarely does any business venture proceed exactly as imagined from the begin- ning.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3782214-017",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-017",
   "claim": "The engineering assumption that such problems can be entirely avoided through perfect system design is naive: exceptions will always exist because business competition always seeks optimal solutions that sit at the limits of the rules.",
   "specific_name": "perfect design fallacy",
   "conditions": [
    "competitive commercial environments"
   ],
   "source": "Decentralized Governance",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "The typical engineering attitude is that such problems can be entirely avoided with perfect system design. This is naïve. Exceptions will always exist. Business com- petition always seeks optimal solutions which occur at the limits of the rules of behav- ior.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:3995709-018",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-018",
   "claim": "Delays in legacy code reviews, which can be exacerbated by digital asset market conditions, can impact development and may require complete rewriting of contracts because the underlying protocol may have upgraded core libraries during the review.",
   "specific_name": "review delay causing contract obsolescence",
   "conditions": [
    "legacy code review settings",
    "fast moving protocol environments in digital asset markets"
   ],
   "source": "How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards",
   "year": "2021",
   "quote": "This can get exacerbated by market conditions in the digital asset market. These significant delays can impact development and may require complete rewriting of contracts because the underlying protocol may have upgraded core libraries during the code review.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4067783-020",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-020",
   "claim": "Smart contracts that govern fungible currency exchanges are engineered for irreversible, unreviewable, programmed self execution, and that design makes the business structure of web3 more rigid.",
   "specific_name": "Irreversible self execution rigidity",
   "conditions": [
    "smart contracts involving fungible currency exchange"
   ],
   "source": "DAO Fallacies",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "Yet, smart contracts involving fungible currency exchanges are designed to guarantee irreversible, unreviewable, programmed self execution. As such, they create a more rigid structure for business in web3.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:4067783-021",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-021",
   "claim": "Code is law fails as a complete business ordering because business ventures very rarely proceed exactly as written in smart contract code: real business relationships are far messier and more multivalent than a series of smart contracts can predict.",
   "specific_name": "Incomplete contracting in code",
   "conditions": [],
   "source": "DAO Fallacies",
   "year": "2022",
   "quote": "In reality, very rarely does any business venture proceed exactly as planned in smart contract code because the reality of business relationships is far more messy and multivalent than can be predicted by a series of smart contracts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5554218-007",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-007",
   "claim": "Because blockchain based contracts are immutable, they cannot be altered by judicial order, which creates enforceability problems whenever a dispute arises outside the scope of the code, such as defective performance or unforeseen circumstances.",
   "specific_name": "Immutability blocks judicial modification",
   "conditions": [
    "disputes falling outside the coded parameters",
    "post-deployment execution on an immutable ledger"
   ],
   "source": "Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "The immutability of blockchain-based contracts means they cannot be altered by judicial order, creating enforceability challenges when disputes arise outside the code's scope, such as defective performance or unforeseen circumstances.",
   "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5554218-008",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-008",
   "claim": "The adaptability of common law to smart contracts is strained when the coded mechanism itself violates a legal norm, as with smart contracts that enable automatic collateral repossession contrary to the Uniform Commercial Code's restrictions on strict foreclosure.",
   "specific_name": "Automated self help violates mandatory remedy rules",
   "conditions": [
    "smart contracts automating self help remedies",
    "United States secured transactions law under the UCC"
   ],
   "source": "Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "However, this adaptability is strained when smart contracts, such as those enabling automatic collateral repossession, violate legal norms like the UCC's restrictions on strict foreclosure.",
   "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5554218-020",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-020",
   "claim": "Unlike legal systems that balance enforcement against fairness, the binary execution of code offers no mechanism for appeal or mitigation, which limits recourse for aggrieved parties and challenges basic notions of justice.",
   "specific_name": "No appeal or mitigation in automated enforcement",
   "conditions": [
    "automated on chain enforcement without human adjudication"
   ],
   "source": "Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "Unlike legal systems, which balance enforcement with fairness, code's binary execution lacks mechanisms for appeal or mitigation, challenging notions of justice.",
   "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218"
  },
  {
   "id": "kaal:claim:5554218-024",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-024",
   "claim": "The deterministic execution of smart contracts rigidly enforces coded terms and thereby incentivizes participants to exploit loopholes for immediate gain, because no mechanism exists to adapt the rules contextually.",
   "specific_name": "Loophole exploitation under rigid coded terms",
   "conditions": [
    "smart contracts without on chain amendment or human review mechanisms"
   ],
   "source": "Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era",
   "year": "2025",
   "quote": "Conversely, smart contracts' deterministic execution rigidly enforces coded terms, incentivizing participants to exploit loopholes for immediate gain, as there is no mechanism to adapt rules contextually.",
   "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218"
  }
 ]
}