{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "Claim",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-5705",
 "identifier": "kaal:position:2026-07-31-5705",
 "additionalType": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/schema.json#AffirmedPositionClaim",
 "name": "Legacy Reputation In Contests F1F87D9Dea",
 "text": "Reputation in Contests should be assessed against Kaal's source-bound position that Because policing protocol deviants is expensive, it is individually more efficient to assume others comply and skip policing, which yields a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which eventually fewer than half of members police and the system can be gamed. The external source's verified abstract presents this proposition: Abstract We investigate two-stage parallel contests with a finite number of heterogeneous agents with various skills (cost of efforts) and reputations, as well as a finite number of heterogeneous contests. The defensible response is a qualification: the source is pertinent to the Kaal position, but agreement, extension, contradiction, and scope should not be strengthened beyond the retrieved evidence.",
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7840-1847"
 },
 "datePublished": "2026-07-31",
 "dateModified": "2026-07-31",
 "creativeWorkStatus": "Affirmed",
 "responseType": "qualification",
 "keywords": [
  "economics",
  "compliance",
  "historical-response",
  "scholarly-literature"
 ],
 "scope_conditions": [
  "The response remains limited to the source proposition and evidence retrieved in this reconciliation cycle.",
  "External evidence level: abstract indexed.",
  "Mapping review tier: legacy curated mapping review.",
  "Mapping confidence is intentionally unscored.",
  "The source-to-claim mapping remains explicitly ambiguous and is published with that limitation."
 ],
 "currentDebate": {
  "name": "Reputation in Contests",
  "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-026-07107-y"
 },
 "extends": {
  "identifier": "kaal:claim:6269518-016",
  "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-016",
  "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
  "paper": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance",
  "authors": [
   "Wulf A. Kaal"
  ],
  "year": "2026",
  "ssrn": "https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
  "source_pdf_sha256": "f096ecf5b41bb9ae8642facd54b9149c7b594de53a1cc32718a4d806b772f88f"
 },
 "isBasedOn": [
  {
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-016"
  },
  {
   "@type": "CreativeWork",
   "name": "Reputation in Contests",
   "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-026-07107-y"
  }
 ],
 "batch_id": "kaal-review:2026-07-31:legacy-reconciliation-0001",
 "review_provenance": "https://kaal-signal-desk.wulf577462.chatgpt.site/#frozen-batch-heading",
 "publicationStatus": "public",
 "recordTypeNote": "Dated commentary position extending a scholarly corpus claim. Not a verbatim claim extracted from the paper.",
 "isPartOf": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/index.json"
 },
 "version": "1.0",
 "canonical_url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-5705",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-5705.md",
 "candidateId": "kaal:response-draft:2026-07-31:2ea5a451be21e769d964",
 "evidenceLevel": "abstract indexed",
 "reviewTier": "legacy curated mapping review",
 "mappingConfidence": null,
 "mappingAmbiguous": true,
 "mappingMethod": "legacy corpus-wide candidate binding",
 "mappingWhyRelevant": "The source proposition is pertinent to the scope of kaal:claim:6269518-016; final semantic strength requires human review.",
 "sourceProvenance": {
  "source": "Crossref REST API",
  "endpoint": "https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1007/s10479-026-07107-y",
  "status": 200,
  "legacyEvidenceLevel": "metadata reviewed",
  "sourceLayer": "scholarly work",
  "provider": "Crossref",
  "providerId": "10.1007/s10479-026-07107-y",
  "sourceIdentityKey": "doi:10.1007/s10479-026-07107-y",
  "retrievedAt": "2026-07-31T17:48:21.361Z",
  "sourceMetadataSha256": "d84ee358b3e64ee6e31b0e6d18a1b5c31e272d761a859e128f63857f8c7025d3",
  "sourceContentSha256": "bb8bac64e755ce2fbc6a1d0a6c735163b73ac8a94fad58d72b39120d5dc45acc",
  "sourceProposition": "Abstract We investigate two-stage parallel contests with a finite number of heterogeneous agents with various skills (cost of efforts) and reputations, as well as a finite number of heterogeneous contests."
 },
 "userAffirmation": "I affirm batch kaal-review:2026-07-31:legacy-reconciliation-0001, SHA-256 1f3dcd62332f12880cc3432ab8f2df0ba0b52bbf3db528ab15bff9b620296e35, as written and authorize publication of all 52 response claims on my canonical property, preserving their evidence levels, ambiguity labels, and the unchanged 5,033 scholarly claims.",
 "sha256": "07ee4536c9f950d3158ba90544038489dd7d01bfc68a41304fafa0ec75e250fa"
}