{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "Claim",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-5710",
 "identifier": "kaal:position:2026-07-31-5710",
 "additionalType": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/schema.json#AffirmedPositionClaim",
 "name": "Legacy The Performance Of Hedge Fund Performance Fees 95424F1380",
 "text": "The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees should be assessed against Kaal's source-bound position that The new fee structure also results from fund managers foregoing market rate management fees, larger investors requiring reduced management fees as a condition of investing, and side-by-side co-investment vehicles charging less than 2% management fees. The external source's verified abstract presents this proposition: Abstract We argue that the effective price of investing in hedge funds far exceeds the headline fee rate of “2-and-20.” In a large 22-year sample of hedge funds, we find that 60% of the gains on which incentive fees are paid are eventually offset by losses. The defensible response is a qualification: the source is pertinent to the Kaal position, but agreement, extension, contradiction, and scope should not be strengthened beyond the retrieved evidence.",
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7840-1847"
 },
 "datePublished": "2026-07-31",
 "dateModified": "2026-07-31",
 "creativeWorkStatus": "Affirmed",
 "responseType": "qualification",
 "keywords": [
  "institutional-design",
  "historical-response",
  "scholarly-literature"
 ],
 "scope_conditions": [
  "The response remains limited to the source proposition and evidence retrieved in this reconciliation cycle.",
  "External evidence level: abstract indexed.",
  "Mapping review tier: legacy curated mapping review.",
  "Mapping confidence is intentionally unscored.",
  "The source-to-claim mapping remains explicitly ambiguous and is published with that limitation."
 ],
 "currentDebate": {
  "name": "The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees",
  "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfag015"
 },
 "extends": {
  "identifier": "kaal:claim:2959730-013",
  "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-013",
  "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
  "paper": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds",
  "authors": [
   "Wulf A. Kaal"
  ],
  "year": "2017",
  "ssrn": "https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
  "source_pdf_sha256": "ebd86972d8817b0c1c80326ae5564476983cedba3f258ff3b2610f156b93fb50"
 },
 "isBasedOn": [
  {
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-013"
  },
  {
   "@type": "CreativeWork",
   "name": "The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees",
   "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfag015"
  }
 ],
 "batch_id": "kaal-review:2026-07-31:legacy-reconciliation-0001",
 "review_provenance": "https://kaal-signal-desk.wulf577462.chatgpt.site/#frozen-batch-heading",
 "publicationStatus": "public",
 "recordTypeNote": "Dated commentary position extending a scholarly corpus claim. Not a verbatim claim extracted from the paper.",
 "isPartOf": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/index.json"
 },
 "version": "1.0",
 "canonical_url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-5710",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-5710.md",
 "candidateId": "kaal:response-draft:2026-07-31:34d0eda8f7e98e84fa41",
 "evidenceLevel": "abstract indexed",
 "reviewTier": "legacy curated mapping review",
 "mappingConfidence": null,
 "mappingAmbiguous": true,
 "mappingMethod": "legacy corpus-wide candidate binding",
 "mappingWhyRelevant": "The source proposition is pertinent to the scope of kaal:claim:2959730-013; final semantic strength requires human review.",
 "sourceProvenance": {
  "source": "Crossref REST API",
  "endpoint": "https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1093/rcfs/cfag015",
  "status": 200,
  "legacyEvidenceLevel": "metadata reviewed",
  "sourceLayer": "scholarly work",
  "provider": "Crossref",
  "providerId": "10.1093/rcfs/cfag015",
  "sourceIdentityKey": "doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfag015",
  "retrievedAt": "2026-07-31T17:48:21.611Z",
  "sourceMetadataSha256": "76f0114f5e7522fb77f003170d8a8dbb2d3f8466c8cca8d6d624829691039490",
  "sourceContentSha256": "6c74c39a15a7a053847fa69f95ae38734b0c14a7639dcae06e4d13a6c1e186e0",
  "sourceProposition": "Abstract We argue that the effective price of investing in hedge funds far exceeds the headline fee rate of “2-and-20.” In a large 22-year sample of hedge funds, we find that 60% of the gains on which incentive fees are paid are eventually offset by losses."
 },
 "userAffirmation": "I affirm batch kaal-review:2026-07-31:legacy-reconciliation-0001, SHA-256 1f3dcd62332f12880cc3432ab8f2df0ba0b52bbf3db528ab15bff9b620296e35, as written and authorize publication of all 52 response claims on my canonical property, preserving their evidence levels, ambiguity labels, and the unchanged 5,033 scholarly claims.",
 "sha256": "cc0ae7f37a929954c14063ebd6fcb0dd139d2449aaff18b1c5b5edc5e8e6c8cf"
}