kaal:position:2026-07-31-7359
When Agents Cannot Be Benchmarked: AI Capability Opacity, Corporate Governance, and a Research Agenda * presents the following source proposition: Classical agency theory cannot account for this pattern: every action was logged, and incentives were perfectly aligned by construction. This proposition is pertinent to Kaal's source-bound claim that In the theoretical model, the incentive design of decentralized reputation staking governance aligns the individual with the group so tightly that the agent cannot gain personally at the expense of the principal. The proposed response is an extension: the relationship should remain limited to the retrieved source proposition and the mapped Kaal claim unless fuller source review supports a broader conclusion.
ai-and-agentsrisk-and-incentivescorporate-governancedecentralizationgovernance-designdefihistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref