kaal:position:2026-07-31-7394
AI, Corporate Governance And Sustainability presents the following source proposition: In fact, this algorithm did not assume the legal role of a board member; rather it operated as an advisor of the board of directors aimed at protecting the firm from risky (as well as overpriced) investments. This proposition is pertinent to Kaal's source-bound claim that Because the Aufsichtsrat owes its duty of loyalty to the firm rather than to shareholders alone, and because non shareholder constituencies such as employees and creditors are more risk averse than diversified shareholders, German supervisory boards may take a more conservative attitude toward risk than U.S. shareholder oriented boards. The proposed response is an extension: the relationship should remain limited to the retrieved source proposition and the mapped Kaal claim unless fuller source review supports a broader conclusion.
corporate-governancegovernance-designrisk-and-incentiveshistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref