{
  "batch_id": "kaal-growth:2026-09-29:daily-001",
  "date": "2026-09-29",
  "status": "standing-preauthorized",
  "repository_mode": "public",
  "private_compilation": false,
  "review_provenance": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions-src/2026-09-29-compound-growth-kaal-growth-2026-09-29-daily-001.json",
  "source_snapshot_sha256": "117417c0b40eab1eddcaa1e572143f0eb2dd8933ab9967b21db818ffe6316b22",
  "review_ledger_sha256": "6d3ec7c91ff1b36f771255c2f25569c288fee3d41e33e6eb16c879d3c7668307",
  "exact_authorization": "Publish frozen scholarly-growth packets automatically only after every evidence, identity, uniqueness, authority, protected-layer, deterministic-build, deployment, and live-byte verification gate passes.",
  "positions": [
    {
      "sequence": 1,
      "response_type": "agreement",
      "slug": "non-transferability-alone-does-not-create-sybil-resistance",
      "topics": [
        "identity",
        "reputation",
        "sybil-resistance",
        "blockchain-governance"
      ],
      "text": "Fábrega and coauthors demonstrate that formal non-transferability does not by itself preserve one-person-one-account control. TEE-based key encumbrance can let one actor rent or direct voting rights across identity-verified wallets without transferring the underlying credential. The result supports the narrower proposition that Sybil resistance also requires control-binding assumptions or countermeasures; it does not show that every non-transferable identity design fails.",
      "scope_conditions": [
        "TEE-based key encumbrance is available",
        "wallet or credential control can be rented or delegated",
        "the protected claim is treated as a negative sufficiency proposition"
      ],
      "current_debate": {
        "name": "Liquefaction: Privately Liquefying Blockchain Assets",
        "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.02634v1"
      },
      "extends": {
        "identifier": "kaal:claim:7456999-035",
        "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/7456999-035",
        "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reinforcement Learning from Reputation Feedback (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7456999",
        "paper": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reinforcement Learning from Reputation Feedback (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7456999",
        "authors": [
          "Wulf A. Kaal"
        ],
        "year": "2026",
        "ssrn": null,
        "source_pdf_sha256": "01016fbbcc25cad205cebd59ea686d8dfee8ae9b632095d86ba6c9a900456a4b"
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      "candidate_id": "kaal:candidate:f4873d4d7ffa500799c2e5ffe83a6d0ac5b1d1f526681cdad47f225052d93dcd",
      "evidence_level": "permitted_full_text",
      "review_tier": "independent evidence-first compound-growth review",
      "mapping_confidence": null,
      "mapping_ambiguous": false,
      "mapping_method": "independent one-to-one proposition and mechanism review",
      "mapping_why_relevant": "The source supplies a concrete blockchain counterexample to sufficiency: formal non-transferability and identity verification do not preserve one-person-one-account control when key encumbrance permits voting rights or credential proofs to be rented across identity-verified wallets.",
      "source_provenance": {
        "canonicalUrl": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.02634v1",
        "retrievedAt": "2026-09-29T13:50:34.917Z",
        "sourceContentSha256": "c1f2566c1831ef117bf3d0d2765267f736fbe58fdc9683009dbce3f2f1fef473",
        "sourceProposition": "Fábrega et al. show that identity systems intended to prevent Sybil accounts can remain insufficient when key encumbrance lets one actor control voting across identity-verified wallets.",
        "sourcePropositionSha256": "6541a5532ced5676f668d7975d1cd690ba23e0e5594a47754e2833469132db20",
        "normalizedWorkId": "arxiv:2412.02634",
        "sourceVersion": "v1",
        "exactEvidenceQuote": "While whales splitting their tokens across Sybil accounts is a known attack on quadratic voting systems, identity systems alone (ensuring one user, one account to negate Sybils) are insufficient in the presence of key encumbrance.",
        "exactEvidenceQuoteSha256": "1b73f25cb56212a892a170f3890458f3eb01c61ce13822bc09748e7823e7b039",
        "claimMappings": [
          {
            "claimId": "kaal:claim:7456999-035",
            "confidence": null,
            "method": "independent one-to-one review",
            "whyRelevant": "The source supplies a concrete blockchain counterexample to sufficiency: formal non-transferability and identity verification do not preserve one-person-one-account control when key encumbrance permits voting rights or credential proofs to be rented across identity-verified wallets.",
            "ambiguous": false
          }
        ]
      },
      "user_affirmation": "Standing scholarly-growth preauthorization bound to 117417c0b40eab1eddcaa1e572143f0eb2dd8933ab9967b21db818ffe6316b22; publication remains conditional on successful projection, deployment, and live-byte verification."
    }
  ],
  "public_authority": {
    "authorityReceipt": "kaal-authority:2026-08-27:compound-growth-standing-preauthorization",
    "lane": "scholarly-growth",
    "standingPreauthorization": true,
    "batchManifestSha256": "117417c0b40eab1eddcaa1e572143f0eb2dd8933ab9967b21db818ffe6316b22"
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}