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 "@type": "Claim",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-7772",
 "identifier": "kaal:position:2026-07-31-7772",
 "additionalType": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/schema.json#AffirmedPositionClaim",
 "name": "Streaming Empirical Analysis Of Reputation Aware Task Delegation By Humans From A  62C44736Df",
 "text": "Empirical Analysis of Reputation-aware Task Delegation by Humans from a Multi-agent Game presents the following source proposition: What are the strategies people adopt when deciding how to delegated tasks to agents when the agents' reputation and productivity information is available? This proposition is pertinent to Kaal's source-bound claim that Honesty would be the wrong strategy for an agent if the contract were anonymous and its resolution did not affect future contracts, because that situation is a single-stage zero-sum game in which stealing all the entrusted wealth is optimal. The proposed response is an extension: the relationship should remain limited to the retrieved source proposition and the mapped Kaal claim unless fuller source review supports a broader conclusion.",
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7840-1847"
 },
 "datePublished": "2026-07-31",
 "dateModified": "2026-07-31",
 "creativeWorkStatus": "Affirmed",
 "responseType": "extension",
 "keywords": [
  "economics",
  "ai-and-agents",
  "corporate-governance",
  "reputation",
  "historical-response",
  "scholarly-literature",
  "crossref"
 ],
 "scope_conditions": [
  "The response is limited to the retrieved source proposition and mapped Kaal claim unless fuller source review supports a broader conclusion.",
  "External evidence level: abstract indexed.",
  "Mapping review tier: moderate-confidence claim review.",
  "Primary mapping confidence: 0.3703.",
  "The source-to-claim mapping remains explicitly ambiguous and is published with that limitation."
 ],
 "currentDebate": {
  "name": "Empirical Analysis of Reputation-aware Task Delegation by Humans from a Multi-agent Game",
  "url": "https://doi.org/10.65109/btct1894"
 },
 "extends": {
  "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-031",
  "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-031",
  "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193",
  "paper": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization",
  "authors": [
   "Wulf A. Kaal"
  ],
  "year": "2021",
  "ssrn": "https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193",
  "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2"
 },
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   "name": "Empirical Analysis of Reputation-aware Task Delegation by Humans from a Multi-agent Game",
   "url": "https://doi.org/10.65109/btct1894"
  }
 ],
 "batch_id": "kaal-review:2026-07-31:streaming-etl-0010",
 "review_provenance": "https://kaal-signal-desk.wulf577462.chatgpt.site/#review",
 "publicationStatus": "public",
 "recordTypeNote": "Dated commentary position extending a scholarly corpus claim. Not a verbatim claim extracted from the paper.",
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 "evidenceLevel": "abstract indexed",
 "reviewTier": "moderate-confidence claim review",
 "mappingConfidence": 0.3703,
 "mappingAmbiguous": true,
 "mappingMethod": "idf-weighted multi-field mapping v1",
 "mappingWhyRelevant": "Shared high-information concepts: reputation, agent, game, agents. Scope: anonymous contracting; no effect of the outcome on future business.",
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  "sourceRecordId": "10.65109/btct1894",
  "queryId": "concept:a2c487c0792c",
  "queryText": "autonomous agent accountability",
  "canonicalUrl": "https://doi.org/10.65109/btct1894",
  "doi": "10.65109/btct1894",
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   "Crossref": "10.65109/btct1894"
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  "workId": "work:doi:10.65109/btct1894",
  "workAuthors": [
   "Han Yu",
   "Han Lin",
   "Su Fang Lim",
   "Jun Lin",
   "Zhiqi Shen",
   "Chunyan Miao"
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  "workPublishedAt": "2015-05-04",
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  "sourceProposition": "What are the strategies people adopt when deciding how to delegated tasks to agents when the agents' reputation and productivity information is available?",
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    "method": "idf-weighted multi-field mapping v1",
    "whyRelevant": "Shared high-information concepts: reputation, agent, game, agents. Scope: anonymous contracting; no effect of the outcome on future business.",
    "ambiguous": true
   },
   {
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    "claimUrl": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6244278-025",
    "rank": 2,
    "confidence": 0.3703,
    "method": "idf-weighted multi-field mapping v1",
    "whyRelevant": "Shared high-information concepts: reputation, agent, game, agents. Scope: requires that competence and honesty be the sole criteria by which reputation is earned.",
    "ambiguous": true
   },
   {
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    "method": "idf-weighted multi-field mapping v1",
    "whyRelevant": "Shared high-information concepts: reputation, agent, agents, available. Scope: review source claim scope.",
    "ambiguous": true
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    "rank": 4,
    "confidence": 0.3477,
    "method": "idf-weighted multi-field mapping v1",
    "whyRelevant": "Shared high-information concepts: empirical, reputation, agents, information. Scope: historical trading networks with communication latency on the order of months; agents with complete control of assets.",
    "ambiguous": true
   },
   {
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    "claimUrl": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-021",
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    "confidence": 0.3456,
    "method": "idf-weighted multi-field mapping v1",
    "whyRelevant": "Shared high-information concepts: empirical, reputation, delegation. Scope: recent decades, drawing on Pew survey evidence.",
    "ambiguous": true
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 "userAffirmation": "affirm batch kaal-review:2026-07-31:streaming-etl-0010, SHA-256 702170a5716aed9e79302e88407930485844aeec8c140fe64a7bf7d5dd9603af, as written and authorize publication of all 250 response claims on my canonical property, preserving their evidence levels, ambiguity labels, provenance, and the unchanged 5,033 scholarly claims.",
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